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your information private again. It's

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aura.com/team house to get two

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weeks for free. Hello,

1:55

everyone. Welcome to another episode of

1:57

eyes on I'm Andy Milburn former.

2:00

Infantry and Special Operations Officer, now

2:03

working for a franchise of the Teamhouse.

2:05

Jason, over to you. Thanks,

2:07

Andy. I'm Jason Lyons, former

2:09

Marine, former CIA officer. I

2:13

used to work with SoftRep,

2:15

which turned with

2:17

Jack over to the Teamhouse, and I'm happy to

2:19

be here. Over to you, Dee.

2:22

Yeah, guys, thanks a lot. I'm excited about this.

2:24

We had a great show the

2:26

other day with each, all together, live at

2:28

the studio, which was awesome. Yeah,

2:32

I'm excited about this. I'm excited about, you

2:34

know, the story you got lined up and,

2:37

like, your perspective on it and, like, what goes

2:39

into, like, actually a foreign

2:43

country recruiting a person

2:45

in the military or in, you

2:47

know, agency to spy. Yeah,

2:51

and before we kick off on that, Dee, I just

2:53

want to say, just for

2:55

the benefit of everyone from the episode

2:57

last time, there was some

2:59

comments, and I think they're fair comments, that, you

3:02

know, it was really just from an Israeli perspective,

3:04

and that certainly is not our intent. You

3:07

know, the problem here is, of course, we're all, you

3:09

know, we're all due to a

3:12

steep, steeped in US military background,

3:14

so our access to the Palestinian

3:16

side is, you know, is a

3:18

little more limited. Having said that,

3:20

I've reached out and will

3:22

continue to do so and would love to also

3:24

be able to tell the story from

3:26

the, you know, from the Palestinian side. But the last

3:28

piece I'll say is it's not the purpose of the

3:30

book necessarily

3:33

to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian

3:35

issue. It's discussing the

3:38

wider issue, the threat

3:40

from Iran, and rational pragmatic

3:43

terms, because someone did

3:45

accuse me of conspiracy theories, too, talking

3:47

about the Iranian threat network. Anyway,

3:50

just to, yeah, absolutely. Andy,

3:53

you're not an agent of the Israelis? I didn't

3:55

know that. I thought you were. No, absolutely fat

3:57

point. That's why we hired you. But it was

3:59

a possibility. perspective is not by any means

4:01

and here the real deal and like to

4:04

put it in context like you

4:06

just got back from Israel and Like

4:09

right and I'm sure like if

4:11

Hamas or whoever Was

4:13

in this is me. Yeah was honestly was in

4:15

the West Bank or in Gaza and they were

4:17

like, hey coming, right? Yeah Look, you

4:20

know that the real the deal his

4:22

is here the three of us here Jack

4:24

and David Okay, who you are if

4:27

we had grown up in the West

4:29

Bank we would probably be

4:31

activists there and the same thing is we've

4:34

grown up in Kyri extra Mona or You

4:37

know one of borderline kibbutz is or even

4:39

in Israel We would have a very different

4:41

perspective and we would be activists because that's

4:43

the type of person People we

4:46

are and I think we just have to accept

4:48

that and and try and Explain

4:51

perception on both sides, but

4:53

my goal here is to understand

4:55

militarily operationally to

4:57

through strategically what what

5:00

the heart what the lessons learned were and Prospects

5:04

for a yeah for a solution political solution,

5:06

but also security

5:08

solution the time No,

5:12

yeah, I appreciate you saying that I mean again

5:16

Guys but to all our you know, seriously,

5:18

I mean if if you if

5:20

you're watching this and you do have Palestinian

5:25

contacts I

5:27

would be delighted to speak to them so

5:29

far I've you know, I've written to about

5:31

a dozen and Got

5:34

zero response, which I get it, you know, they

5:36

Google man like no But

5:41

it would be nice to break through that right for

5:44

sure So,

5:47

yeah, we're all about Rubble

5:49

out walking walking a straight line, which

5:52

is not what the what a whole

5:54

host of young sailors have been doing

5:56

recently No, I'm not about to talk

5:58

about a longer person again, D,

6:01

if this show is very successful. Jason and

6:04

I will buy you a round trip ticket

6:06

there. But

6:08

I digress. This

6:11

is absolutely Jason's area,

6:13

not trade and not treachery, but I

6:15

mean, you know,

6:17

Intel counter Intel. But I'm

6:19

going to turn over to him for his

6:21

insights on the latest Pedicini. And I want

6:23

to begin with why, you

6:26

know, the US government has no

6:28

problem about fingering, for instance, Chinese

6:31

foreign intelligence services, right, as manipulating

6:34

or recruiting spies. But here, Mr.

6:37

Pedicini is, you know, who is also,

6:39

I believe, a senior a senior chief,

6:41

right? If you want to read,

6:43

he's a chief, a chief, okay, so about 50% of

6:46

the navies. And

6:49

yeah, but but in any case,

6:51

you know, long term career

6:54

sailor, not with

6:56

with obvious

6:58

connections. But

7:01

it is strange. What do you

7:03

what do you thoughts? Why? Why

7:05

the mystery here? Yeah, that's

7:08

so first, let me just do a little background about

7:11

what we're talking about recently, a maybe

7:14

chief petty officer, fire

7:16

control man, Bryce Pedicini, was

7:19

charged with espionage, specifically

7:21

passing classified material to

7:23

a foreign government, that

7:26

nation, which is what Andy was alluding

7:28

to, which nation is not

7:30

being disclosed right now? I think

7:32

I just guessed that. It's Yeah. Yeah.

7:36

It's a trend here, right? Absolutely. Yeah.

7:38

And I will definitely talk about that. There's

7:40

he's one of at least

7:42

three within the last year, who have

7:45

been arrested on similar charges. So

7:48

this petty off

7:50

chief petty officer was assigned to the USS

7:52

Higgins, which is an Arleigh Burke class destroyer,

7:54

DDG 76. And

7:57

so alleged

8:00

I'm going to say allegedly a lot because the

8:02

trial is not over. I believe it just started.

8:05

His court martial between November 2022 and

8:07

February 2023 in and around both Hampton Roads, Virginia

8:15

and Yakuza, Japan, where

8:17

his ship had been ported. He

8:21

passed information to include,

8:24

let's see, multiple documents of

8:27

an exact nature we don't know

8:29

or it's having this closed, as

8:31

well as photos of a classified

8:33

Cipronet computer screen. So

8:36

he passed these things to a

8:38

foreign agent. He was also

8:40

charged with failing to report a foreign contact,

8:42

which we will talk about why that is seems

8:45

trivial, but is important and taking a

8:47

personal device into a secured space. So,

8:52

so let's go back to the foreign

8:54

entity that he passed this information to.

8:56

Yeah, like you said, I mean, normally

8:59

it's blasted out. Hey, this was China.

