0:04

There Are No Girls on the Internet. As a production of iHeartRadio

0:06

and Unbossed Creative, I'm

0:12

brigitat and this is There Are No Girls on the

0:14

Internet. Graduation

0:18

is supposed to be a time for eager college

0:20

grads making speeches and walking

0:23

across the stage to receive their hard earned

0:25

diplomas, but campuses

0:28

around the country at places like usc

0:30

Columbia, and Emery have either

0:33

shrunk or canceled graduation

0:35

ceremonies in the wake of protests

0:37

demanding universities divest from Israel,

0:40

in other words, withdrawal any funds

0:42

their university endowments have invested in

0:44

companies that are linked to Israel. The

0:48

protests have really escalated recently,

0:50

and even before that, A digital billboard

0:52

truck funded by a well moneyed conservative

0:55

group drove around university campuses

0:57

at Columbia, Harvard, and UPenn with

1:00

pictures and names of students, accusing

1:03

them of being quote their campuses

1:05

leading anti semites. One

1:07

student whose picture and name were on a

1:09

billboard truck at Columbia spoke

1:11

to Verge, saying, I literally

1:14

did not leave my apartment the days my

1:16

friends told me about it. The student

1:18

said that her name was listed on the truck because

1:21

a club that she was no longer a part of had

1:23

signed on to an open letter urging Columbia

1:26

to cut ties with Israel. I completely

1:28

wiped as much as I could of my online

1:30

presence and stated my apartment as much

1:33

as I could, the student said. Meanwhile,

1:35

Canary Mission, a website that lists

1:38

people perceived as being supportive of Palestine

1:40

in order to keep them from getting future job prospects,

1:43

has stocked students across the country. It

1:46

is your duty to ensure that today's radicals

1:48

are not tomorrow's employees. A

1:50

video describing the project explains Caroline

1:53

Cinders and their colleague Sam are

1:55

part of Convocation Research and Design, or

1:58

Chords for short people who

2:00

are being doxed or at risk for being

2:02

doxed, train people on how to stay

2:04

safe both online and off while engaging in protest,

2:07

and advocate for technology to be designed in

2:09

more responsible ways. When

2:11

I first caught up with Caroline and Sam, I

2:13

thought this whole conversation would be pretty straightforward,

2:16

you know, turn off your phone out of protest, that

2:18

kind of thing. But as we spoke, Caroline

2:21

and Sam described just how charged

2:23

of a landscape we're talking about. And

2:25

I realized the conversation is so

2:27

much more complicated than that. So

2:34

when I first reached out to y'all to do this episode,

2:37

I thought it was going to be a pretty basic guide

2:39

for how folks protesting on

2:41

campus and off campus can stay

2:43

safe digitally. I thought we'd be talking

2:45

about pretty basic things like use

2:48

a pass code to unlock your phone so that if you're

2:50

detained by police they have a harder time getting into

2:52

it, or cover any distinctive tattoos,

2:55

that kind of thing. But then when

2:57

you and I started talking, I realized

2:59

there was so much more going on here,

3:01

and then I needed to take a step back. You all

3:03

told me about things like provocateurs

3:06

setting up fake dating profiles and then

3:08

going on fake dates with protesters

3:10

and trying to secretly record them saying

3:13

things to make them look bad James O'Keeffe

3:15

style, or how right wing influencers

3:17

are kind of selling themselves as a citizen

3:20

journalists and trying to make names for themselves

3:22

by engineering viral content of

3:24

protesters looking bad on top

3:26

of threats to protesters that

3:28

you might traditionally think of, you know, threats from

3:31

campus administration or police. So

3:33

can you just give us kind of the lay of the land

3:36

in terms of the threats that these student protesters

3:38

are facing right now.

3:40

These threats are wide and varied. I

3:43

think student activists are seeing

3:45

threats not only from

3:48

outside, but from inside as well,

3:50

So they're having to contend with school

3:53

administration, sometimes

3:57

hostile students

4:00

who are against

4:02

what they're protesting for, as

4:04

well as outside forces like

4:07

the police or outside

4:11

sometimes infiltrators like people

4:15

like Project Bearitas style where

4:18

they're trying to get into

4:20

protests in order to record

4:22

people who they perceive

4:25

as their political opposition in order

4:27

to make them look bad and then posting

4:29

that on the internet for clout

4:32

or subscriptions or money, as

4:35

well as a variety of other threats

4:39

that I think a lot of people don't really take into account.

4:42

So you talked about people doing this for clout

4:44

or engagement. Do you think that's a big

4:46

undercurrent of what we're seeing here, Like people who

4:48

are like, oh, this is a great opportunity to put

4:50

out some viral video that makes a protester

4:53

look bad or look uninformed, or look

4:56

threatening or dangerous. I'll put that

4:58

online and become a superstar myself.

5:00

I mean, we are more in a

5:03

time of the kind of like citizen journalists

5:06

some of them call themselves, or like man

5:08

on the street interviews where those are very

5:10

popular on like TikTok or Instagram or

5:13

Twitter or YouTube or

5:15

rumble, like the list goes on and on

5:17

of all these different platforms that they're able

5:19

to monetize these videos for

5:22

and it is very big in the

5:24

the cultural climate that

5:28

that these protests are happening in.

5:32

So yes

5:34

and no, like they are a small part

5:37

of these protests.

5:37

But any large event I feel like that's

5:41

happening happening collectively in

5:44

the country is going to

5:46

have probably a similar amount of

5:48

people that are chasing it for some

5:51

type of engagement and.

5:52

Just to build on that. You know, I really do think we are

5:55

in the age of the influencer. Like,

5:57

I think that is something a lot of folks to feel

5:59

comfortable saying. It is really hard

6:01

to say, you know, citation

6:04

needed in terms of how many folks are attending these

6:06

protests in person

6:08

or following them online right

6:11

and

6:13

commenting in a way that is related

6:16

to influencer or citizen journalism.

