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Hey guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to

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out at patreon.com/the Team House. Hello

0:55

everyone. Welcome to another episode of

0:58

Eyes On. Before we go introducing

1:00

ourselves, I'm Andy Millman, by the

1:02

way. But before we

1:05

go on to introduce my

1:07

other Orgast co-hosts, I want

1:10

to reveal today's guest,

1:12

Matt Brazile, who is

1:14

bottom line is if there

1:16

is anything to know about

1:18

China that Matt doesn't know,

1:20

I would be very surprised. How's

1:23

that for a for a mini

1:25

intro and his why. Okay, Matt

1:27

some, Matt's throughout his

1:30

career has been a senior analyst with

1:33

a focus on China right now. He's

1:35

with Blue Path Labs. He's

1:37

also a senior fellow at the Jamestown

1:40

Foundation. He did China

1:42

studies as an undergraduate way back in

1:44

UC Berkeley. Matt, that wasn't in the

1:46

60s though, was it? But

1:49

still, you know, not still not known

1:51

as necessarily as being a staunch pillar

1:53

of the establishment. So good on you.

1:56

But that's UC Berkeley,

1:58

not Matt. Matt Went on. To

2:00

be a solid pillar of the establishment

2:02

and army officer or intelligence. Also served

2:05

tours in Korea as well as we

2:07

thought the an essay. Arm.

2:10

And. That is it. Yes, so you

2:12

know in the wake of that

2:14

Jason Indeed. Please introduce yourself. Hey,

2:18

I'm ready. I'm Jason Lions. I am

2:20

a former Marine, stammers, Cia officer. Ah,

2:22

I'm now working with these Scally Ways

2:24

is that's the term overusing. Hey guys,

2:27

I'm the I'm the producer, the team

2:29

house and eyes on ads on the

2:31

guy puts it all together. Semi.

2:34

Puts it all together. Now. I'm just. Excited

2:37

about this conversation today. Match.

2:40

So. To to kick

2:42

this off. An answer for the. Sake!

2:45

Of our own, he has met

2:47

Feals. Feel free to contradict me

2:49

here, but you know, mess specialization.

2:51

It's an espionage counterespionage ah or

2:53

new. Rather he writes about that

2:55

met them. Please. Elaborate

2:58

on that and and Die and little bit

3:00

about your i didn't cover your written works

3:02

and you have an upcoming book I believe

3:04

to read. Every

3:06

choose. So I'm I'm

3:09

the Kloser Us Chinese

3:11

Communist espionage and intelligence

3:13

primer I caught. It

3:15

was Peter Maddest who

3:17

is a former Cia,

3:19

a Counter Intelligence analysts

3:21

and. Is now the President

3:23

of the Jamestown Sunday Son. And.

3:28

And so I'm still. There is a book coming

3:31

up. I'm trying

3:33

to finish it up Now I've I've read

3:35

some to Cede excerpts. By the way, And

3:38

and hopefully we'll get into those

3:41

know I'm as shit is literally

3:43

expert at in advance of the

3:45

the first one was was intended

3:47

for and for law enforcement and

3:49

intelligence professionals as a handbook as

3:51

a reference work I just next

3:53

one is intended to the general

3:55

public to try to explain and

3:57

and normal everyday terms what's going.

4:00

on with the

4:03

Chinese security apparatus.

4:05

Specifically how they go about

4:08

recruiting in the West. And

4:13

then I think you uncovered some

4:16

very key differences between what they do

4:18

and what we do. And I'd love

4:20

to hear your thoughts about effectiveness. Sure.

4:25

Would you like me to just launch right into

4:27

it? Launch right in. Yep. Streamer consciousness. What will

4:29

be tell? What will be say? Yeah,

4:33

so the acronym

4:35

MICE, Money Ideology Compromise Ego,

4:38

is often used to describe

4:41

how foreign intelligence services

4:43

go after people. And

4:46

in the Chinese case, the

4:48

documented cases that we can read on

4:51

the DOJ, the Department of Justice website.

4:53

And by the way, DOJ.gov

4:55

is like a great resource to

4:57

this kind of thing. Because

4:59

the Americans, to my knowledge, are

5:01

the only country that

5:04

publishes in detail

5:07

what happened in espionage

5:09

cases. And you read the

5:11

indictments. And there's

5:14

an awful lot of detail there for

5:16

the espionage nerd. Matt, I

5:18

got a quick question for you that

5:20

had us, even Jason stumped the

5:22

other day. So

5:26

the government, DOJ is very open in

5:28

some cases about, most cases,

5:30

about naming the country for which the

5:33

alleged spy was spying. But

5:35

in some cases, it doesn't. Now, what reasons

5:37

might there be for not outing

5:43

a foreign government? If

5:46

we are prosecuting someone for working for

5:48

them. Yeah, I think

5:50

it has to do, this is only speculation on my

5:52

part, but I think it has to do with

5:55

the content of the case.

5:58

In previous times. The

6:00

US was reticent

6:03

to name China in cases

6:06

like this because

6:09

they didn't want to upset bilateral relations.

6:11

There was a lot at stake, not

6:14

only on the commercial side, but

6:17

also before 1989 and a

6:21

little bit afterwards, there was a lot of intelligence

6:23

cooperation to spy

6:26

on the Soviet Union. After

6:31

the Nixon visit, the US began

6:33

providing intelligence to China about the

6:35

Soviet Union in a

6:37

trade relationship. Then

6:42

after 1979, when the

6:45

US and China established formal diplomatic

6:48

relations, the Chinese side agreed to

6:50

set up a SIGINT

6:53

and E-Lint station in the Xinjiang

6:55

Uyghur Autonomous Region to spy on

6:57

Soviet missile tests. That

7:00

kind of thing was considered, of course,

7:02

by the Americans to be of high

7:05

value. Nowadays, I think

7:07

it probably has to do with

7:10

the details of the case and how

7:12

people who are

7:15

in the press or more

7:17

importantly in foreign intelligence services

7:19

might be able to dig into

7:22

sources and methods on the US

7:25

side. Yeah,

7:27

understood. Sorry, go ahead

7:29

with this room of consciousness. Okay,

7:32

so you

7:35

asked earlier about how the Chinese

7:37

work in the United

7:39

States and in other countries. By the way, they

7:41

are all over the place. I

7:45

like to call it their worldwide

7:47

espionage and influence offensive nowadays,

7:51

which began to

7:53

really expand Under Xi

7:55

Jinping when he came to power in 2012.

8:00

As I was saying, we like to talk

8:02

about mice money, ideology, compromise you go. On.