9:01

Hey, this was Russia, whatever. Almost

9:04

immediately. But I am I

9:07

am not for those who are not

9:09

familiar with how it works with

9:11

the federal government. I am not an

9:13

FBI agent. I had as as a

9:15

CIA officer, I had no law

9:18

enforcement jurisdiction or powers, no

9:20

arrest powers whatsoever. So

9:22

what I like to can it

9:24

to people is the agency. We

9:28

will we have counterintelligence who is looking

9:31

at this sort of thing. But

9:34

our main goal is to

9:36

collect information, collect intelligence. FBI's

9:39

main job is to criminal

9:42

posture prosecution. And I've worked hand

9:44

in hand within the US and

9:46

overseas with FBI on just that.

9:48

So I'm collecting the intel

9:52

FBI is working in

9:55

coordination with me to form

9:58

a case against. whoever could be

10:00

the asset depending on what's going on. So

10:04

this gentleman I'm going to say he's a kid. I don't

10:06

even know how old he is. It's,

10:10

you know, people

10:12

ask the question why, you know,

10:14

why does somebody do something like this? Only

10:18

he knows that and probably

10:20

the prosecutors now, counter intel and

10:22

FBI know, but, and you'll

10:25

have to forgive me for looking at my notes here, but

10:27

people do things for we'll do these things

10:29

for different reasons. There's

10:32

acronym MICE, M-I-C-E,

10:34

there's money. People, I mean, it's

10:37

a classic, hey, I'm down

10:39

on my luck and I need money. There's

10:42

ideology, you know, whether it's

10:45

extremists, you

10:48

know, on one end or the other depending on what it

10:50

is. There's extremism ideology.

10:52

There is coercion, which I

10:54

think we talked about it

10:57

on the

10:59

team house episode. Coercion

11:01

is can be anything from a honeypot,

11:03

you know, operation where

11:05

a male or female is put

11:08

up against that target to try

11:10

to entice them sexually. I

11:13

believe the has a background in doing that.

11:16

How'd you know that? Listen,

11:19

we all have to make ends meet. We

11:21

all make ends meet how we make them meet. So

11:26

there's coercion I just mentioned. And

11:34

then how did I just blank on the last one? I

11:38

just blanked on the last one. Hold on. Yeah.

11:42

I don't think that's right. That's

11:44

just me. Somebody is going to.

11:48

That'll be fine. So

11:54

either way, anyway, people have the reasons for doing

11:56

it. There are at least here in the

11:58

US, I can't speak to. other foreign

12:02

entities, but at least in the U.S., there

12:04

are parameters that are set that

12:07

makes someone an actual

12:09

recruited asset. And I'm

12:12

kind of paraphrasing and, you know, just

12:14

going, being a broad term

12:16

here, but if they're taking money for

12:19

what they're doing and they're providing

12:21

information, they're a paid asset just by,

12:23

you know, virtue of the name. Some

12:27

will choose, some will say, you know

12:29

what, I don't want your money. We will always push

12:31

that, you know, but some

12:33

will just don't want it, in which case the money

12:35

will just be held in like an escrow. Or

12:41

need it. But the other question

12:43

is, was this person,

12:45

was this chief petty officer approached

12:47

or did he approach the foreign

12:50

government? That has happened before. Some,

12:54

Robert Hanson, he went

12:56

to the Soviets and offered

12:59

his services. I believe Alja Gaines did as

13:01

well. I want

13:03

to say at the level that they

13:05

were at, Ames and Hanson, that

13:13

they're approached because they are, and it

13:15

would be known that they are higher

13:18

ranking intelligence officers. But, and

13:20

I'm not saying that a chief petty officer is

13:22

not an awesome, you

13:24

know, rate rank. I think it's

13:27

changed now. It's no longer a rate to rank, whatever. It's

13:30

not an awesome rate of rank, but it's

13:32

low that he was

13:35

approached that whoever that foreign intel services

13:37

were or is,

13:39

they decided that, hey, it's safe to

13:41

approach him. Because at higher levels, senior

13:45

officers, they've probably been approached

13:47

more than once in their career, depending on how

13:49

long their career is. And there

13:52

is a set playbook

13:55

for when you're approached, which I won't go into,

13:57

but when you're approached, how you're supposed to respond.

14:00

Can I ask a question real quick? Yeah. So

14:04

you were talking about the

14:07

fact that the higher you are in rank, the assumption is

14:09

that you know more. So you're under kind

14:12

of the compass argument to that, that I would

14:14

argue these cases of bringing to the light is what

14:17

we talked about the other day, which is need

14:19

to know. And it seems as though certainly when you

14:21

look at it, we can talk about this, but in

14:23

the case of Toby, in case

14:25

of this guy I'm speculating, but he's a,

14:27

you know, he's on an

14:29

Aegis, he's an Aegis cruiser,

14:31

but he doesn't have access.

14:33

I'm sorry. But he

14:36

doesn't have access to what the Chinese would

14:38

really want, which is, you know, the kind

14:40

of ballistic missile measures on that ship. He's

14:42

a fireman, whatever, you know, the thing is,

14:44

though, he's a fire control man. Oh, that means

14:46

he does. Yeah. Okay. Yeah. So

14:49

he worked to understand. Yeah,

14:51

no problem. No, it's fire

14:53

control. Yeah, it's easy to

14:56

mix that up. But

14:58

yeah, he does have access. And the fact

15:00

that he does have access and

15:03

he's of a mid

15:06

middle rank, you know, basically. Makes him

15:08

perfect target. Exactly.

15:10

And if it is the Chinese, and even if

15:12

it is the Russians, they're, we've talked about this,

15:15

they play the long game. So even if he

15:17

didn't have the exact access

15:19

they're looking for, he's

15:21

a, he gets, they get their foot in the

15:23

door by, I mean, look at, oh, gosh, I

15:26

don't know what's going on in my brain today. I

15:28

worked last night. There

15:30

was a family, the

15:32

Walkers, I believe it was, who were

15:34

spying. And

15:37

what that was is one was it was

15:39

approach or one made the approach to a

15:41

foreign intelligence service and then

15:44

bought in, I believe it was a

15:46

son, and then uncle or

15:48

a best friend. So even

15:50

if you're not getting right off the bat keys

15:52

to the kingdom, if you can get your foot

15:54

in the door as an intel officer, and

15:57

you can, you can ascertain.

15:59

that, hey, there's others in

16:01

this guy's network who are susceptible to

16:04

it. Well, I mean, that's what

16:06

you want. Again, if you're playing

16:08

the long game, especially if it's, you know,

16:10

at the Chinese and in the Pacific region,

16:13

I mean, God forbid that it kick off tomorrow, but, um,

16:16

it doesn't look like it will. So right now they're willing

16:18

to play the long game and get their foot in the

16:20

door. This guy's a, you know, chief petty house fire control.