6:18

Like there are a variety of organizations

6:21

that are trying to identify student

6:23

protesters and docs

6:25

them and put their information online. Like one that comes

6:27

to mind is Camary Mission for example. But

6:30

yeah, there are a lot of folks that are

6:33

either or not a lot, but there are there

6:35

are definitely folks that are showing up to the protests

6:37

that are we could argue, have

6:40

you know, maybe some more malicious

6:42

intentions that are in

6:44

this morsus in journalism or influencer

6:47

space. But there's also lots of folks watching

6:50

online trying to identify

6:53

different different folks

6:55

at these protests and sort

6:57

of doing a kind of let's say, like recap

6:59

or an analysis. And this is stuff you know, we've

7:01

seen in many other different

7:04

kinds of spaces and ways. Like what comes

7:06

to mind for me is, you know the Johnny

7:08

Depp amber Heard trial where we saw so

7:10

many sort of armchair investigators

7:14

and heavy heavy quotes, body language

7:16

experts

7:19

like this, this is the lip readers

7:21

and things like that, and and but

7:24

that had like a real impact on how people

7:26

really perceived that trial and

7:29

how I would argue in really

7:32

discoloring amber Heard not as a victim

7:34

but as a perpetrator, when in fact

7:36

she was a victim, right, And so I think,

7:39

you know, we're still seeing a lot of that here

7:42

and now with folks I think also maybe

7:44

not physically being at the protest, but commenting

7:47

on them, analyzing

7:49

them, right, and providing

7:52

different kinds of like wrongful

7:54

assessments.

7:56

And similar to what we saw with the

7:58

Amber Heard Johnny Depth trial. Do

8:00

you have you seen that those

8:02

kind of armchair folks who aren't

8:04

necessarily involved in

8:06

the protest but are like you know, commenting

8:09

on the viral video they saw from

8:11

the protests or whatever, that that is having

8:14

an impact on how every

8:16

day people are perceiving what's going on on college

8:19

campuses across the country.

8:21

I think it's leading to like stratification

8:23

for sure, and I think some of that is

8:26

also you know, I would argue actually

8:28

also coming from a place even

8:30

of sadly like traditional media.

8:33

One of the things I like to highlight is we don't live in a harassment

8:35

literate society, and

8:38

I think a lot of the analysis

8:41

that is sort of existing around this,

8:43

this this particular conflict,

8:46

right, is sort of caught up in

8:49

a really lack of nuance. Right, So the

8:52

inability to see let's

8:54

say, the people of Gaza as individuals

8:57

that we are watching a genocide

8:59

unfold, that we are watching

9:02

things where many

9:04

respected, reputable international bodies,

9:07

right, are weighing in and saying like this is unprecedented

9:09

in terms of like a famine that's being caused,

9:12

in terms of the attack, in terms of the amount of journalists

9:14

killed, in terms of the amount of children that are killed

9:17

in this particular conflict,

9:20

right, And a

9:22

lot of what I think a lot was

9:24

happening is a version of context collapse in

9:26

which I

9:29

think some folks are weaponizing, are

9:33

weaponizing anti Semitism to

9:35

push for other agendas, and

9:37

that is also creating a space

9:39

in which it's very difficult to have one

9:42

could argue a nuanced conversation, right,

9:44

And I think that is a large part of

9:48

this. And then from there that kind of

9:50

gives bad actors a space to

9:54

push different kinds of agendas and

9:56

different kinds of information and also

9:58

in a way, almost again like justify the

10:01

doxing of different activists,

10:03

right. And so

10:06

I think it's

10:09

sort of hard to like definitively say, but

10:11

I do see on

10:15

on like the you know, on the

10:18

like writer or conservative end uh,

10:20

this sort of lack of nuance and inability

10:22

to understand like

10:26

a human rights conflict really muddying

10:29

the waters in terms of also how do you contextualize

10:32

or talk about let's say, like student

10:34

protesters.

10:35

So we talked a lot about like media

10:39

entities. I guess I'll say, who are known

10:41

provocateurs that like nobody should trust.

10:43

But I do think that national reporting

10:46

is not all it's not I have not seen a lot

10:48

of national reporting that is super clear

10:50

about what is going on, like the fact

10:53

that we're talking about nineteen like a

10:55

nineteen year old college freshman or something

10:58

being up against a coordinated, organized,

11:00

well funded institution with

11:03

a mission to dox them

11:05

and make them look bad, right, and so like, I

11:08

don't feel like we are really getting

11:11

a lot of opportunities to have that full

11:13

story told. I think

11:15

that the way that you have described it, Caroline, as

11:17

like we just don't live in a harassment literate

11:20

society where you know the

11:22

actual context of what that would be like and

11:24

what and like why that is happening

11:27

is not being reflected perhaps, And I

11:29

guess I wonder, like, how can we get to

11:31

a place where that's that story is

11:33

being told more honestly, where people really understand

11:35

that like, yeah, you're talking about a

11:38

college student for who and then a

11:41

billionaire funds a truck with their

11:43

picture and their name on it to drive around their campus,

11:45

right or like, like, how truly fucked

11:48

up? That really is.

11:49

Totally and thank you so much for that. I

11:53

I don't know how

11:55

we get towards a harassment literate society.

11:57

That's why I'm really grateful for podcasts

11:59

like No Girls on the So I've been really grateful

12:01

for a lot of the programming we've seen across different

12:04

kinds of civil society organizations. Been

12:07

extremely grateful for teen

12:09

Vogue and it's like existence over the

12:11

past few years. I

12:13

think a lot of this is really

12:16

sort of insisting on having nuanced

12:20

conversations. But I think a lot of it also actually

12:22

does come down to different

12:24

kinds of education, and

12:27

I don't know at what level that should should

12:30

happen or exist in Like, for example,

12:32

with our organization, we don't really work a

12:34

lot with children for a variety of reasons. Some

12:37

of that is also just like regulatory

12:40

reasons. It's not one of our advocacy

12:42

focuses because children are like under

12:44

eighteen, they're just a different legal group

12:46

than adults. But

12:48

you know, I think there's something to be said around how

12:52

do we how

12:54

do we sort of talk about things

12:56

like digital harm and also offline harm.