8:06

On the Chinese side, they seem

8:08

to. according to the D J

8:10

indictments, they seem to put stress

8:13

on money. As the preferred

8:15

method which tracks with I'm Marxist

8:17

ideology I was very important on

8:20

their side because if there's one

8:22

thing that the ministers say security

8:24

is known for, it's just says

8:26

a haven of true believers in

8:29

marxism. Hum. So the idea that

8:31

capitalist nations are on the decline,

8:33

that terms that people are motivated

8:36

entirely by money which shown seems

8:38

to be kind of on the

8:40

market just just assist someone sold

8:42

out. That said, recently. Was

8:44

at forty two thousand dollars and then

8:47

previously was like and twelve thousand dollar

8:49

case. In the last few

8:51

weeks, Both Earth Navy guys? that's

8:53

almost irrelevant, that's you Know that.

8:55

But. He has no money.

8:58

small, small beer or is the actual

9:00

information lot of money that. To.

9:03

Betray your country? I mean, that's very

9:05

little money to betray your country, right?

9:07

I mean, Lung. Unbelievable. Yeah

9:09

and ended in one of the

9:11

cases These were these were to

9:13

Chinese Americans on both of which

9:15

I think it been born in

9:18

China and in one case the

9:20

mother of the sailor was encouraging

9:22

him to go ahead and remember.

9:25

Remember where he's from et cetera, et cetera. And

9:28

she was in the States while

9:30

doing this. Upon the smith, Yes,

9:33

yes yes This is something. I

9:35

have a say. It's first of

9:37

all that a very small percentage

9:39

I'm sure it's under one percent

9:41

of Chinese people would would really

9:43

be subject to that kind of

9:45

influence and pressure by just ethnic

9:48

Chinese people in United States as

9:50

very important for us to keep

9:52

se Chinese people on side. We

9:54

the. United States because

9:56

not only are they.

10:00

American citizens and sense for permanent

10:02

residents who just want to settle

10:04

down here, work in and be

10:06

ignored and be ignored by the

10:08

Chinese government. but splitter. Very valuable

10:10

resource As matter of fact I've

10:12

heard people I've I've lived in

10:15

China for eight years and during

10:17

that time I was It says

10:19

in this topic in that house

10:21

or for the years I was

10:23

I was completing my. Doctoral.

10:25

Dissertation on this topic stand or the

10:28

Chinese side. New at and they were

10:30

actually cooperating with means giving me seats,

10:32

eating me. Their side of the story

10:34

introduced me, introducing me to a revolutionary

10:37

hero. that sort of things. But

10:40

but. But. Even then,

10:43

On people were quietly chinese yeah

10:45

know all we really want do.

10:48

Is. Live our lives and try

10:50

to stay out of the cross

10:52

hairs of state security and public

10:55

security. Hum And this is one

10:57

of the strengths of seen as

10:59

the Americans have in China or

11:01

but that's course the other side

11:03

the coin. Bullets. Won a

11:06

d or with. Particularly. Interested

11:08

of course in some of the the weaknesses

11:10

that the. The.

11:13

Chinese. It's it's big in we

11:15

janeiro to use the term and as

11:17

has says right and the says but

11:19

it's be is it the Mss or

11:21

is it a subdivision than what what

11:23

sort of things you mentioned that gonna

11:25

bomb over the place. but it seems

11:27

as though once they hit pay dirt

11:30

on one particular methodology they'll take that

11:32

handler and he'll use it again. maybe

11:34

in a different country. Is sad that

11:36

on target I know I'm throwing couple

11:38

questions you at once since his yeah

11:40

if you don't mind talking about their

11:42

methodology really are. So. I'm.

11:46

In the book published year

11:48

and a half ago, Spies

11:51

and Lies That spies analyzed

11:53

by how it's just the

11:55

and stealing scholar homs see.

11:59

gave some really interesting cases

12:02

of state

12:05

security officers, some very senior,

12:08

engaged in influence operations.

12:11

That is trying to convince

12:15

politicians in Australia and

12:18

others to support Chinese

12:21

foreign policy objectives. And

12:24

there's a history behind that, going back

12:27

to the revolution of intelligence

12:29

officers engaged in influence operations

12:31

sort of on the side.

12:36

There are some scholars who

12:38

criticize what Jawski wrote,

12:40

saying that he's conflating the

12:42

two, espionage and influence. But

12:45

I think the jury is out on that

12:48

particular question. So that's one methodology

12:50

of interest where we

12:53

have intelligence officers

12:55

or agents engaged in

12:57

influence operations. And

13:00

a recent example here in the San Francisco Bay Area

13:06

is a woman named Fang Fang,

13:08

that is Christine Fang, F-A-N-G,

13:12

who was being run by

13:15

a state security officer out of

13:17

the Chinese consulate in

13:19

San Francisco. She was a

13:22

student at Cal State East

13:24

Bay in Hayward, and

13:27

she was engaged in

13:29

influence operations, including some

13:35

honey operations where she had

13:39

relationships with some American

13:41

politicians, which

13:44

is outlined in

13:47

a recent book

13:50

by somebody whose name all of a

13:52

sudden – Bethany Allen, Abrahamian. Her

13:56

recent book outlines that in detail. She

13:58

has probably published the best. account,

14:02

Bethany Allen, Abrahamian, of

14:05

Fang Fang's operations.

14:08

That was the name, Fang Fang.

14:10

Okay. That is likely to be

14:12

a movie. No, I was just

14:15

wondering, because Jack and Jason always

14:17

tell us this rather lame story

14:19

of Honeypot, who they

14:22

suspect who worked for a Chinese foreign

14:24

service place and pursued them

14:27

relentlessly. But my point is, it's

14:29

kind of this urban

14:31

myth almost, isn't it? A lot of

14:34

people think they're being pursued, but it

14:36

is something that the Chinese, it's among

14:38

their many methods

14:40

of getting people, of coercing

14:43

people into giving up information, right?

14:46

It is. And Christine

14:48

Fang's modus operandi, not

14:50

to get

14:52

stuck on her, but her modus operandi

14:54

was to get

14:56

to know and be

14:58

friendly with not only for sexual

15:02

entrapment, but with politicians

15:04

whom she judged were

15:06

up and coming, or maybe the

15:08

San Francisco Consulate judge were up

15:11

and coming, people who

15:13

were on local board

15:18

of supervisors, et cetera. But

15:23

the money aspect

15:27

has certainly been very prominent

15:29

in these different cases,

15:32

and it probably makes up a very

15:34

large percentage of how

15:37

these cases are pursued. So

15:40

Matt, let me ask, stepping

15:42

back a little bit, and

15:45

to kind of dispel the boogeyman concept

15:49

is, I'm going to

15:51

venture to guess that the answer is

15:54

no, but is the average person who

15:57

Gets on a plane in Beijing, flies to the

15:59

US, You know they're moving here.