16:23

So he probably knows more

16:25

than the average, you know,

16:27

lower enlisted sailor and, but

16:30

a little less than a senior officer, but

16:32

he actually may know more than a senior

16:34

officer, you know, depending on, um, what

16:36

the job is, because a senior officer may not need

16:39

to know. Usually, usually judged by how much he was

16:41

getting paid. Yeah. So at the, at the

16:43

lower end of the spectrum, you know, we're talking

16:45

about it, the run of guys

16:47

being arrested recently, um, two sailors

16:49

last year arrested, I think they

16:51

were just sentenced in January. Um,

16:54

and one of them, I'm going to mispronounce his

16:56

name, but Wang Hang Zao. Yep. He,

16:58

um, he, he was only paid $15,000. Yeah.

17:02

You know, but then you look at, I mean,

17:04

it doesn't matter. And he's only gone to

17:07

jail for two years. This is only some

17:09

months. But yeah, but what he, what he

17:11

gave them was pretty, I mean, honestly, pretty

17:13

low level, um, pictures, videos. Yeah. Um, or

17:15

I mean, of SIPA screens. So we know

17:18

SIPA, I mean, this is a different kind

17:20

of the same stuff. I said, uh, you

17:22

know, um, technical manuals. Yeah.

17:24

He gave like a blueprint for a

17:26

radar spectrum that was on Okinawa. But

17:28

again, just like getting your foot in

17:30

the door, uh, as far

17:32

as that initial recruitment is

17:35

concerned, uh, a

17:37

good intelligence and service will take bits and

17:39

pieces from, you know, aggregate it, put it

17:41

all together and say, okay, now we have

17:44

a little bit bigger picture of

17:46

what's going on. So, uh, and

17:48

you'll run down, you'll run down of

17:51

the motivation of, you know, the,

17:53

the normal motivations for agents. That was,

17:55

that was really, you know, that, that

17:57

was really clearly done. I

17:59

think. that when people fall into, when you look

18:01

at these guys, they often fall into more than one

18:05

of those areas, right? You

18:07

know, I'm trying to think, I

18:10

think Toby Navy,

18:12

he's a Navy veteran nuclear

18:14

engineer arrested a couple years

18:16

ago. And he was

18:18

like, he had something like a quarter of

18:21

a million dollars in debt. Yeah. I

18:24

mean, he was, he was not

18:26

at all ideologically motivated. Yeah. And

18:28

that's kind of the exception. Um,

18:32

Zao doesn't, the guy who's

18:34

arrested Zao Wei was

18:37

talked into it by his mother, who lives

18:40

in Wisconsin, which actually, you know, brings

18:42

up this whole thing about Wisconsin and

18:44

people that cannot be trusted. Oh, no.

18:47

And as a saying, I mean, so

18:49

he was a, he was a

18:52

very clever approach from his, from

18:54

his mother. Yeah.

18:58

Um, and then of course, I mean, what,

19:00

what more deeply suited ideology can be

19:02

played into it? Absolutely. And

19:04

especially, you know, in that culture. Yeah.

19:07

And by the way, the last, the E is ego. Ego.

19:11

Ego. Which is

19:13

kind of threaded as far as from what I've seen,

19:15

um, you know, and what I've

19:17

been taught is threaded into all of the other ones.

19:22

Um, if it's not initially there, eventually

19:24

it will be because as you start

19:26

to pass the information, make, you know,

19:28

whatever, however you do it dead drops,

19:30

you know, when you're doing those operational

19:32

acts, you start to gain that confidence.

19:35

And if you didn't already have a big ego,

19:37

well, now you're going to start to get one

19:40

because now it's like, whoa, I didn't get caught.

19:42

I'm a fucking spy. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

19:45

Yeah. Smarter than your adversaries.

19:47

Exactly. And, um, so. So

19:50

just real quick, another interesting point in that

19:52

one, Toby, I'm going to mispronounce his name.

19:54

The one in 2021. He got 19 years

19:57

in jail. His wife. Hannah

20:00

got 22 years. What

20:02

does that suggest? Handler?

20:06

Yeah, obviously she

20:08

knew. So probably her level

20:10

of involvement in his espionage.

20:15

That could have been support. She could

20:17

have driven him to the meeting. She could

20:19

have set them up. She could have acted

20:21

as a cutout. More than likely, probably, and

20:23

again, I am not law enforcement. So I

20:25

can't, I'm only speculating here. She

20:28

probably hindered the investigation in

20:30

some way, shape, or form. But

20:33

she gets more than him, but I suppose

20:35

he struck a plea bargain that perhaps he

20:37

was not. Yeah. Well, good news

20:39

for him. He's gonna be out three years.

20:41

You know, he had three years to look for a new

20:43

wife. I was gonna say he's got three years to get

20:46

on Tinder or whatever that was. I was joking. Hey

20:48

guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to

20:51

you today about a way that you can help

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support the podcast if you're not already. We

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21:38

that. So go in and check

21:40

us out at patreon.com/the Team House.

21:43

Jason, I got a question about, why

21:47

not announce who the,

21:49

what country it was? Impossible

21:52

that it was an ally? Oh,

21:55

absolutely. I'm probably gonna

21:57

get hammered for it, but the Israelis have

21:59

done it historically. league to us. Follow up.

22:02

Yeah. Follow up. Yep.

22:05

I mean, they've done it. France

22:07

has done it. You know, there's a

22:09

there's a bunch and could it be because

22:11

of that? Possibly, but we've

22:14

outed them before. So I

22:16

think my speculation

22:19

is that is because it's an ongoing

22:22

court martial. They don't want to throw

22:24

it out there yet. So

22:28

there and everything when it comes to

22:30

espionage, when it comes to intelligence, everything

22:33

is trying to protect methods,

22:35

sources and methods. So

22:37

it could be a

22:39

little bit of that. Hey, we don't want

22:41

to reveal it yet. I mean, obviously, if

22:44

it made the news that this guy got

22:46

caught, the country that he was spying for

22:48

knows, you know, oh, shit, you know,

22:50

but they may be holding on to that, maybe

22:52

trying to make them sweat. It

22:54

could be any number of things. And it also

22:56

could be that something came out of the investigation

22:58

that is leading them to someone else. So

23:01

they don't want to start tipping off these,

23:03

you know, sort of thing because people have

23:05

worked for more than one country at once,

23:07

you know, three different countries passing information.

23:10

So it could be

23:12

any number of things about why.

23:15

So I want to talk real quick about the

23:17

failing to report a foreign contact and taking a

23:20

personal device in the spirit space. Those

23:22

are two of his charges. The

23:25

personal device in the security space, that's kind

23:27

of a no-brainer. You

23:30

know, you have skiffs, the

23:32

secured compartmented facilities.