12:59

But I think that this is also an issue that adults

13:01

run into as well, Like you

13:04

can't necessarily summarize,

13:06

I think often

13:08

or I think it's difficult to summarize a lot of harassment

13:11

cases into a tweet, right, to summarize

13:13

it in a few characters.

13:16

And I think in this sort of space of us

13:18

trying to maybe editorialize

13:22

or in you know, take a stance

13:24

on something that often

13:26

really collapses the

13:29

nuance of what we're talking about. I

13:31

also think that there's like a

13:33

binary in which people tend

13:35

to approach good and bad,

13:38

and then that sort of weighs

13:40

into harrassment. I think that there's also

13:43

a deeper context here. So this is one of the

13:45

things I've noticed in some of the

13:47

trainings we do with folks that are like victims

13:49

that are facing harrassment or have been

13:52

harassed. And

13:55

I've also noted this with folks that are, let's

13:57

say, into being friends of her assers. It can be very

14:00

stabilizing and difficult to

14:02

sort of come to terms with that someone you care

14:04

about might harm someone else. Folks

14:07

often I've found in my

14:09

experience, So this is like in my observations,

14:13

like they'll sort of reflect on their

14:17

own personal feelings about it,

14:19

right, and what that says about them.

14:22

And it's one of those things where I like to say,

14:24

harassment isn't complicated, it's

14:26

your feelings about the harassmer that are complicated,

14:29

right, Like, those are the complexities. So

14:32

if you're a fan of Johnny Depp,

14:34

it's probably very difficult to

14:37

reconcile your fandom and

14:39

like this thing you've invested in, even

14:42

with clear evidence that

14:44

he has harmed someone, right, or

14:47

if someone is your friend. So then

14:49

what I've found is people try to look for logical

14:51

reasons, like, oh, what did the victim

14:54

do? There must be

14:56

a reason that this thing or

14:58

person or institution or country

15:00

I really like is doing

15:02

this. There has to be a logical

15:05

reason. And one of the things I like to

15:07

point out to is like sometimes there's not. It's

15:09

like the bitch eating crackers meme. Someone just

15:11

might not like that other person and

15:14

that's all that it takes, and they happen to like

15:16

you. And that is sometimes just

15:18

how harassment unfolds.

15:19

Right.

15:20

Other times people are seeking out a

15:23

weaker opponent to feel stronger.

15:25

You know, there's all different reasons. My

15:29

work in particular doesn't really focus

15:31

on the psychology of the harasser

15:33

or why they harass. That doesn't necessarily help me

15:35

help victims. What

15:38

helps me help victims is often

15:40

looking at like how they're being targeted, how

15:42

are systems being subverted to harm them,

15:45

how do we improve those systems,

15:47

and how do we also support victims in

15:49

a trauma informed way. So

15:51

I think this is where we're sort of seeing

15:54

this almost at scale. I

15:56

think the complexities here are

15:58

also in terms

16:00

of policy, they get very complex.

16:03

I would say in terms of is it a genocide

16:05

or not complex it is a genocide.

16:07

But I think this is where people also don't

16:09

understand international

16:12

relations or international politics,

16:14

I e. That the people of Gaza are

16:16

not Hamas, that they don't understand

16:19

how like aid work works, that they don't

16:21

understand different rules

16:23

of law and rules of war. In

16:25

terms of also how or how journalists

16:28

and the media are allowed

16:30

to engage in document how

16:33

different spaces or sites

16:35

are targeted or not targeted, right,

16:38

how aid and food is allowed to flow

16:40

in and out. Like these are we

16:42

work in human rights. These are even areas

16:45

that are complex to me because I don't work

16:47

in like war torn areas, right, So

16:50

these are also very complex systems

16:52

to myself as someone who is a human

16:54

rights expert. And so I think there's

16:56

no space right now with how

16:58

Internet conversation has been defined

17:01

or how we're engaging in it to be able

17:03

to have a conversation. I can't give you

17:05

a one tweet description

17:08

or summary of this, like I have to give you

17:10

a long essay. And then this

17:12

also butts up against you,

17:14

know, then

17:17

different kinds of miss and disinformation that

17:20

I think build on what Whitney Phillips calls

17:22

people's deep memetic framework, so beliefs

17:24

that you have and then you see those reflected

17:27

in other spaces. So if you've ever

17:30

like I'm from Louisiana, I very distinctly

17:32

remember Hurricane Katrina. You know,

17:35

I can understand how certain folks

17:37

in New Orleans and Louisiana and Mississippi,

17:39

where my mom's family is from,

17:41

like might have a slight

17:44

distrust of disaster relief

17:46

programs or trusting the government to like

17:48

handle disaster relief, right because people

17:50

have lived through many hurricanes and not seen

17:52

that go very well. So, like that's

17:55

a deep memetic frame of them saying like, oh,

17:58

can I trust an international body?

18:00

Right?

18:00

And while those are different things, you can see

18:02

how some of that mistrust

18:04

gets sown and how like missin disinformation

18:08

can sort of exacerbate

18:11

that at scale. So then how do

18:13

you have a conversation with someone who's

18:15

had lets of negative experiences with FEMA to then

18:17

be like, well, here's why actually you should trust

18:19

like this you and organization that you've never heard

18:21

of that only operates in

18:24

this one region. It becomes actually

18:26

very difficult to have those conversations.