16:01

not just businesses in our lives

16:03

here are they approached beforehand? Normally

16:05

in sold Hey we're going to

16:07

be knocking on your door to

16:10

do some You now some work

16:12

for us or is it someone

16:14

who has specific access to say.

16:16

At. Judge or politicians So what

16:18

I met a basically we're brother.

16:20

What I'm asking is is every

16:23

Chinese that comes to this country.

16:25

Ah, Told. That

16:28

they're expected to do this or is

16:30

it just have a few. I.

16:33

Suspect it's just a few,

16:35

but that's just my hypothesis.

16:37

There's a lot of controversy

16:39

over this and their cases

16:41

that have been documented. Were

16:45

a local state security

16:47

bureau will learn that

16:49

because that young people

16:51

have to apply for

16:53

passports to the Ministry

16:55

of Public Security that's

16:57

the National Police and

16:59

Mps and Mps Mss

17:01

trade information. They

17:03

have databases that say. That.

17:06

They share that they can both meets

17:09

away. I take

17:11

a look at and so

17:13

when somebody is leaving. China

17:16

to go to the United States

17:18

and the going to studied physics

17:20

at at M I T then

17:23

there's a high risk to say

17:25

will be approached him fast not

17:27

to get in contact with as

17:29

a security officer in Chicago or

17:32

anything like that necessarily But when

17:34

you come home for Chinese New

17:36

Year. You're.

17:38

Expected to come see us and tell us what's

17:41

going on. the contacts

17:43

you making and and such but

17:45

i think come again this controversial

17:47

my friend or nicholas as to

17:49

me ah does for example who

17:52

studies this stuff science or he's

17:54

he's put together a compendium of

17:56

cases it is now it's about

17:58

nine hundred where

18:01

he is analyzing how

18:04

they were done, and he's written

18:06

a book which I think is

18:08

called Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics,

18:12

which you can find on Amazon. So

18:14

in his opinion, nearly a very

18:17

large percentage of people are approached.

18:21

In my opinion, the

18:24

Chinese Communist Party has always considered

18:26

their society to be full of

18:28

enemies, and

18:32

I think this probably causes

18:34

them to be more careful about

18:36

whom they approach. But

18:48

they do operate – I

18:51

think one indication that they're selective

18:54

is the case that came

18:57

out three or four years ago now of

19:00

Xu Yanjun, the state

19:02

security officer who was arrested

19:05

in Belgium after being lured into a trap

19:07

by the FBI and the Belgian authorities, and

19:09

he was extradited to the United States, put

19:11

on trial, and convicted and sentenced

19:13

to 20 years in prison, a

19:16

very interesting case. But one of the people who

19:18

was in his network was

19:22

a young man named Ji Ciao-Chun, and

19:25

Ji Ciao-Chun had

19:28

immigrated to the United States.

19:30

Ostensibly, he was a graduate

19:33

student in Chicago, and he

19:35

had joined the U.S. Army

19:39

under a program that the U.S. Army

19:41

has to bring in people with hard

19:43

languages, even

19:46

if they're not citizens. And so

19:49

he raised his right hand and swore to defend the Constitution

19:51

of the United States and all that jazz, just like the

19:53

rest of us, but he

19:56

Was an agent in the network of Xu

19:58

Yanjun, and his – Job.

20:00

Was to spot Chinese people

20:03

in the Chicago area who

20:05

were graduate students and who

20:07

were engaged in high stem

20:10

science and technology, engineering or

20:12

occupations that might be of

20:14

interest to Chinese military developments

20:17

so that would indicate that.

20:19

Certainly they don't after everybody

20:21

as they please and probably

20:24

means selective but again you

20:26

I think. That's.

20:31

My. Idea. Even Next ideas about says

20:33

star or at the level of hypothesis

20:36

were not. It's a scary level quite

20:38

yet. And the still. it makes sense

20:40

though, isn't it? I mean they to.

20:43

Why would they ignore this incredible potential

20:45

asset? And when you look at the

20:47

way they think about everything else is

20:49

you know from our from integrating a

20:52

marketed Khomeini you with the Chinese Communist

20:54

Party to how they controlled coded. It's.

20:57

Some kind of done in a very. And

20:59

the same way isn't it with his

21:01

family or mirror image to you know they

21:04

they cigarettes. Hey look at what we're

21:06

doing you know we're going after week

21:08

for using everybody we possibly can. We're going

21:10

after all these different people were and

21:12

so on. The Cia must be Do

21:14

ever see I is Dana and this

21:16

is why they're going around their anti spy

21:18

campaigns and warning children to watch out

21:20

what their parents are doing and stuff

21:22

like that crazy. Say if only we were

21:25

Yeah, if only we were that efficient.

21:27

A Guys it's Jack I just wanted

21:29

to talk you today about a way

21:31

that you can help support the podcast

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if you're not already be Would really

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as reviews really help people find the

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I you know if you've been enjoying

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A noticing that you can do to

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support the channel is to become a

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month and. when you sign up you get

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That's the big bonus for that. I

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this is the biggest and best way

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like to, and we really appreciate

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that. So go in and check us

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out at patreon.com/the Team House. So

22:23

I'm intrigued too about, because

22:25

you talk about the recruitment of

22:27

their own people going

22:30

overseas, and you mentioned, and

22:32

this is

22:34

being a topic that's recurring in

22:37

the last

22:40

two years, but recruiting ethnic

22:42

Chinese of dual national

22:45

or who have joined the

22:47

military. I'm not dual national, no, they

22:49

would, but who are, yeah,

22:51

in some cases dual national, in

22:53

some cases first generation immigrants, in

22:55

some cases pending citizenship, but they

22:58

also of course target people with

23:00

no such connections. And you,

23:02

you know, you mentioned that with a different

23:04

kind of different approach. I

23:07

thought it was very

23:10

interesting. When we think

23:12

of approaches, we think of kind of

23:14

a more affertive bump, you

23:16

know, perhaps not in a dark alley, but

23:18

in a bar or this and that. But

23:21

I was just looking at what it was

23:23

like Kevin Mallory, I was just, you know,

23:26

when I was doing some background reading on

23:28

for this Kevin Mallory

23:30

is a CIA, you know,

23:32

agency guy, Chinese turned him.

23:35

And they made him, he was he

23:37

was contacted on LinkedIn. The

23:40

guy, the guy who contacted him was

23:42

very obvious from his profile that he

23:44

was, you know, he was had

23:47

something to do with background in Chinese

23:49

intelligence. That's,

23:51

you know, at least what the FBI reported.