23:37

When I was at the agency, when

23:39

you're at headquarters, you're not even bringing

23:42

your phone into the building, much less

23:44

sticking it in the cubby somewhere. Now,

23:46

there were exceptions to that. You know,

23:48

there were operational phones that are Blackberries,

23:50

which only certain people have. And

23:53

they saw one which they were able to

23:55

bring in with certain caveats. But

23:58

as far as we were concerned, And I'm going

24:00

to, I can say this because it's the

24:02

stupidest and out most outdated, uh, thing

24:05

in the world, but we were told, we

24:07

had to turn our cell phone off and

24:09

take the battery out like a mile or

24:11

so before you got to headquarters, um,

24:14

which just include anybody tracking

24:16

you in that, you know, you were going

24:18

to where you were going to. Um,

24:21

but, uh, yeah, so you had

24:23

to leave all that in your car. Um, so

24:26

at other stations that I was at, you

24:29

usually had a, like a, a set

24:31

of cubbies that you right outside the skiff that

24:33

you would turn off your phone and take the

24:35

battery out, put it in to that cubby with

24:37

either your name, monitor or number or whatever. Um,

24:40

and it wasn't supposed to be in there.

24:42

Having said that I was actually in a

24:45

station, um, sitting

24:47

actually in a meeting and someone's cell

24:49

phone went off. They forgot

24:51

to, you know, so, oh my

24:53

God. What's that like? So it was

24:56

kind of like a little bit of a,

24:58

you know, um, so we, everybody looked around,

25:00

we, you know, figured out, they figured out

25:02

who it was and that person, nothing was

25:04

said. They just ran out, turn

25:06

their phone off, you know, uh, took

25:08

the battery out, stuck it in the cubby. Um,

25:10

when they came back in the meeting

25:13

just continued as normal. Um, afterwards,

25:15

I don't know what happened. I'm going

25:18

to guess that probably they had to

25:20

sit with the security chief and,

25:22

um, figure out what happened,

25:24

why they missed it. And I'm going

25:27

to say probably didn't go in their

25:29

record because, you know, especially if it

25:31

was a one-off, um, and

25:34

depending on the type of meeting we were having,

25:36

uh, which I, you know, I don't even remember

25:38

what it was. Um, it might

25:40

not have been a big deal. Uh, if it was

25:42

something that was, but it was noted, you know, I'm

25:44

sure it was noted because if it becomes a pattern

25:47

along with other things, well, that's a issue

25:50

and, uh, with something that would be reported.

25:53

So the failing to report a foreign

25:55

contact thing that starts from day one,

25:57

from the time that you apply. Two,

26:00

I'm just going to speak for. I

26:05

suppose it's with any agency where you need

26:07

a clearance. You are not

26:10

asked, you are told to report any

26:12

and all foreign contacts to include family

26:14

members. On your SF 86,

26:17

you'll put it down, which is this big, long, like 50

26:19

page, basically it's

26:21

your whole life. You'll

26:23

put those foreign contacts down, and

26:25

then they will become what's called

26:27

close and continuing. So close and

26:30

continuing contacts, these

26:33

are all my foreign contacts, but out of those,

26:36

these five are the ones that I have continuing

26:38

contact with. I go visit them, I talk with

26:40

them on the phone, we email, we feed our

26:42

friends on social media, whatever it is, and

26:45

those foreign contacts will be investigated.

26:50

Now that's

26:52

the official foreign

26:55

contacts. Even if you're out somewhere, like

26:57

you're in Japan, you're close to Japan,

26:59

like this guy, this chief was, you're

27:02

in a foreign country, so you're going to

27:04

meet foreign foreigners. You know, they don't care

27:06

that you go into a shop and you

27:09

say, Ohio gazaimas to the shop owner every

27:11

day, you know, that you go to get your coffee

27:13

at or whatever it is on your way to work.

27:16

What they care about is if you struck up a

27:18

friendship with that shop owner, you're having dinner at his

27:20

house, you've met his family. Or

27:25

whatever it is, that kind of stuff is what they want to know. I

27:28

would venture to guess that most

27:31

military folks don't report that because

27:34

that's not, unless you're in the

27:36

intel part of the military. It doesn't meet the

27:39

intent of the, unless it goes

27:41

beyond that, it doesn't really meet the intent

27:43

of the company. Exactly. It doesn't meet the

27:45

intent. So common sense, this common sense involves

27:47

a little bit, but you can't develop the

27:50

common sense too much if you give in

27:52

clearances to brand new E5s and E6s. Exactly.

27:55

And they would rather you, yeah,

27:57

they would rather you come in every two weeks.

28:00

Hey, I met this, you know, Japanese girl

28:02

or this Korean girl or whatever. And

28:04

then say, Hey, listen, don't worry about it.

28:06

You're fine. Then either

28:09

this happens, what happened with this chief,

28:11

or you go for

28:13

your review, your security clearance review,

28:15

and then you keep hitting on

28:17

a poly or, you know,

28:20

you're acting funny when they ask about foreign contacts

28:22

and all of a sudden you're like, well, a

28:25

month ago there was, well, now it's, it might

28:27

not have been a big deal then, but now

28:29

the fact that you didn't say anything because it

28:31

was a big deal. So it's better

28:33

to err on the side of caution and let them

28:35

say, all right, dude, you're getting annoying than to not

28:37

report it at all. Um, and

28:40

I'm going to say, I'm going to guess in

28:42

this case, again, I don't know the full story,

28:44

but I'm going to guess in this case, he

28:46

was probably, if he was approached and did not

28:48

approach them, if he was approached,

28:50

it was probably very innocuous where at first he

28:52

was like, you know, I don't need to report

28:55

this, but eventually it became

28:57

pretty evident, especially when you're passing at

28:59

the point of passing information, whether it's

29:01

verbally or um, physically,

29:04

that's when you know, you should have reported

29:06

it. Um, and that's usually where depending

29:09

on the service, the coercion comes

29:11

in, the, uh,

29:14

ideology and most certainly the ego comes in

29:16

because at some point when you're

29:18

handing that over or your mouth opens

29:20

and you're giving that information, some part

29:22

of your animal brain is saying, you're

29:25

not supposed to be doing this. And you

29:27

can either add, then say, I'm not

29:29

doing this, go back and report it.

29:32

Or the ego kicks in and you say,

29:34

you know what? Screw them. You

29:36

know, my senior who passed me over or

29:38

screw my wife or whatever it is,

29:40

I'm doing it, or it's just one time

29:43

I'll do it this one. And you may

29:45

verbally say it. I'm just going to

29:47

do it this one time. I'm never going to do

29:49

it again. And, but that Intel officer on the other side that

29:51

you're giving it to is like, yo, okay, yep.

29:53

Yeah. And then we'll do it again. No

29:55

problem. You know, um, see you next month.

29:57

Exactly. Cause they know how it works. So.

30:00

So yeah, that failing to report a

30:02

foreign contact at the very beginning of

30:04

your career can number one derail

30:06

your career. Just you're never getting the job.