18:29

And I think this is what I mean,

18:31

like these are the ripple effects of not living in

18:33

a harassment literate society, is

18:36

that we can't look at things just through a good

18:38

and bad binary. You have to look

18:40

at the context. You have to look at

18:42

impact versus intent, So like

18:44

what is the impact of someone's actions versus

18:48

like what they say their intent is. You

18:50

have to also look at I think, or

18:54

I think, really analyze and think very

18:56

deeply about one's own ego in

18:58

these situations, and like the

19:00

seeking of justice or like retribution,

19:03

that that sometimes results in

19:05

more and more and more harm. And

19:07

this is also very complex in which you want

19:09

to allow a space for victims to be

19:11

able to vocalize anger

19:14

and distrust and dissent, like they're like, you're

19:16

allowed to be angry. This also then conflates

19:19

or combats

19:21

our idea very like

19:23

I would say global Northwestern American

19:25

idea of like what a victim is. There isn't

19:27

one kind of victim. There's so many different kinds

19:30

of victims. There's no one way to

19:32

embody victimhood. And I

19:34

think that's also a complexity people don't

19:36

understand, which is how we then get into I

19:39

don't know if I believe that person or I would have done

19:41

this in this situation, And

19:43

the answer is like, you don't know what you would do in that situation

19:46

until you're in that situation.

19:49

And so that's also a very strange

19:52

and skewed way to view how an

19:54

individual or a group of people are responding to

19:56

trauma.

20:03

Let's take quick break

20:14

at our back.

20:16

It reminds me so much of

20:19

what we saw around gamer Gate in some

20:21

ways, and just this idea that

20:23

it's so much about, like

20:26

what's happening is maybe not so complex.

20:28

The feelings surrounding it might be

20:30

the complex thing. And then the

20:32

bit where we then don't

20:35

have a media that is informed

20:37

enough or harassment literate enough

20:40

to really lay out what's

20:42

happening, right, And so they try to

20:44

find a way of like reporting

20:46

along those binaries of like well maybe

20:49

they maybe they they really do just

20:51

care about ethics and game journalism,

20:53

and like maybe this woman really did deserve

20:55

it and have it coming, and maybe you know, maybe

20:58

women have taken things too are in their criticism

21:01

of gaming or whatever. Rather than actually

21:04

laying out like the sort

21:06

of complexities that you did and the nuance that

21:08

you just did, it's so much easier

21:10

to have it be this binary, simple

21:12

thing. And I almost wonder if they're if

21:15

they're like giving us what we want in a kind of way,

21:17

because we want simple answers. Sometimes

21:19

we want like oh bad guy, good guy,

21:21

or here's the reason they did that, and what

21:24

they sometimes what we don't want is like, oh, well

21:26

it's actually a really complicated situation totally.

21:29

I mean, this is something I see where I

21:32

talk about a lot in my coaching

21:35

with different victims of harassment, is that

21:38

one of the one of the very

21:40

unsatisfying things that comes out

21:42

of of harassment. There's many unsatisfying

21:45

things. There's many awful things. There's many harmful things.

21:48

Is that you might never get a why, and

21:50

the why might be something that

21:53

feels simplistic or

21:55

minimal or naive, or you

21:58

know, not even very well thought out.

22:01

And one of the things I

22:05

try to really coach people through is it

22:07

might also not be worth thinking about

22:09

why, Like it might actually,

22:12

you know, it is your being targeted,

22:14

but it might not have anything to do with

22:16

you. And in terms of seeking the why,

22:19

like why this person is doing this, that

22:23

that might not give you the peace of mind

22:25

or the closure that you're looking for. And

22:27

I think that's also I think

22:29

that's really hard for people. And I know

22:31

that, like when I have faced harassment,

22:35

sometimes that's even hard for me, even though I know that,

22:37

like I know that if someone

22:39

were to tell me why, it wouldn't

22:42

be it wouldn't be the answer that

22:44

I'm looking for. It maybe wouldn't solve

22:46

any of the conflicting feelings I'm feeling

22:49

about that particular instance.

22:52

And I think, you know, this is where it is sometimes

22:54

important to separate harrassment research and

22:56

harassment like literature from let's

22:58

say international politics and

23:01

war and conflict. But I

23:03

do think it is at times

23:05

and important to sort of understand, Like

23:08

the why can be incredibly

23:11

simplistic and heavy quotes, like

23:13

I think a lot about my

23:15

partner's family. He was born in nineteen ninety one

23:18

in the Western Balkans, when Yugoslavia

23:20

was breaking apart, and like, what are

23:22

the whys there? There's a lot of

23:25

whys that Yugoslavia was breaking

23:27

apart. There's a lot of whys in

23:29

which a group different

23:31

groups were targeted, and a lot of those whys

23:33

are not satisfying, you know, because it comes

23:36

down to hate

23:38

and discrimination and Islamophobia

23:41

and like very entrenched

23:45

like ethnic ties and views of

23:47

a particular region. And that's an overly simplistic

23:50

way to even look right at that region.

23:52

But that's also a why, and that doesn't explain

23:55

or excuse anything. And I also don't know if that

23:58

improves what

24:01

what it feels like to have lived through that. That's

24:03

just an observation, right, And

24:05

I think sometimes you

24:07

know, some like sometimes the most awful

24:09

things that happen there is a simple

24:12

answer again, which is unsatisfying, which is just we

24:14

live in a society that is full

24:17

of bias and hate and power

24:19

differentials.

24:22

True, but I could see

24:24

how that's not the most satisfying

24:26

answer, particularly if you've been

24:29

in a situation that has like upended your life,

24:31

right Like if you're like, oh, someone

24:33

got a picture of me at a protest and now I

24:35

am unable to live a normal life. Having

24:37

the answer be like, oh, well, we

24:40

live in a society that's full of hate that

24:42

people somebody identified

24:44

you as an easy target to pick on, and

24:47

that's what they did. I could see how that could be

24:49

unsatisfying. But it goes back to what you

24:51

said about sometimes the why is

24:53

not necessarily worth dwelling

24:55

on totally.

24:57

And this is something where I'd like to say, like that also

24:59

doesn't excuse the harm you're facing, Like

25:01

like you shouldn't be facing that, right, Like that's something

25:03

that no one should be exacting

25:06

or putting on to you for you to experience,

25:10

which I think is why Sam and I really

25:12

do focus on victims

25:15

their care. What are the ways in which

25:17

systems, inadvertently

25:20

or you know, via their own design,

25:22

create space, create flaws

25:24

and vulnerabilities and spaces for harm

25:27

because I don't need to know the why to focus

25:30

on the victim. We don't need to know the why

25:32

to support someone and

25:35

even for us, I think, even if I were to

25:37

put on my research hat, the why isn't also

25:39

a satisfying thing for

25:42

me to seek personally, even in a research

25:45

context.