23:53

That's how the initial bump took place, you

23:55

know, and then they hooked

23:57

him with the $25,000. payment

24:01

in Shanghai and he was you

24:03

know he was done. Yeah

24:06

you know I would like to point

24:08

out to everybody that LinkedIn when you

24:10

when you get in an

24:13

in mail from somebody if

24:15

you look for those three

24:18

dots on the top right hand of the

24:20

of the mail you

24:22

click on it you have

24:24

an option to report and block

24:27

somebody and that should always be done

24:29

when you get these in and I

24:31

get them every day. I

24:33

bet you do. Yeah sure. Well

24:35

it's really kind of goofy the

24:37

way they're doing it and and

24:40

I hope they continue to be goofy about

24:43

you know coming up with these pictures

24:45

that show a woman

24:48

from her nose down you

24:50

know in the photograph. Your

24:57

profile is so interesting I would like

24:59

to know you. I have the background

25:01

in Bitcoin. Yeah it's just ridiculous and

25:04

I hope they stick to that approach

25:06

because it's so obvious and ridiculous but

25:11

but they won't you know they if

25:13

there's one thing that that I

25:15

think they do it's learned from experience

25:20

and and these approaches

25:22

will probably improve over time

25:24

and more sophisticated artificial

25:26

intelligence will change everything quite

25:29

certainly and just give it

25:31

a few months a few years. Do you

25:34

have any question? Sorry?

25:37

Yeah I was asking D if he

25:39

had anything. Nothing specific I mean more

25:42

at a broader point like what's

25:44

the MSS's

25:46

goal? Is it IP mostly? Is

25:49

it how the US

25:51

goes about it like protecting our interests across

25:53

the globe and stuff like that? Like what's

25:55

their main aim I

25:58

guess? Yeah,

26:00

they used to go after a

26:03

lot of different things. In

26:06

2017, 2018, there was a reorganization.

26:12

And without getting too political sciencey about

26:14

it, it seems

26:16

to have been an effort to get

26:19

MSS and the

26:21

military to define their

26:23

turf and go after what they're

26:25

supposed to go after. That

26:29

may or may not be working well, it's kind

26:31

of hard to say. But

26:34

now we have four

26:36

different bodies doing this kind of work.

26:40

We have state security, which is

26:43

going after, it seems, both

26:46

military and civilian

26:48

technology, and of

26:50

course political intelligence

26:55

and possibly – probably not economic intelligence, because that's all

26:57

there. And

26:59

then you

27:03

have the Joint Intelligence Bureau,

27:06

which used to be known as the second department

27:08

of the PLA, and the

27:10

Joint Intelligence Bureau of the People's

27:13

Liberation Army goes after

27:16

military technology. And

27:18

they're – or at least

27:20

in theory they do. Their actual

27:24

activities are a little bit unclear so

27:26

far. And

27:28

then you have the PLA

27:31

Strategic Support Force, which is like

27:33

their NSA. So

27:35

they do signal intelligence. They also

27:37

do web-based hacking and other type

27:40

of intelligence, too. But

27:43

the state security –

27:46

administrative state security and the

27:48

Ministry of Public Security, according

27:50

to recent revelations out

27:54

of a hacking contractor from

27:56

Shanghai called ISUN, They're

28:00

doing hacking too overseas and

28:03

they're going after dissidents,

28:07

political enemies overseas and

28:09

they're going after political secrets

28:13

in countries all over the

28:15

world, the usual sort of regular spy

28:17

stuff, but they're

28:19

employing these hacking

28:21

firms at

28:23

the State Security

28:26

Bureau level in the provinces to

28:29

go after these secrets. And

28:31

sometimes because in the Xinjiang Uyghur

28:34

Autonomous Region, for example, they're

28:36

worried about dissidents

28:38

overseas who are

28:40

either training to be terrorists in their

28:42

minds or who

28:45

are talking too much about what's going on in Xinjiang.

28:47

And so they pressure relatives

28:49

and then they find out names of

28:51

people and then they go after them

28:53

using hacking. And

28:56

then there's the United Front Work Department, which is a

28:59

department of the party, a major

29:01

department of the Chinese Communist Party

29:04

and they're the influence handlers.

29:08

Yeah, it's interesting, isn't it? So

29:10

the Russian, in a sense, that

29:12

the Russian cyber activity

29:14

both cyber in the sense of OCO,

29:18

offensive cyber operations turning ones

29:20

to zeros, that's my right

29:23

description of this, but

29:25

also disinformation using cyber

29:27

as a domain. And the Russians

29:30

get a lot of publicity about this, but I'm

29:32

intrigued when you talk about the Chinese because

29:35

when we talk about Chinese

29:37

espionage, and this is anecdotal,

29:40

I'm told by friends in the FBI

29:42

that 90% of the

29:44

cases they're handling are Chinese and that

29:46

they are way more, they

29:48

regard China as a threat exponentially

29:51

more dangerous than Russia or Iran.

29:54

And yet again, we just keep hearing about

29:56

Russia on the side of peace. Do you

29:58

think we should also be... equally,

30:00

this sounds kind of a dumb question, but more

30:03

worried about China? They're

30:05

only dumb answers, and I'm

30:08

good at them. But

30:13

yeah, I would agree with what your

30:16

friends at the Bureau are saying, if

30:20

only because of the

30:22

developing sophistication and

30:25

the quantity the

30:29

sheer quantity of operations

30:32

that are going on.

30:35

And the way they're doing it is

30:38

through these hacking

30:40

contractors like Isun, a Shanghai-based company

30:42

that's been around for about 10

30:45

years, that has

30:47

offices in four other

30:50

Chinese cities. And

30:53

the data dump that was put on

30:55

GitHub of

31:00

their stuff probably by an insider of

31:02

some sort, or who

31:05

is being run by a competitor, it

31:07

seems, indicates

31:10

that they

31:13

were going all over the place.

31:16

They were running hacking

31:18

jobs in India, Malaysia,

31:22

Japan, Korea,

31:25

Indonesia, the UK,

31:29

and other places that are not immediately coming to

31:31

mind. And

31:34

it also indicates that they weren't

31:36

being paid all that much, that

31:40

typical, unfortunately, to a Chinese

31:42

company that the management was

31:45

making all the money, and

31:48

the worker bees were not

31:52

making very much money, and were miserable and being

31:54

overworked. Now,

31:56

I... This is a counterintelligence opportunity.

32:00

One would think we, um yes but

32:02

one of the one of the. Axioms

32:05

have this problem. Is

32:08

that? Is running as

32:10

me eyes and China has always

32:12

been difficult since are going back

32:14

to the revolution was hard for

32:16

the nationalist to run has been

32:18

ice in the the red areas

32:21

because they were so locked down.

32:24

And indeed, and my lips

32:26

language. Same language. same code

32:28

from the Phillies, even same

32:30

language to god Home Font

32:32

Chinese Yeah. Yeah,

32:35

so it's it's said that the

32:38

counterespionage, Sam's, a. Counterintelligence.