30:08

It's because they're going to find out or

30:11

later on in your career, this is what's going to happen. You're

30:14

going to, you're going to be court martial or

30:16

you're going to prison or you know, whatever is

30:18

going to happen. So let's

30:20

see. So the approach, uh,

30:23

you guys have any questions before I make

30:26

it sound like I'm doing a damn Ted talk. Oh,

30:28

it's just, um, so

30:31

the approach again, we don't know

30:33

whether, whether he was

30:35

approached or they approached him.

30:38

So if he was approached, um,

30:40

I'm going to say that all of that, that

30:43

animal brain common sense stuff went

30:45

out the window in the beginning.

30:48

He decided he planned like, like

30:50

Robert Hanson had this, I

30:53

believe he walked into the Soviet embassy.

30:56

And, um, one of them did walk right

30:58

in and I'm an

31:00

intelligence officer. Um, I

31:02

need to speak to your resident, um,

31:05

residence or whatever they call it. Um, you know,

31:07

some people are that bold. Other

31:09

people. Um, and I'm going

31:11

to say he's a chief, you know, a

31:13

chief petty officer. He's probably

31:15

intelligent. Um, but if he

31:18

approached them somehow, some

31:20

way, he had to find out where are

31:22

the foreign intelligence hanging out? You

31:24

know, where, where can I go to get this

31:27

information to somebody? So it needs to be, it

31:29

has to be planned out in the same way,

31:31

shape or form. Um,

31:33

so he can't plead in my book. He can't plead.

31:36

I was ignorant. I didn't know that this person was a

31:38

foreign intelligence officer, even if that person's

31:41

not a foreign intelligence officer, even if

31:43

it's a, um, uh, uh, you

31:46

know, uh, it could be an ally.

31:48

It could be a Japanese sailor that he

31:50

goes to and says, Hey man, I've got

31:52

this information. Blah, blah, blah. You don't know

31:55

who that person is working for. Um,

31:57

and even if you do, you're not supposed to be giving that

31:59

information. Very interestingly,

32:01

that guy Toby, who he came

32:03

back to, the way

32:06

he was caught was whichever country he

32:08

sent that stuff to, so obviously it

32:10

was not solicited, they turned

32:12

it into the FBI. There

32:14

you go. So, I mean, yeah, it's boring. That's

32:16

the first time I've heard of that happening. And

32:19

that could, I don't know, I'm not

32:21

familiar with who it was, what country, but

32:24

that could be China, that could be

32:26

Russia. It's what that person is passing

32:28

to them is so low level that

32:32

not that they don't need it, but it's like,

32:34

okay, let's turn this guy in so

32:36

that we can get something bigger later on.

32:39

We want our guy back that you caught or whatever

32:41

it is, they'll do it. They'll give him $15,000. There's

32:43

no such thing as a favor. Absolutely.

32:47

Yeah, there's no honor among, you

32:49

know, monkeys in this case. So

32:53

if they approached him, that's

32:56

a pretty nuanced thing. Jack

32:58

and I talked about, quote

33:01

unquote, Madame Butterfly on the podcast,

33:03

on the team house. Those

33:06

sorts of things are set up,

33:08

not well in advance, but they're set up

33:11

pretty intricately. It may look

33:13

like, hey, there's this, you know, beautiful woman or this

33:15

good looking guy is approaching,

33:18

you know, hey, there's something fishy about them,

33:20

but they're giving me time a day. And

33:22

that fishy thing is they like me. Exactly.

33:25

You know, and that's going to be true.

33:28

What a woman likes me. What?

33:30

Yeah. It's like,

33:32

what the hell? And again, that number

33:34

one, it's gauges that person's

33:36

willingness to engage with you.

33:39

And number two, it creates a layer where

33:42

if, you know, you approach

33:44

the woman approaches me and I'm like, wait

33:47

a minute, this is doesn't make any sense.

33:49

You know, I'm as ugly. You

33:52

know, she can find yourself

33:55

getting unbelievably lucky. It's probably

33:57

unbelievable. If it's too good to

33:59

be true. probably the case. So

34:01

yeah, and they can back off then.

34:03

If you are pushing back, why me,

34:06

why me, why me, and it's just

34:08

getting too hokey, they can always back

34:10

off. So there's

34:12

that there's there is the coercion

34:14

there is especially in the case

34:16

of governments and

34:18

societies like in China, where,

34:21

you know, they just tell you, hey, we

34:24

know that your mom and your dad and

34:26

your little brother are still back in China,

34:28

they may not make overt threats. It's just

34:30

my dad, little brother still in China understood.

34:33

Yep. And then they have their arms. Yeah,

34:35

what are we going to do now? And

34:39

that happens not just with you know, sale,

34:41

military personnel or intelligence officers. That happens with

34:43

their citizens as well over here. They're

34:45

their average citizen. It's like, hey,

34:48

you yeah, you might be a

34:50

housekeeper or a dentist or whatever

34:52

it is. But you have access

34:54

to clients that we don't all

34:57

you got to do is tell us what they talk about, you

34:59

know, that sort of thing. I've

35:01

actually even heard a rumor and I don't know how true this

35:03

is, in the Intel world that the

35:07

Chinese are actually not

35:09

getting into the are they're already into but

35:12

really ramping up their real

35:14

estate agents as far as getting them

35:16

trained and things like that because of smart houses,

35:19

you know, in order to when you set

35:21

up these smart houses, you're putting your personal

35:24

information into these homes, unlock doors, safe,

35:27

turn off the lights, whatever it is. That's still

35:29

your personal information. Some people and I've actually been

35:32

told this by an actual real

35:34

estate agent. And someone correct me

35:36

in the comments if I'm wrong, but some

35:38

people actually sell the house and leave and

35:41

never wipe their personal information. So

35:43

now you have someone who was

35:45

an ambassador or you know, it

35:47

works for Ray Theon or something

35:49

like that. You have

35:51

you know, you have that asset

35:54

who is a real estate agent, they can come

35:56

into they have run of the house now, you

35:58

know, while they're showing it while all that

36:00

kind of stuff. So, you know, we

36:02

all know real estate agents are fucking

36:04

scumbags. So let's pass over the fucking

36:06

pass over the info. No, no problem.

36:08

It's technically susceptible to black all the

36:10

commission, first of all. Yeah,

36:15

so they play, they'll play

36:17

that long game. So they may be able

36:19

to collect information that way. And then take

36:21

it, let's just say that ex ambassador or

36:23

whatever it is, leave sells their house, they're

36:25

gone, they're somewhere else. They're retired,

36:28

long retired. Well, they take that information

36:30

now, create a dossier, slide

36:33

it across the table. Hey,

36:35

you know, this is what we have. What are you going to

36:37

do for us? Now,

36:41

if we take that to the from the perspective

36:43

of an intel officer who's being approached in

36:46

that manner, nine times out of 10,

36:48

an intel officer, and I'm saying nine times because

36:50

it does happen, most intel officers are going to

36:52

say, go screw you, I don't care.