25:47

So you might be listening to this and think that it sounds

25:49

like I'm trying to dissuade you from showing up

25:51

to a protest irl because you could find

25:53

yourself a target for this kind of harassment

25:56

surveillance and criminalization. But

25:58

Caroline and Sam don't see it that way. In

26:00

fact, they say that you should still make

26:02

your voice heard while also having a

26:04

good understanding of the realities of our surveillance

26:07

landscape and what's at stake. When

26:09

I reached out, I thought this conversation

26:11

was going to be a lot more simple that it ended up being.

26:14

And I think that is reflective of

26:17

the need to talk about this whole conversation

26:19

in a way that is surveillance literate, right, that like

26:22

really takes into account the full sense

26:24

of like why experts

26:26

like yourselves recommend make certain recommendations

26:29

to people, how it connects to

26:31

a larger criminalization

26:34

and surveillance landscape when it comes to things

26:36

like protest in descent, And so I

26:38

wonder, like do you think we live

26:40

in a surveillance literate society,

26:42

and do you think people have a

26:44

good sense of like how these things are all connected.

26:48

Oh?

26:49

Absolutely, absolutely not. We

26:51

do not live in a surveillance literate

26:54

society. I mean there's just

26:56

the capabilities of statent on state actors

26:59

is is not

27:01

really completely understood. I feel like people are

27:03

oftentimes protesters or

27:05

activists, shall we say, are oftentimes operating

27:08

with a knowledge base that's maybe like five,

27:11

ten, fifteen years even sometimes

27:13

backdated. So or

27:16

sometimes people will just be like, oh, well,

27:18

the adversary maybe the state

27:21

we'll say that's the adversary in this example

27:23

is so advanced that why

27:26

should I even bother? Like they can read

27:28

everything that I'm doing,

27:30

they can read my mind.

27:32

Basically, They're just that

27:34

capable. Not the

27:36

case.

27:38

The opposition is oftentimes

27:42

not as sophisticated as we think.

27:45

And there are things that we can implement

27:48

best practices in digital

27:50

security and privacy that we can

27:53

implement that will keep us safe er.

27:57

And it's like super simple

27:59

stuff you signal with disappearing

28:01

messages for communications, like don't

28:03

just use text messages or phone

28:06

calls, like super

28:08

simple stuff like that will

28:11

keep people safer, like you

28:13

said in the beginning of this podcast, like don't

28:15

have a face unlock on your phone

28:18

or fingerprint unlock on your phone, because

28:21

the cops, if you are arrested, can just

28:23

take the phone and hold it up to your face and then unlock

28:25

your phone.

28:27

Stuff like that. But backing

28:29

up a little to surveillance.

28:32

You know, the capacity for

28:34

surveillance is really

28:37

increased with the proliferation

28:40

of AI assisted facial

28:42

recognition or you

28:45

know HD cameras that can do

28:48

like a thousand X zoom

28:51

and still have like four K quality,

28:55

or even like we could talk about

28:57

all the different optics that are on like helicopter

28:59

cameras, police helicopter cameras that can

29:01

like see in thermal, in infrared,

29:04

in different heat signature patterns

29:06

in you know, movement

29:09

outlines and stuff like that, to

29:12

where they can also like zoom

29:15

in to where they can essentially see

29:17

a protesters screen on their phone

29:20

from a helicopter.

29:21

That type of.

29:21

Stuff, or just

29:24

like super stuff that's been around for

29:26

like decades, like police poll cams that

29:28

they'll just like stick somewhere and people just

29:30

won't notice, or applars,

29:33

automatic license plate readers to kind

29:36

of map, like where people are driving around

29:39

all of these things. They exist, they're in

29:41

the real world, and they're used by

29:44

law enforcement on a daily basis

29:46

almost And this is just like the physical

29:48

world that we're talking about.

29:49

This isn't even the digital world where we're.

29:52

Talking about, like them

29:54

having the capabilities of seeing

29:57

all of your social media accounts interlinked

30:00

and essentially

30:03

pulled together in one little package

30:05

deal that is maybe like this is Sam,

30:08

Like this is his Facebook, this is his

30:10

Instagram, this is his Tumblr, this is his MySpace

30:12

from fifteen years ago. They

30:15

have these capabilities, but

30:17

we can do things to

30:20

prevent them from having fuller

30:24

access to them, and we can make

30:26

things private. We can have burner

30:28

accounts, burner emails, burner phone numbers,

30:31

things that aren't maybe directly associated

30:33

with us.

30:33

And there again this.

30:35

Does boil back down to best

30:37

practices in digital security

30:39

and privacy.

30:40

Yeah, I have heard the feeling

30:43

like, oh, the state they have everything

30:45

about me? Why bother? I've heard that described

30:48

as like a kind of nihilism, like

30:50

surveillance nihilism, where you're like it doesn't

30:52

even matter anymore. I

30:55

like, I get it, because

30:57

the list of ways the state surveils

31:00

US is vast and I could see, I could I

31:02

totally understand that as a reaction,

31:05

but Sam, you're

31:07

so right like it. There are still

31:09

things we could do, basic steps that

31:11

we could take to maintain

31:14

privacy, and I think the state,

31:16

it kind of like, is counting on us being

31:18

like, oh, well, there's no point of doing any of this. I

31:20

may as well just leave my phone unlocked. I may as well just

31:22

like not wear a mask. I may as well just whatever,

31:25

because they already you know, they already have everything.

31:27

It is.

31:27

It is, there are things you can do, and the state

31:30

totally benefits from us thinking that

31:32

that's not true, that there's nothing we can do, despite

31:35

the fact that I do understand that as a reaction

31:38

totally.