32:41

Ah, Ah environment.

32:43

there is. Is

32:46

the hardest of targets. And

32:49

so. Finding. Somebody to

32:52

want to approach. Has

32:55

saw. It seems like it's a lot

32:57

of is being done over the web

32:59

just like they're doing lot of stuff

33:02

and web against us or the the

33:04

the as counterpoints seems to be going

33:06

on as well. Breathing.

33:09

Apparatus Sorry. go ahead, it's not

33:11

as sorry I've given the the

33:13

It seems that the Chinese Intelligence

33:16

focuses on as you said, Are

33:20

taxed? You know I t those

33:22

sorts of things meet probably political

33:24

as well and and seen, Publicly.

33:27

At least that it seems

33:29

like Iran is not above

33:31

renderings someone who they consider

33:33

a threat. Ah, assassinations does

33:35

seem it's a the Russians

33:38

as well. I don't see.

33:40

I personally don't seem to

33:42

see that in the Chinese.

33:44

Is am I wrong in

33:46

that? Are they above? You

33:48

know. I

33:50

and doesn't fascinating someone or rendering

33:52

someone that they see as eight

33:54

an issue. I.

33:57

have no i've asked that question of

34:00

assassinations to a

34:02

number of my contacts and so far

34:04

I'm not getting any positive responses. So

34:07

it does not seem that way and that's

34:10

related to another problem that I'll get into

34:12

after finishing answering

34:15

your point. But when

34:17

it comes to renditions, in

34:20

the countries along China's

34:22

periphery, the land border

34:25

countries, specifically Laos and

34:28

Thailand, there

34:30

have been kidnappings of

34:34

dissidents taken

34:36

back to China to face trial. And

34:40

this also includes people

34:42

who, in Hong Kong

34:44

before the recent crackdown, made

34:47

Hong Kong basically totally

34:49

a mainland city now almost anyway,

34:52

much more of a mainland city than it used

34:54

to be of

34:56

people being just abducted and

34:59

taken back to China. And they do this,

35:02

it seems, when it's operationally

35:07

convenient to get

35:09

somebody across the land border and back

35:12

into China. So that's why Laos, Thailand,

35:16

Hong Kong, Macau, going

35:19

back decades Macau. It

35:22

used to be, by the way, before 1997, and

35:25

the 1999 handover of Hong

35:27

Kong and Macau, respectively, that

35:30

people with security clearances could travel,

35:33

Americans could travel to Hong Kong,

35:35

no problem, but not to Macau.

35:38

Wow. Yeah. Yeah.

35:46

So in countries that are more

35:48

far afield, the United

35:50

States and in Europe and

35:54

other places, the

35:56

emphasis seems to be there

35:59

are people. who come over here

36:01

from state security and try to

36:03

convince somebody to go

36:06

back to China to face trial because if

36:08

you don't, we've got your family. And

36:12

indeed, public

36:15

security people have actually told

36:18

me that

36:20

somebody, a Chinese person living overseas is

36:22

like a kite. We

36:25

have the string here on the ground. They can fly

36:27

around all they want, but we have the string, and

36:29

that string is their family. Wow. Thank

36:32

you. Appreciate that. That's a powerful

36:35

analogy. Yeah,

36:37

definitely is. But

36:40

this sort of thing goes back. You know, it's got

36:43

a long history. Having

36:46

the revolution the same sort of ideas

36:50

were in play, where

36:54

espionage and influence

36:59

operations were commingled at times,

37:03

where families were used as

37:06

pressure, where

37:08

money was

37:10

used to recruit

37:12

people to work for the

37:15

revolution. But also during that time, it

37:17

was a very different time. Ideology

37:20

was and appeals to patriotism

37:24

and appeals to fight against Japan

37:27

during that long period of Japanese

37:30

occupation and the exploitation of

37:32

China and foreign

37:34

exploitation of China were

37:38

used to appeal to people to spy

37:40

for the communist cause. And they were

37:43

extremely successful

37:46

during that time. And

37:51

the efforts of Chinese communist

37:53

intelligence during the revolution were very key to

37:55

the victory. And

37:57

so from that, they learned. and

38:01

lessons from before that,

38:04

that espionage was

38:06

a core business of the party. During

38:09

those times, intelligence

38:12

operations had a seat at

38:14

the table at this party

38:16

central committee that was at

38:19

the same table, if not equal, to

38:21

the propaganda and military and organization

38:24

departments, which are the

38:26

three key departments of

38:29

the party. Now

38:32

the nomenclature is a little bit different because

38:34

it's all been moved over to the government

38:36

side rather than on the party side. It's

38:40

still important, but

38:45

interestingly, the party doesn't like

38:47

to admit that they do foreign

38:49

intelligence operations at all. They

38:53

will talk about doing

38:56

stuff in Taiwan, certainly, and Taiwan

38:58

is, along with the United States,

39:00

those two are the main enemies

39:03

where most of the attention, I

39:06

have to say, is focused and

39:08

historically has been focused on both

39:10

Taiwan and the US. But

39:13

they don't do spy trades at all, in spite

39:15

of the fact that the US has at least

39:19

one of their officers in a

39:22

federal penitentiary. Only

39:26

one right now. It used to be two.

39:28

There used to be Chi Mok. Was they

39:31

smart enough to use diplomats as case

39:33

handlers or just smart

39:35

not to get caught? Yeah,

39:38

that's true. Well, you know, the ones

39:40

that were caught, the really prominent

39:43

ones were Larry Wu Tai Jin from

39:45

1984-85, who was a long-term

39:47

non-official officer,

40:00

he was actually an officer of

40:03

Chinese intelligence, and he was not

40:05

a traitor. He was infiltrated into

40:08

the US by

40:11

the Chinese services, and

40:14

so the US

40:16

begrudgingly acknowledges that, you know,

40:18

when he talked to people about

40:21

that case. But

40:23

they let him, they did not acknowledge him, they

40:26

did not try to trade him, they let him

40:28

kill himself in jail after

40:30

he was sentenced, or

40:32

before he was sentenced after he was convicted. And

40:35

then there's Chi Mok, who was

40:38

also a military intelligence officer,

40:41

who went

40:43

first to Hong Kong and then emigrated to

40:45

the United States and set

40:48

up himself as

40:50

an employee of a

40:53

Navy systems contractor called

40:55

Power Paragon, and

40:58

he was engaged in sending export

41:00

controlled technology relevant

41:03

to naval

41:05

operations, including

41:07

quiet propulsion systems

41:09

to to

41:12

China for 20 years until

41:15

he was caught, and I think it was 2006 or 2005. There

41:21

was a really good article in The

41:23

New Yorker that came out about

41:25

a year and a half ago

41:27

that outlined that case in retrospect,

41:31

but they let Chi Mok

41:34

rot in prison and die there at the age of

41:36

82 or 83. In October of 2022, he passed away

41:39

at Lompoc

41:43

Federal Penitentiary. So

41:46

it's really, it's

41:48

a very odd sort of

41:50

thing. Yeah, one way, one

41:52

way. It's

41:55

one way loyalty, right? Loyalty to the party,

41:59

to buy in you get the party is not

42:01

going to help you out. You're on your own. If

42:03

you were caught, the secretary will not

42:05

– will disavow knowledge of your actions.