36:54

Take whatever you got, you know, do whatever you

36:56

got to do, and go report it. But

36:59

we now we're looking at a chief

37:01

petty officer, you know, again, probably more

37:04

than likely intelligent, he's chief. And

37:06

he's a fire control man. So but

37:09

as I like the use to like to

37:11

say and still say to my kids, intelligence

37:15

and common sense are not the

37:17

same thing. You can have all the book

37:20

knowledge you want, but your street if your street knowledge

37:22

sucks, well, you're going to get got

37:24

so it happens. So

37:27

if they approach him, if they

37:29

approached him, I'm going to guess that

37:32

it could have been a cold pitch, meaning

37:34

they just said, hey, this guy's wearing a

37:36

uniform. I'm gonna cycle up to him

37:38

in the bar, buy him a drink and see what happens, which

37:41

is a cold pitch. Or they've

37:43

created a target package on this guy, because

37:45

somehow some way it was known what he

37:47

did. And the fact that they were able

37:49

to put he was a fire control man

37:51

in the articles I've

37:53

read means that it's probably somewhere

37:56

in the public anyway. So They

37:59

put together a target package. however big

38:01

or small it is and they plan

38:03

their approached and. You. Know,

38:05

sometimes it works. spit balling? sometimes it

38:07

works, sometimes done, it doesn't. It all

38:10

just depends on the yeah, The.

38:12

Marked to user you know let

38:14

it be like new to Japan

38:16

doing it. I. Mean

38:18

it could be Yeah, banning. Let's.

38:22

Think about the world situation as it

38:24

is right direction. Would it be in

38:26

Japan's best different interests? Said do something

38:28

like that. Probably not because there are

38:30

ships are going to be part of

38:32

was defending them. So. They probably

38:34

not and we'd probably be more ass

38:37

and I would venture to say some

38:39

of our tech not that technology is

38:41

probably on their ships anyway or on

38:43

something probably not. Could it be yes

38:45

you know anything is possible. Bucks more

38:48

than likely I would say based on.

38:50

Where. This took place. I would say

38:53

probably the Chinese more than. You

38:56

know, but could be wrong because more

38:59

used to our allies. Who?

39:01

those who might be prompted to

39:03

spy on us more used to

39:05

them? strategic level into justify his

39:07

intentions. You know what a what's

39:09

us government's contingency plan for? Or

39:11

do you know? do you think

39:13

that the president's gonna decide x

39:15

all wines Those are. That's

39:18

important whereas that kind of the run

39:20

of the mill military secrets. the As.

39:23

A innovate. They can gain the

39:25

benefit of that either directly by

39:27

being provided it through estimates, all

39:30

through a partnership with Us. You

39:33

know, in upset. And.

39:39

We. as an as intelligence officers

39:41

we are always taught you're taught the you're

39:43

always collecting so yes if i was talking

39:45

to an australian partner you know the if

39:48

i was these i'm talking to mostly apart

39:50

next and he says you know i'm not

39:52

going dig what if he says something that

39:55

i think might be of interest i'm gonna

39:57

go back and chop it up with my

39:59

me ops chief and deputy

40:01

chief and chief

40:05

and say, you know, this is what

40:07

they said, you know, what do you think? And

40:09

then it could be, nah, it's nothing. We already

40:11

know that. Or it

40:13

could be write it up, you know,

40:15

get that cable out. You get it out. Headquarters to

40:17

come back and say, don't talk about

40:19

it anymore, because they don't want

40:21

to ruffle feathers, you know, but you're always

40:23

collecting. You're always, you know,

40:26

trying to get that next piece of information.

40:28

The key is you don't, when it comes

40:30

to a partner nation, you don't want to

40:32

burn that bridge. Yeah. So unless you're specifically

40:35

directed to do it, it's

40:37

usually half. Because

40:43

then you have one on them, you know, they,

40:45

they know, and they're doing the

40:47

same to you there, you know, so you know what

40:49

to say and what not to say. So

40:52

yeah, I'd really like to get somebody

40:54

on who's like an expert on like the MSS,

40:56

the Chinese,

40:59

absolutely. You know, like how they go

41:01

about it, what they do. It kind

41:03

of sounds like they cast a pretty wide net. Because

41:06

there's so many like, you know, Chinese

41:09

people living here that have family back home

41:11

that have resources in place. Yeah,

41:13

they have resources in place between, you

41:15

know, nationals here and you know, abroad

41:17

in other countries and traditional, you know,

41:20

their traditional methods and things like that.

41:22

It's a huge net that they can

41:24

then can call on. We do as

41:26

well. But I think most of that

41:28

net and we talked about this again

41:30

on team house is technology wise. Yeah,

41:32

we got a part

41:40

of it. And there's

41:42

different reasons for that. From

41:44

my low level, some of them are

41:46

mistakes on mistakes in the past. That's

41:49

what I was gonna say. The political

41:51

control of that intelligence collection to get

41:53

tighter and tighter. So you know, and

41:55

I said kind of jokingly on whenever

41:58

we met on Monday. we

42:00

make humans so painful. But

42:02

it, yes, it has to be that way. You

42:05

know, there has to, there have to be

42:07

certain steps to recruit a source and you

42:09

have to go through those steps and you

42:11

can't call them a source until X

42:14

it's very absolutely.

42:16

Yeah. And you can't play

42:18

on some motivations. Yeah. Quotient,

42:21

for instance. Absolutely. Yeah. And,

42:23

and, and part of it too,

42:25

is I keep saying, you know, human,

42:27

you know, that face to face thing, but

42:30

a good portion of human is not face

42:33

to face. It's covert communications, you know, you

42:36

know, signaling things like that. Those

42:38

things are all subject to, to

42:42

breaking down. And they did. We've seen that

42:44

in the last probably 10 years or more,

42:48

where our communications, covert communications,

42:50

I'm not saying anything that's

42:52

not open source that have

42:54

been compromised and used to

42:56

walk back to find our

42:59

assets and then put push

43:01

other assets against us. So

43:04

we had to take a pause, had to take

43:06

a step back and figure out what broke, why

43:08

did it break? And what is our next step?

43:10

So we need to catch

43:13

up plain and simple. We, and I really, you

43:15

were speaking D about bringing on, you know, expert

43:17

on MSS. I would really like to get, and

43:19

I have a few names in mind, senior

43:22

officers who have retired,

43:25

some who just did it for a lot longer

43:27

than I did, whether they retired or resigned, who

43:30

are just amazing. And I will, once

43:34

we have those secured, I'll, you know, get

43:36

you those names and they're

43:38

just incredible wealth of doing

43:41

things that I've done things that I think are

43:43

pretty cool. And it's absolutely nothing compared to what

43:45

some of these men and women that I'm talking

43:47

about have done. Yeah, that'd be

43:49

great. Awesome. Yeah, that'd be awesome.

43:52

Yeah. So, yeah.