31:38

And I think there's something else also here

31:41

too, where I want

31:43

to highlight where I'm about to say sounds contradictory,

31:45

and I'm going to try my best to say

31:48

it in a way with nuance lay

31:50

it on us. The

31:53

state is very powerful, and I think also

31:55

at times people overestimate

31:58

or don't totally understand how the tools

32:00

of the state work, so they have a lot

32:02

of data on us. But also

32:05

like there's a lot of things that surveillance

32:07

technology can't do that. I think

32:10

often people misunderstand that

32:12

it can do. And I

32:15

think that isn't That isn't to

32:17

say we should all take a sigh of relief,

32:20

you know. I think we should all be like breathing in and out constantly,

32:24

you know, trying to quell different

32:26

levels of anxiety. And I say, this is a highly anxious

32:29

person.

32:29

Same.

32:31

But but one of the things I think it is important,

32:33

and I'm thinking about this in like a protest context,

32:36

is you know, like the state has a

32:39

lot of data on a lot of people, as

32:41

we learned from

32:44

from like Edward Snowden and

32:47

and like the prison program for example. But

32:49

also there's like so much data that at times

32:52

it can be hard to identify people. And that's

32:54

the other end of security nihilism that I see

32:56

is people being like, I'm just a drop of data

32:58

in a very large data bucket. And

33:01

for me, it's like, well, you never know when

33:03

the state is going to decide to look at you, And

33:06

if you have any marginalized

33:08

identity, then you know already that

33:12

bad actors of the state, like a local police

33:14

force, they don't need very much to decide

33:17

to look at you. In fact, they need almost nothing

33:19

to decide to arrest you to like,

33:22

you know, fuck up aspects of your life, et

33:24

cetera. And that's only getting more

33:26

and more worse now, especially

33:29

in the United States. If we look at the overturning

33:31

of Roe v. Wade, of attacks on gender affirming

33:34

care, like it's so difficult to

33:36

sort of just do things we should be able

33:38

to do. One of the things I want

33:40

to highlight this is something I think we've seen a little

33:42

bit in our training, is people sort

33:45

of at times sort

33:47

of assuming that let's say, like police

33:49

surveillance is magical,

33:52

or that like AI is magical.

33:55

It's not. There are things we actually can do to

33:57

be safe. And I think that's

34:00

like what I want to sort of emphasize.

34:02

This is like the space of nuance, Like we should

34:04

be afraid, and also there are things we

34:06

can do to try to like mitigate

34:09

and reduce these harms and be

34:11

safer, and we

34:13

should do those things. We should especially

34:15

do those things, and we should do those things if we're also

34:18

in community with marginalized

34:20

community members. So like I'm

34:24

a white, non binary person, you

34:27

know, I was born in the United States. For

34:29

me, going to a protest unmasked

34:33

even though it's COVID, So actually you should all be wearing

34:35

masks out there anyway. But

34:37

like if I were to go hypothetically unmasked,

34:40

which I wouldn't do, Like

34:42

me getting arrested is very different than someone else getting

34:45

arrested. But I shouldn't be worried just about

34:47

me. I should be worried about the people

34:49

I'm standing with, right, And I should

34:51

be worried about how I've saved those

34:53

people in my phone, And I should be worried

34:55

about what kinds of things can

34:57

be done with just a little bit

35:00

of like nudging from the police.

35:02

Right.

35:03

And this is where understanding

35:06

security measures and privacy measures

35:08

and having good what Matt Mitchell

35:10

calls like security hygiene and digital hygiene

35:13

is really important. Right,

35:15

So like disappearing messages, using signal,

35:17

not bringing my phone at all to a

35:19

protest, these are really helpful

35:22

things versus going

35:24

to a protest and thinking you need like

35:27

a farity bag and a mic jammer

35:29

and all these things. But then let's say

35:31

you're connecting to public Wi

35:33

Fi and you're messaging and you're

35:35

posting on Twitter, like

35:38

that has almost negated the other

35:40

things you also don't necessarily need something like

35:42

a mic jammer if you

35:45

like, you know, if you don't have malware on your phone.

35:47

Right.

35:47

So I think that there's these things where people sometimes

35:50

sort of over estimate

35:52

the capabilities of

35:54

some of the tools that the police have and

35:57

then underestimate how little

36:00

evidence the state needs to

36:02

seize your devices or be able

36:04

to engage with

36:06

with your phone. And so I think it's this

36:08

balance of understanding where it does like security

36:11

on the device stop, and

36:13

like good protest

36:16

tactics start, like my good

36:18

physical security, right, And

36:20

I think these are very much intertwined.

36:23

And I think that's also another level of complexity

36:27

we've been dealing with, Like we've also

36:29

worked with activists who are really nervous

36:31

and like want to put their phone in the freezer

36:33

or the microwave. And you know, that's

36:35

something too where it's like I totally hear that

36:38

you're scared if you

36:40

want to do that, Like I

36:42

can understand how that makes you feel

36:44

safer, But the issue more is like,

36:47

let's talk about what would be happening

36:49

on your phone that would cause

36:51

that to happen, and

36:54

also that there's an even

36:56

more serious question of that means there's something on your

36:58

phone that is the listening in all other different

37:00

instances, and so if

37:03

you're really worried about that, then the problem

37:06

is something we need to look at on the phone.

37:08

Right.

37:08

The problem is spyware or malware

37:11

on your phone, right, And

37:14

that's something we need to deal with immediately.

37:17

And I think that's also something that I think

37:20

is very difficult to understand or

37:24

work through if if you aren't a technology

37:26

expert. And that sucks, because you

37:29

know, we want people to have the

37:32

most accurate and

37:34

like salient information as possible, and

37:37

it I think a lot of barriers to this

37:39

is having to be constantly updated with how

37:42

technology works, what are the different kinds

37:44

of tools and apparatuses of the state, and

37:46

then how do you get that information into

37:48

people's hands.

37:54

More after a quick break,

38:05

let's get right back into it. Yeah,

38:10

I'm almost cringing a little bit because I definitely

38:12

went to a meeting where we

38:15

all put our phones in the freezer because somebody

38:17

saw it on the Snowden Doc. And then I definitely

38:19

like logged onto Starbucks WiFi.