42:07

Just a black chair. Madam,

42:11

as we – you know, so

42:14

just rounding up, oh, guys, before I do anything

42:17

more for Matt, I had a

42:19

question that's – No, you

42:21

answered – I was actually going to ask

42:23

you about Taiwan, but I guess a branch

42:25

off of that would be given the tensions

42:28

between the two, so

42:32

would anyone – I'm assuming that there

42:34

are already some of these intelligence working

42:37

on the – you know, on Taiwan, but

42:40

given the tensions, are those

42:43

coming into Taiwan from the

42:45

mainland automatically suspect? And

42:48

does the – Taiwan have

42:50

the intelligence apparatus, the

42:52

numbers to be able to keep up with that? It's

42:57

a tough problem. So

43:01

there – when I was

43:03

in Taiwan last April doing reporting

43:05

for this upcoming book,

43:11

you know, usually as a former commercial

43:13

officer, I'm

43:15

able to approach a U.S. diplomatic post

43:17

and talk to the

43:20

RSO, the regional security office, and

43:23

certainly talk to the commercial section and ask

43:25

them questions about the local scene and all

43:28

that, but not in Taiwan.

43:30

They did not want to speak to me, and

43:32

I understand why. I understand why. The

43:38

relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan right

43:40

now and the military assistance, which is

43:42

very well documented, by the way, if

43:44

you've ever heard of a guy named

43:47

Wendell Minnick, M-I-N-N-I-C-K,

43:51

you can find him on the web. Wendell

43:53

– I like

43:57

to call him. I tell him, Wendell, you're the

43:59

perfect person. of doom. I'm

44:01

gonna look him up. Yeah

44:03

you should definitely look him

44:06

up. He just published a

44:09

really interesting summary of how

44:11

China has locked down the

44:13

South China Sea with E-Lint

44:16

and other capabilities. Very

44:20

detailed and very interesting but when

44:24

I was in Taiwan, I, IIT wouldn't

44:27

touch me even though I'm personal

44:29

friends with one of their former senior officers

44:31

who tried to get me in to talk

44:33

with them. But former

44:36

and current Taiwan intelligence and

44:38

military officials did talk to

44:40

me and

44:42

their outlook was not

44:44

rosy. They talked

44:47

about how there are mainland organizations

44:49

set up in Taiwan. For

44:52

example to introduce Taiwan

44:54

men to mainland women. There

44:57

are organizations that are Buddhist

45:00

based organizations that go back and

45:03

forth between the two parts

45:05

of greater China there.

45:10

And, and also

45:12

one of the things that was said to me

45:14

by more than one person is

45:16

that they're not dumb enough to use electronic

45:19

means of communication to do their reporting

45:21

back to Beijing. They

45:24

use couriers and

45:26

and that's really interesting because

45:29

it underlines the uneven nature

45:32

of state security operations where

45:35

you have some really

45:37

sophisticated officers who

45:39

are language capable and know

45:41

what they're doing and follow

45:43

careful tradecraft and you have

45:45

others like Sri Anjun, the

45:49

the State Security Bureau officer who

45:51

was arrested in Belgium who

45:54

brought his cell phone with him that was full

45:56

of all this information and the

45:58

FBI got a hold of it and that's why we know

46:00

all about him because of what

46:02

was in his cell phone. He

46:04

was carrying. Like this is like

46:06

we tell him. Don't take your cell phone for

46:09

God's sake. Don't take your laptop. It's going to

46:11

be compromised as soon as you check into your

46:13

hotel or as soon as you get off the

46:15

plane. But he did

46:18

that. So very uneven. But in

46:20

Taiwan, they seem to have a

46:22

tighter operation where they don't

46:25

do dumb things and they use better

46:27

trained people. That's just a hypothesis. That's

46:29

good. Thank you. So

46:32

Matt, kind of a concluding question.

46:34

And it's

46:37

quite a broad one. And basically it comes to this.

46:39

All of these efforts are

46:42

cases of China making sense of the

46:45

world for its own game. And

46:47

yet, and we talked a

46:49

little bit about Li Ming

46:51

and Fu Fu, the appearances

46:53

on the rather amateur approaches

46:55

that we see on LinkedIn.

47:00

But this all brings to mind, I

47:02

think a concern. I'd be interested to

47:04

hear what your thoughts are. So we

47:06

have on one hand now with the

47:08

internet combined with AI, the potential for

47:11

Chinese type approaches to be

47:13

successful, just to just increase

47:15

exponentially. Right. I mean, especially

47:17

with integration of AI, you

47:19

can see potential for coercion

47:23

for blackmail. On the

47:25

other hand, as

47:27

we see Xi's

47:30

party or his

47:32

administration become increasingly isolated. Right. I

47:34

mean, so they're making all these

47:36

efforts to learn about the world,

47:38

but culturally arguably they're learning, they're

47:42

understanding less and less. And

47:44

you're going to get a new generation, kind of the

47:47

wolf generation, right, of

47:51

spies who've grown up in

47:54

this very kind of muscular vision

47:58

of China, aggressive China. but

48:02

not necessarily one, but

48:05

arguably one that understands the

48:07

Western world less. So you

48:09

see this divergence and

48:12

on issues like Taiwan that

48:15

kind of lack of understanding but

48:17

that aggressive desire to get ahead

48:19

and learn more is

48:22

concerning. I'm not asking for

48:24

a solution. I'm just saying that to

48:26

me is a

48:28

real problem here. It's not that China

48:31

or the United States are

48:33

going to be irrational enough to go to

48:35

war. It's as that understanding

48:40

diverges more and more

48:42

and as China gets

48:45

increasingly kind of xenophobic,

48:47

aggressive, cracks in the

48:50

facade, this kind of increasing existential

48:52

fear of enemies, the

48:55

potential for a misnap that

48:57

causes escalation grows. I

49:01

think one of the main problems is

49:04

that Xi Jinping, according to people

49:07

who know more about Chinese politics, elite politics

49:09

than I do, seems

49:13

to be people

49:15

like David Shambaugh, for example, the

49:18

scholar from George Washington University who's now out

49:21

here at Hoover, and

49:24

others seem

49:26

to have concluded, and they have a

49:29

lot of contact with people on the Chinese side, seem

49:32

to have concluded that Xi Jinping

49:34

has surrounded himself with yes

49:36

men and

49:39

that his view of the

49:41

United States is one of

49:45

disrespect and hubris.