43:55

So the last thing I

43:57

wanted to hit on was the why. Why

44:01

did they approach this person If we're going

44:03

to go with the fact that he was

44:05

approach which we don't know yet If this

44:07

guy, why was this petty officer price wise?

44:09

Any. Of them asset

44:11

approach or target approached.

44:14

The. Reason number one is access. We.

44:16

Believe that person has

44:19

access so the information

44:21

that we want or

44:23

they have peripheral access

44:25

meaning they are connected,

44:27

weather's familial or you

44:29

know professionally to. The.

44:31

Person that has the actual access that we

44:34

want. So there are steps to get our

44:36

foot into the in the doors. But.

44:40

The. Second reason is that why they

44:42

were approaches are vulnerable and vulnerability.

44:45

A bad marriage. Ah, finances

44:47

disgruntled works. you know things like

44:49

that and all this stuff is

44:51

easier to find now because of

44:54

social media. People. I

44:56

said it from the beginning. People. Make

44:58

social media their personal diary and it's

45:00

not personal so you know a good

45:02

intelligence officer. Maybe not themselves, but they

45:05

have targeters who will be strolling through

45:07

social media and be able to say

45:09

okay, You know what? They made these

45:11

posts in the last month and the

45:14

month before they were flying high. Now

45:16

they're talking shit about their job, in

45:18

their boss and all his other stuff.

45:21

There might be something here. These are

45:23

all things that go into a Target

45:25

package and will be a part. Of

45:27

the approach to that person of course

45:29

it's It's not like in the movies

45:31

where it's some they side left you

45:33

and hey I hear your boss is

45:35

an asshole I now I think we

45:37

can help you out but it'll be

45:39

you know at some point it will

45:42

be a sympathetic thing. You know you

45:44

as the intelligence officer my bosses you

45:46

know my damn nerves there any try

45:48

to what we call you me same

45:50

same I share your pain brother or

45:52

I share your pain sisters. Gain.

45:54

Their confidence and then. It

45:57

could take a month to get, takes six

45:59

years. Whatever perks. The events of that

46:01

person is bob the deepen your

46:03

confidence. And you stroke their

46:05

ego at the same time. You've stopped

46:07

that fire saying, You know what? Ah,

46:10

This is what I did. you know in

46:12

order to back of my boss? You know

46:14

maybe this will help you out or something

46:16

like that. There's also the traditional. Sick

46:19

relative? a child's apparent? Something

46:21

like that. I'm.

46:24

Which. From what I was

46:26

taught, we try not to approach base

46:28

At least we don't based on ideology.

46:31

as far as stoking that I yards,

46:33

he. Oh. You think the U S

46:35

I hate us to? You're putting in a

46:37

dangerous territory during that, doing that kind of

46:39

thing. You

46:41

can play on their sympathies. As far

46:44

as you know what's happening in in

46:46

Gaza, you know your the loss of

46:48

life. It's horrible, You know those sorts

46:50

of things, but you want to be

46:52

careful about taking a side, especially if

46:54

that sizes and extremists sites. and I'm

46:57

not saying that's the case. And ah,

46:59

got except for the Hamas part of

47:01

it's. What You want To

47:03

be Very careful about that sort of thing, But. They.

47:06

Will know your vulnerabilities and we will

47:08

know their vulnerabilities before we walk into

47:10

it. Unless it's like you've just met

47:12

this person out there already, are a

47:15

party that you have to backtrack. Get.

47:17

This information that you do get a

47:19

business card or whatever back to headquarters

47:22

then it we pass were targeted will

47:24

do open searches and classified searches on

47:26

this person and will They'll move forward

47:28

so little. The. Take

47:30

away from that is is I'm a sane

47:32

don't be on social media I'm saying. If

47:35

you are given a job the you

47:37

know works with classified information or your

47:39

even on the periphery of it your

47:41

your husband's your spouse, your girlfriend, boyfriend

47:43

does that sorta thing. Need me? Very

47:46

careful about what you're posting on social

47:48

media and even the things you're saying.

47:50

I just saw something on it I

47:52

instagram the other day. I can't remember

47:54

the name of the young Security group.

47:56

Really great one. Where.

48:00

She was talking about a woman had approached

48:02

her, I guess

48:04

she's a client, about she

48:06

was in an airport or she was at a conference

48:08

or in an airport or she was in an airport,

48:10

I'm sorry, and she was talking to someone else. Well,

48:14

apparently she was either talking too loud or wasn't

48:16

aware of her surroundings, whatever it was, and

48:19

she was approached at

48:21

a conference, the conference that she was

48:23

flying to, by a gentleman, and he

48:25

called her by her airline seat

48:28

name, 19B, I think it was. Hey,

48:30

19B, good to see you. That sort of thing. She

48:32

was like, what the hell? Then

48:35

she found out he came to her

48:37

hotel room. He was able to dig and

48:39

find out what hotel she was in, probably

48:41

got some information from, you know, the conference,

48:43

found out and was looking for her. I

48:45

believe he called her room or something like

48:47

that. So

48:50

that was a creeper, stalker-type thing,

48:52

which is bad enough. But

48:55

put that on an espionage level. What

48:57

you can find out just by listening

48:59

to people, you know, just talking,

49:02

you know, at a party or whatever it is,

49:05

you can gain that information, so you just got to

49:07

be very careful about what it is you're saying and

49:09

where you're saying it. I'm

49:12

sure like us, or, you know,

49:14

we don't recognize it yet, but I'm sure that

49:17

for the Chinese, they're getting a

49:20

huge amount, if not most of their

49:22

intel from open source. You

49:24

know, it's so just like

49:27

little snippets of information in their

49:30

aggregate,

49:33

you know, and they're

49:35

making substantial discoveries. I

49:38

wonder how it was like 30 years

49:40

ago or 15 years ago,

49:43

pre-internet, where like everyone basically, you

49:45

know, journals their lives publicly,

49:47

how they chose people to target,

49:49

like who was kind of disgruntled,

49:51

who had maybe like how they

49:53

figured the angles then. And the

49:55

second one was illegal to certainly

49:57

the British army. Because

50:00

I did not because I was there. Thank you, Dee. I'm

50:03

going to praise my father. It

50:07

was illegal in the British armed forces to keep a diary

50:09

during the war. Oh, wow. Okay. There

50:12

was no, oh, hey, listen, I'm just keeping up.

50:14

No, because, you know, everyone,

50:17

then you're carrying it around and she gets

50:19

killed or wounded. And who knows what you've

50:21

written in that diary. Right. So it

50:23

was very sensible precaution. Absolutely.

50:25

And also too, that if you're

50:27

in a position where

50:29

you're dealing with sensitive, I'm just

50:31

even going to say classified information.