38:21

I had a whole conversation about what we talked about

38:23

via Starbucks WiFi,

38:26

via just SMS messengers like oh well,

38:29

like the more like it

38:32

felt cool to put our phones in the freezer,

38:34

but I took no other security steps

38:36

that day, and in fact did things that were

38:38

like risky that you know, a little

38:41

common sense, basic considerations

38:44

would have probably been more effective

38:47

or made a bigger impact on my security

38:49

or my made a bigger impact on

38:52

my security than like, let's all put our phones in

38:54

the freezer. And I think, Caroline,

38:56

you made a point about people

38:58

not being tech expert. I wonder,

39:01

you know, in twenty twenty four, with the ubiquity

39:03

of smartphones and facial recognition technology

39:05

and doxing and like all of these

39:08

technological innovations and advancements,

39:11

do you think that folks feel

39:14

a barrier to protest or

39:16

to speak up and use their voices because

39:18

it seems like, well, this is so much, this is

39:20

so opaque. Some of the guides

39:23

and way that people talk about technology and

39:25

security feels not

39:27

accessible. So I'm just gonna like not show

39:29

up because who has the time? Like I wonder, is

39:32

that something that you've seen in your work?

39:33

So I haven't personally seen that, And

39:36

some of that I will highlight might be from where

39:38

we sit as an organization because

39:41

we tend to work with other

39:43

community organizations. We

39:45

tend to work with human rights defenders,

39:47

journalists, activists, and

39:49

then members of the general public who

39:52

like want to engage with this knowledge.

39:54

So I would say that like, I haven't seen

39:57

necessarily a deterrence. What

39:59

I have seen is people showing up but still

40:01

being scared and or

40:04

showing up and then something bad happens

40:07

and they weren't prepared,

40:10

let's say, for for

40:12

for what was happening, and that I want to highlight that's not there.

40:14

That's not their fault, Like we live under

40:17

surveillance capitalism, how software

40:19

and hardware has been designed is not the fault

40:22

of the user or the vulnerable individual.

40:25

That's the fault of capitalism

40:27

and big tech. And like a lot of not

40:30

regulation we have in the United States,

40:32

right, and so I think luckily

40:35

at least you know, Again, also we're speaking

40:37

from a very specific sort of space convocation,

40:41

our lab, in which we are often

40:43

engaging with people that are you know,

40:45

human rights defenders, journalists, activists,

40:48

community organizations. So we

40:50

haven't seen a hesitation.

40:53

But what we have seen is people recognizing

40:55

that there

40:58

are like skills and tools that they that

41:00

they don't have, and they're

41:02

seeing that also in real time. I think right

41:04

now because of the amount

41:07

of doxing attempts that are

41:09

happening on social media, and

41:11

so I think that's weighing into our people are now

41:14

a bit more aware. You know, there's

41:16

been many stories, as you know, Bridges, as you pointed

41:18

out, with billion paires renting buses

41:22

and putting people's faces on them or putting

41:24

people's names on them. And I think that

41:26

is, you know, causing folks to reflect and be

41:29

like, oh, like that could be me, and I still

41:31

need to show up. I still want to show up,

41:33

but how do I how do I create

41:36

or maintain some safety knowing that

41:38

that is a potential outcome. So that's

41:40

a little bit more of I think

41:42

what we've been seeing.

41:43

I started this conversation wanting to use

41:45

the focus or framing of like campus

41:48

protesters, campus activists, and what's happening

41:50

on campus is right now, But how have

41:52

you seen these same tactics being used to

41:54

target anybody, like people who are not necessarily

41:57

protesters, who maybe work for companies

41:59

that are like deemed to woke

42:02

or have in some way have been

42:04

like perceived as ideologically

42:06

against the bad actors who are doing

42:08

the dosing, Like, is this the kind of threat

42:11

that really all of us might

42:13

need to be aware of, whether or not we've ever set foot

42:16

on an IRL protest on a campus.

42:18

I would say so. I would

42:20

say, with how you know, regardless

42:23

of the country you live in, with

42:26

how politics have been going over

42:28

the past few years, it is always

42:30

good. It's very important

42:33

to be thinking about your own

42:35

digital footprint, data that's out

42:37

there about you, and how it can

42:39

be used or misused to harm you. I

42:42

think that that's something we

42:44

all now especially

42:46

really need to be thinking about.

42:49

I don't want people to listen to this episode and

42:51

think every threat that we have

42:53

discussed is something that they personally

42:56

like, will be are likely

42:59

to become a target for. Like, I don't

43:01

want people to be paranoid. I want people to be informed

43:03

and smart, right, And I guess, like, in

43:05

your work, how have you prepared

43:08

people to understand like they're

43:10

specific their specific needs in this

43:12

whole conversation.

43:14

Oh gosh, I think this is one of the hardest things. This

43:16

is where this is why we do I

43:18

think really targeted workshops. But Samya,

43:21

do you want to do you want to.

43:21

Weigh in the answer is

43:24

threat modeling.

43:25

Oh, you

43:28

were going to say that, I was going to say that,

43:30

Sam is going to say it.

43:31

Well, we all have different

43:33

threat models, right, and what Carl's

43:36

threat model is going to be way different than mine, and

43:39

what bridgets is is going to be way different

43:41

than Carlos. Threat modeling is

43:43

the process of trying to figure

43:45

out the possibility

43:48

or probability of a threat

43:51

that the person

43:54

may encounter and

43:56

weighing that weighing

43:58

the consequences of that threat

44:00

on how realistic

44:03

it is that it will happen or will not happen. And

44:06

I think that people can

44:10

try to figure out what

44:12

their personal threat model is by

44:16

considering who the bad

44:18

actors that they may encounter are

44:21

and what their capabilities are, and

44:23

then what they're trying to protect.

44:26

So that might maybe student protesters

44:29

that want to keep their anonymity,

44:32

and so maybe they will not bring

44:34

their phone to a protest, or maybe they will wear

44:37

a mask or cover their tattoos in

44:39

order to not be identified physically.