49:50

So that's certainly a problem. Although

49:53

it doesn't seem

49:55

like he is about to

49:57

just go to war with the US

50:00

Taiwan in the near

50:02

future, there are too

50:04

many disadvantages

50:07

there, too many problems

50:09

that could result. It

50:13

seems like we're kind of

50:15

in a space in between

50:17

the two possibilities

50:20

when it comes to that. I

50:23

think that China no longer feels that

50:25

time is on their side, nor

50:29

do they really feel overly

50:31

threatened by the current situation to the point,

50:34

like in 1989 when they felt that

50:37

the party was in danger, they

50:41

decided against

50:44

the instincts of everybody in the West who

50:46

thought that China would never

50:48

shoot itself in the foot by

50:52

cracking down. To

50:58

many people in the West, the crackdown on June

51:00

4th, 1989 was a big surprise. It

51:04

wasn't much of a surprise to people who

51:08

knew that the party was always interested in

51:10

maintaining its power and was always felt threatened,

51:12

and still today feels threatened by

51:16

even the slightest organizing against

51:19

it. So

51:22

we're in between those two poles

51:24

where China feels threatened enough to

51:26

do something drastic or feels that

51:29

time is on its side, and

51:31

that's the dangerous part of that.

51:37

So remind me if I'm answering a

51:39

question. You

51:43

are, and I realize my question

51:47

kind of answers itself as we talk

51:49

through this. Yes, absolutely. There's

51:51

reason to concern. I said that

51:54

was my last question, but you brought

51:56

up a Blythe-Yutinaman Square. My

52:01

brother-in-law was actually arrested there. He

52:03

was a correspondent. In

52:06

any case, total

52:09

divergence. How

52:13

many people were killed in

52:15

Tinnemann Square? Because I know

52:17

there's true

52:19

numbers of – well, we in the West

52:21

probably don't know the real numbers. And I

52:23

only asked that question not at a prurient

52:25

interest, but it

52:28

was indeed. I mean, it was – yes,

52:30

it wasn't the Cultural Revolution, but it

52:32

was a tectonic event

52:36

in Chinese society. Yes,

52:39

it was. Were

52:42

the state proved to everybody who was

52:44

paying any attention that if

52:46

you oppose us, you're dead meat? Yeah,

52:50

you know, in the aftermath,

52:55

the embassy sent people around.

52:57

I heard

52:59

these stories because I arrived in 1991 as

53:02

a commercial officer. So I heard these stories

53:04

about how embassy officers went around the hospitals

53:06

looking for dead Americans, but while they were

53:08

doing that, they were also counting the dead.

53:12

And the official number that

53:15

the U.S. came up with was relatively low,

53:17

as I recall. I don't recall the number.

53:21

The number that I actually trust was

53:26

in a book by

53:29

my friend Jan Wong,

53:31

W-O-N-G-J-A-N, who

53:33

was the Toronto Globe and Mail correspondent

53:36

in Beijing at that time and

53:39

who I met when I moved there. And

53:43

she cited the Chinese Red Cross

53:45

figure that was initially issued

53:47

of 3,000 dead, which

53:50

they later retracted, and

53:54

her reporting indicated that that

53:57

was the most reliable number. Yeah,

54:01

phenomenal amount when you think a

54:03

relatively short period of time

54:06

that the actual shooting took

54:08

place, but it gives you some

54:12

indication that... Well, civilians came out onto

54:14

the streets because they were mortified

54:17

and outraged at what was going on,

54:19

and they were mowed down with automatic

54:21

weapons. A very

54:25

difficult situation. Same

54:27

understatement. Just

54:30

to close out quickly, like, how does

54:32

the U.S. respond? What do we do

54:34

to counter what China is trying

54:36

to do to us? Great

54:39

question. Well, we have a

54:41

problem, a very

54:44

– there's a real imbalance between

54:47

China and the U.S. when it comes to one

54:50

understanding the other. In

54:53

China, English

54:56

is available and often

54:58

required as

55:00

a subject beginning in the fourth

55:02

grade, primary four. In

55:06

the United States, people typically begin

55:08

studying Chinese if they're interested in that topic

55:10

at the age of 18. I

55:14

got to jump on that at the age of 17, but

55:19

it was too late, in my

55:22

opinion, to begin learning the

55:24

language, which I've struggled

55:26

with for decades, and I can use,

55:29

but I'm only of

55:31

average competence when it comes to learning languages.

55:35

I think what we need to do,

55:37

not only language but also area studies,

55:39

we need to redouble our efforts there.

55:44

It's possible nowadays to get

55:47

a scholarship to study the Chinese

55:49

language and major

55:52

in East Asian studies or

55:54

Russian studies, et cetera, but

55:58

the amount of money that's pledged to the Chinese language, to

56:00

that effort should probably be

56:02

increased. We

56:06

should probably have more programs at

56:08

the high school and younger

56:11

levels to study the language.

56:15

And one place to look for this as

56:18

a model is DOD

56:21

and the Department of State. So

56:23

when they identify somebody to work on

56:26

China or Russia or Saudi Arabia, the

56:28

Arab world or whatever, somebody

56:31

who's already cleared, already

56:34

professionally trained, they

56:36

send them off for one or two

56:38

years for intensive language study.

56:40

And then they send them to a

56:43

graduate school for a year to do

56:45

an area studies degree. So

56:48

that's a three-year investment.

56:52

And then we pass them over for promotion then.

56:55

Maybe we do, yeah. But

56:58

the point is that the

57:00

FBI doesn't do that. They

57:03

rely on linguists who

57:05

are not field agents, and therefore you

57:07

have field agents who do not have

57:09

a field. They do

57:11

not speak the language, but they are required

57:14

to go out and recruit sources

57:16

of information in the community. And

57:19

they – there are

57:21

some. I've met one

57:24

in particular who went

57:26

to Taiwan, was really interested in China,

57:28

got the language, married a

57:31

local gal, came back, and he was recruited

57:33

by the FBI, and immediately he was put

57:35

on organized crime. But

57:38

eventually he was put

57:41

onto counterintelligence and

57:44

foreign counterintelligence squad and

57:48

did great things. But

57:52

he was an exception. Yeah.

57:54

All right. I mean, you think that – I'm

57:57

sure it's happening that the FBI would make

57:59

a good deal. Certain recruiting drive.