50:35

You need to be aware of what

50:38

your spouse knows and is putting

50:40

out there, your children, all those sorts

50:42

of things, because I think it was, I don't know,

50:44

probably 10 years ago now, probably more. I

50:47

believe it was MI6, the newly

50:51

appointed head of MI6 or MI5,

50:53

one of them, wife posted on

50:56

social media, picture of their new house,

50:58

you know, something about the perks of,

51:00

I remember that. No, your husband being

51:02

appointed. What the hell? You know,

51:05

so those are all things. It's

51:07

a huge responsibility to have this,

51:09

that kind of information, access

51:13

to that kind of information. So, you

51:15

know, this is the result of a

51:18

combination of having that access and having

51:20

some sort of issue in your life

51:22

that made you approachable and

51:24

amenable to, because that's two different things.

51:27

You might be approachable, but doesn't mean you're amenable

51:30

to giving the information. But he

51:32

was both, and now he's paying the price

51:34

for it. I personally think 27 months is

51:36

light, but it all depends on exactly

51:38

what he gave and what deal he worked at. 27 months, is that what he

51:40

got? I

51:44

believe that's what they're looking at. I know

51:46

that I'm going to butcher his name. I

51:49

know that Wenheng Zhao

51:51

was given 27 months

51:54

for, you know, for what, $15,000? Um,

52:01

yeah, we can definitely go into that more. See,

52:03

like my, my instinct, cause I'm like a street

52:05

rat from New York. I always think it's like,

52:07

it's money. Yeah. Always. It's

52:09

money. Like I want money. How

52:12

much do chief petty officers make? Literally.

52:14

I like, who knows what

52:16

he's like into or whatever. Like,

52:18

you know, maybe he's got a lot of expenses.

52:20

Like it's easy to just take 50 G's, pass

52:23

over something you see every day and like

52:26

kind of rationalize it too, as you do it, you know?

52:29

And that's part of the ego. Right. You're

52:31

rationalized doing what you're doing. So it's the

52:33

money, right? Like you said, every part of

52:35

that acronym is like goes back to ego.

52:37

Yeah. Yeah. Absolutely. It's all intertwined. Yeah.

52:41

And when

52:43

you think that the big spies,

52:45

you know, post-war, um, Philby,

52:48

McLean, Ames, you

52:51

know, up to two Walker, it's, it's two

52:53

or three of those. You know, I mean,

52:56

Philby was almost sexual at the time when

52:58

it was illegal in the UK, but he

53:00

was also pro-Soviet. Um, Ames

53:02

was an alcoholic. Uh,

53:04

he was pissed off at his lack of career

53:07

progression. I wonder if there's a link there. Um,

53:09

and he was deeply in debt, you know, so.

53:12

Hanson too. I think Hanson was doing it largely

53:14

for the money because his wife was a. Splurging.

53:17

Yeah. See, it's

53:19

always seems that the trend

53:21

here is wise. Yeah.

53:26

And I mean, like you said, this one

53:28

kid's mom approached him. So sometimes

53:31

it's, you know, your own family or own

53:34

friends. When, uh, when your mom is your

53:36

handler, that, that comic, thanks. Yeah. And it

53:38

doesn't look that cool. You know, so you're

53:40

not going to make a movie about it.

53:42

It doesn't. Yeah. When you're getting, uh, when

53:44

you're being handcuffed and walked out right next

53:46

to your mom and she's rating you a

53:48

peanut butter. Yeah. I'll ask you if you

53:50

brush your teeth. We'll take a coat in

53:52

it. Yeah. Oh,

53:55

yeah. Yeah. That was great.

53:58

Yeah. I think we definitely can go into it. More

54:00

today if we well for Japanese the you

54:02

can I give you I just give you

54:04

guys just one bullet before we go to

54:06

chew on in So in a lot so

54:09

d you do with tracking this at the

54:11

Ukrainian shut down you know Russian Awacs basically

54:13

an atheist, the Russians only have nine of

54:15

those and the Ukrainians now shut down to

54:17

not the only at seven last. Are

54:20

rarely analyses are I like slots? Oh

54:22

excellent. Okay so so split bad as

54:24

the point is, The. Point is this

54:26

your it to remember a couple weeks

54:28

scars Talking about how the Ukrainians are

54:31

extending the reins on patriots name is.

54:41

Right up to the yeah to the front line

54:43

fire and as soon as those in a soon

54:45

as the rockets rather to say anything back and

54:47

and a trick you know.this lot of thing sent

54:49

make that difficult. It sounds easy but it's not.

54:51

It's getting in a rapid target data it is.

54:55

It's. It's also a D. V.

54:58

r The ability to. To.

55:00

Transmit that target data in time, you notify

55:02

the rockets and then explain that for a

55:05

while. but that but it getting target data.

55:07

You know when I have really rapidly moving.

55:09

Target and transmitted to enter in of

55:12

battery that smooth and baobab. All these

55:14

things is apparently complicated as he can

55:16

gather the friendliest have cracked the code

55:19

on that and I know that they're

55:21

a D U R E and we

55:23

talked feather to you are under on

55:26

food and off I've been sickly particularly

55:28

are capable part of Ukrainian military. They

55:30

are feeding and target targeting data and

55:32

the result I think and speak too

55:35

soon but is clearly evident. Six Days

55:37

de France a shot down, six a

55:39

cast. In in Three Days

55:41

including or from the rather than

55:44

yeah including spore Su Thirty falls

55:46

in which yes, Tom. Green

55:48

you know again they've got unlimited number and

55:50

in a high high performance aircraft so they

55:53

seek it out something you know and then

55:55

they shut down the a safety this week

55:57

so I would say would probably gonna learn.

56:00

Trips to the trade from the Ukrainians

56:02

about air defense. Yeah. Me,

56:04

they ran a very capable at offense with

56:06

they Ain't One Not ancient but of a

56:08

thirty five year old sister. Yeah.

56:14

And a protected their infrastructure I was is

56:16

a plus front think that they managed it

56:19

and now the using patriots in a way

56:21

that. That's. Odd that we haven't by

56:23

like the as the the or a city though

56:25

they shut that down of the sea of Azov

56:28

than it might have been through a patriot in

56:30

a by pushing a patriot south but actually they

56:32

could pride they could have reached at length of

56:34

the reins on a pack to is ninety miles

56:36

of something so they could have reached it from

56:39

there. Are often as

56:41

behind Alliance Yeah. Awesome!

56:44

Cool. Guys Graham? Yeah, that is.

56:47

That is that. Everyone and down.

56:50

We'll. See you again in a few! Don't

56:52

don't forget. Yeah, don't go of it a

56:54

day. Don't forget to like its inscribed V.

56:57

Listen to us on audio rate and reviewed

56:59

five stars. That helps out big time. Check.

57:02

Out a subset check already swear. Ah,

57:06

Not as questions please? Yeah

57:08

yeah. Undone by by omits

57:10

on comments, bitches, gripes, moans

57:12

whenever. You can leave those. We're not going

57:15

to reduce weight. We feel them that. Although

57:17

all of that led that a calorie got

57:20

a D. Ah okay. a. Sacred.

57:22

S.