44:44

So that's just like one example of a of

44:48

a threat posed to campus

44:53

activists. And this

44:55

threat modeling process can really be used

44:59

for all aspects of life. You

45:02

can threat model everything in

45:04

your daily life.

45:05

I mean, I just to build on that. Like one thing I

45:07

want to highlight is we all threat model every

45:09

day, as Sam is saying, like you

45:12

can use it in your everyday life, and you do, Like

45:14

when you decide to cross the street not

45:16

at the light, you are threat

45:18

modeling right when you're sort of making

45:20

a decision around how

45:23

you're going to get

45:25

home or go to go somewhere. That

45:28

is like a form of threat modeling. And

45:30

I think I

45:33

think that there, this is I think this is what gets

45:35

really tied into then trying

45:37

to understand a bit more about surveillance

45:39

literacy and like security literacy and

45:41

privacy literacy is really important. Threat

45:43

modeling is incredibly important.

45:47

It's how you can decide, you know,

45:49

it's how you can maintain some safety.

45:52

What I think is harder when

45:54

the challenges is also helping folks

45:56

feel safe and secure around

45:59

threat mode. And some of that now

46:01

comes down to how do we understand like

46:04

the tactics and tools

46:06

of our adversaries. That's understanding

46:09

there why right so why it doesn't

46:11

matter, but it's understanding like what are they using?

46:14

And so I think for folks

46:18

that are going to actions, please

46:20

go. Please try to

46:22

wear something that sort

46:24

of helps anonymize you. So

46:26

I would not recommend wearing your

46:29

you know, cal

46:32

state the year you're graduating

46:34

shirt, or

46:38

like your really awesome jacket that

46:40

you made that's one of a kind. I

46:43

would recommend wearing something that's a little

46:45

bit more plain. I

46:47

would really try to cover

46:49

your face, cover your tattoos. I

46:52

would recommend leaving your phone at home

46:55

if you feel comfortable doing that, you

46:59

know, I think this gets into a different space

47:01

if we're talking about folks that are

47:05

either there to observe

47:08

or document. There's

47:11

a lot of great guides out there on how

47:14

to document a protest

47:16

safely. Some

47:18

of that, you know, we point to

47:20

our friends at open Archive

47:23

and Witness who have really great guides written

47:26

for human rights defenders on how

47:28

to document actions and safely upload

47:30

them. We recommend following that, you

47:33

know, please check out different safety

47:35

guides that have been put out, you know, pretty

47:37

recently from the eff or the Markup in

47:39

terms of how to stay safe at a protest. We're

47:42

updating, we're updating

47:44

and creating a new anti doxing guide, and we're also

47:46

putting out guides hopefully soon. But

47:49

a big thing is, you know, maybe don't bring your phone with

47:51

you, and if you have an iPhone and you need to bring

47:53

your phone, consider turning it off,

47:55

putting it lockdown, mown, and turning it off.

47:57

Yeah.

47:58

Well, actually hear from eff technologist

48:00

who wrote that guide next week about some concrete

48:03

tips for digital security at protests. So folks

48:05

should definitely tune in, But are you

48:07

all working on any guides that folks should know about.

48:10

One thing is like, you know, if

48:12

you turn your phone on and you've brought

48:14

with you at the protest and you're like tweeting

48:17

about where you are and you're taking a photo

48:20

of where you are, that might negate

48:22

a lot of the safety tips that you've already

48:25

gone through, right, And so one thing to consider

48:27

is also like can you put

48:29

that out later? Can you scrub metadata from it?

48:33

Are you doxing accidentally your

48:35

fellow protesters? Like are they are

48:38

their faces covered? You can use

48:40

Signals face blurring tool which they

48:42

have you can blur out people's

48:44

faces. That

48:46

also helps strip the image of metadata.

48:49

So there's like all these different things you

48:51

can do, and I think it's worth doing those

48:53

and going to the protest.

48:54

I think some of this is.

48:55

Also shifting our own

48:57

concepts of what it means to sort of document

49:00

and protest safely.

49:02

And I think some of that is.

49:05

Recognizing that, like going to the protest is

49:08

almost more important than

49:10

publishing an image that you were there. I

49:13

think there's other ways to talk about being there, And

49:16

that's not to discourage people from posting,

49:19

but rather it's to say threat

49:21

model and really think about what's in this image?

49:24

You know, what does this image reveal?

49:26

Right?

49:26

What does this image reveal about me? Does

49:28

it reveal about other people? Could

49:32

someone be identified? Who

49:35

is you know, who I'm protesting

49:37

with? How could this negatively

49:39

impact them?

49:40

Right?

49:41

I think it is thinking about some of those some

49:43

of those things as we engage

49:45

in collective action.

49:49

And so those are like some of the tips I want

49:51

people to like think about, which is, you

49:54

know, make a plan with your friends later of when you're

49:56

going to meet up and pick a time and make

49:58

sure you know how to get there, and and if

50:01

you don't show up in a certain amount of time, maybe

50:04

that's a signal to them that something has

50:06

happened, and like have that conversation. And these

50:08

are like really safe ways to still go about

50:11

and engage in this

50:14

really necessary. I would argue, like civic

50:16

action that we need to be engaging

50:18

in, and that's just a

50:20

really great way to cut down on ensuring

50:23

your your phone

50:25

isn't, you know, contributing to

50:30

this ongoing surveillance

50:32

apparatus, or just turn

50:34

your phone off and don't turn it on until

50:37

it's over.

50:38

Caroline Sam, thank you so much

50:40

for being here, and like truly thank

50:43

you for your work. We need folks like

50:45

you who are making it easier and

50:47

safer for everybody to use their voices

50:49

right now. So I hope this gives people

50:51

a sense of how they can do that. Thanks

50:53

for being here. If

50:58

you're looking for ways to support the show, check out

51:00

our March store at tangody dot com slash

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store. Got a story

51:04

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51:13

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