58:02

Now they are other trying to trying

58:04

to recruit people already have the language

58:07

mess great the land but I really

58:09

think that they have been under law

58:11

enforcement on can we have other law

58:13

enforcement other to we have the Commerce

58:16

Department of Labor Department et cetera the

58:18

I'm that Department of Energy's. Come

58:20

as you point out, a lot more

58:22

than the is more than the language

58:25

and putting right. As you point out

58:27

the A it's a cultural understanding, it's

58:29

on. It's an understanding of on of.

58:31

of what he you know what factors

58:34

are. I played to enough the people

58:36

to do certain things. I think one

58:38

a means. To. Promise that wants

58:40

the saw going through us education system which

58:42

I never did by the way but. Once

58:45

people do and they become. It's.

58:48

Hard for them then to imagine. I.

58:51

Didn't wear that for a while but you

58:54

know a bet it's in the it's a

58:56

whole problem As human yeah you can learn

58:58

the language but it's just the it the

59:00

even if you if you learn it picture

59:03

perfect the that pronunciation and speak it like

59:05

a native, That's only part of the puzzle.

59:08

I think that's correct.

59:11

And ah, and because

59:13

we are such a

59:15

cultural, a powerful nation,

59:17

or an economically powerful

59:19

nation, harm. Americans

59:22

do not steal and in general

59:24

do not sell the same compulsion to

59:26

learn about foreign countries that foreign countries

59:29

learn. People on countries

59:31

are compelled to learn about than I'd say. It's. And

59:35

has room for I think it under the

59:37

be said about like you know our second

59:39

generation kids. Were. At the

59:42

you know they do get. Targeted probably

59:44

because they have family in China

59:46

still. but. It's gotta be.

59:48

Someone. In that generation where.

59:51

They'll. Be our biggest asset in terms of working

59:54

at the F B I working at See I.

59:56

Am so I guess at near as

59:59

be overcome. Yeah, that's that's

1:00:01

exactly yeah, understanding that fair and then

1:00:03

overcoming it and being able

1:00:05

to balance aspects of American life culture

1:00:08

against that. Along with that too,

1:00:10

I think we also need to tap into working,

1:00:13

which I've done working with local law

1:00:15

enforcement and not just local law enforcement,

1:00:18

but also ethnic law enforcement officers. We

1:00:20

need to get to the point where

1:00:22

we're not going to stick out like

1:00:24

a sore thumb. If

1:00:27

you send that FBI agent into that neighborhood where he's he

1:00:29

or she is not known, you have that local law enforcement.

1:00:35

It's like, oh, that's, you know, Officer X or Y. You

1:00:39

know, I see them patrolling every day. We need to

1:00:41

start using those folks a little bit better

1:00:43

as well. Yeah, good. Fair

1:00:45

point. Great. It's always, you

1:00:49

know, we always try and end these episodes on a little

1:00:52

bit of a constructive positive point. So that was brilliant.

1:00:54

Right. The whole, I have my moment.

1:00:56

Yeah, well, I'm sorry we went over it,

1:00:58

but we went over it because this

1:01:00

is, you know, we've got you. I mean,

1:01:02

this is a nugget that we're going to.

1:01:06

I'm not going to be able to finish this metaphor, but

1:01:08

clean all of that. Anyway, thank

1:01:10

you so much. Matt, please

1:01:13

plug your book when it's coming out. Any

1:01:15

other previous works you've done, feel free. The

1:01:18

floor is yours. Okay. Well,

1:01:21

please take a look. If you're interested

1:01:23

in this kind of thing, my website is mattbrazil.net,

1:01:25

m-a-t-t-b-r-a-z-i-l.net, where I try to plug in the

1:01:28

book. If you're interested

1:01:30

in this kind of thing, my website is

1:01:33

mattbrazil.net,

1:01:35

m-a-t-t-b-r-a-z-i-l.net,

1:01:38

where I try to post as much as

1:01:40

I can. There's

1:01:42

a, I have a newsletter.

1:01:45

If you go to the website that I

1:01:47

just named, you can sign up for the

1:01:49

newsletter. And

1:01:53

I also write for the Jamestown China Brief.

1:01:56

There's stuff available there. jamestown.org.

1:02:01

as well as

1:02:03

SpyTalk.co, which

1:02:05

is an interesting little online newsletter

1:02:07

run by a veteran journalist named Jeff

1:02:09

Stein. Yeah, we've had Jeff on the

1:02:12

team house before. Oh, have you? Yeah.

1:02:15

Very good. So,

1:02:17

I do my best to cover China

1:02:20

angles for his

1:02:23

audience. And it's

1:02:28

also good to

1:02:31

just try to do

1:02:34

ordinary web searches that

1:02:37

will bring you to a lot of this

1:02:39

stuff. But the one thing

1:02:41

I would caution everybody when they look at

1:02:43

Wikipedia, Wikipedia can

1:02:45

be very useful, but

1:02:47

you should always check out the

1:02:50

footnotes because quite often the

1:02:52

footnotes lead to absolutely nowhere. As

1:02:54

many frustrated thesis write-up line. And

1:03:01

I'll put all of Matt's links in the description and in

1:03:03

the show notes, so you guys can just go down there

1:03:06

and click it and find your way to Matthew and his

1:03:08

work. Thank you very much.

1:03:10

You've all been very kind. Thank you. Thank

1:03:12

you, Matt. Awesome. So,

1:03:15

everyone, I don't know

1:03:18

if you had a chance to see the

1:03:21

team house kind of – what was

1:03:23

it called? The interval, the intermission, but

1:03:26

it's a very short video that was

1:03:28

released by Jack and CrowdD was on it.

1:03:30

But anyway, bottom line is this. Please

1:03:34

subscribe. Jack made the point that

1:03:36

a lot of people will

1:03:39

click subscribe, but they don't get

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sent reminders. And for

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Eyes On, that's particularly important because we know

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when the next episode is coming out kind

1:03:47

of the day before, but

1:03:50

generally twice a week, either when news hits

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or we have a great

1:03:54

guest. So please do.

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Anyway, support the team house. Please do.

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click on subscribe even better consider

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joining patreon

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which is five dollars a month which

1:04:07

is poultry you know I mean that's

1:04:09

a tip right yeah you get even

1:04:12

add free episodes yeah that's that's

1:04:14

a tip D drops that every time he

1:04:16

spends over a hundred bucks on a meal

1:04:19

that's a bad tip but yeah wait a wait a

1:04:22

not to spend it all

1:04:25

at one but yeah my point

1:04:27

is it's it's a d-tip

1:04:29

you know per month that's nothing okay

1:04:31

all right anyway hey great see everyone

1:04:34

in in a couple of days all

1:04:36

the best you take thanks everybody thank

1:04:39

you thank you man that was brilliant