0:04

Hello and welcome to an update episode of

0:06

This is Not a Drill. I'm

0:30

Gavin Essler. In our previous

0:32

podcast, we reported on a new

0:34

era of espionage as the CIA

0:36

and other US government intelligence agencies

0:38

warned publicly of an increasingly fragile

0:41

global order. Meanwhile, in

0:43

Europe from Ukraine to the Baltic and

0:45

beyond, Russian intelligence operatives

0:47

have been increasingly active and

0:50

menacing. But then, on Friday,

0:52

March 22, more than

0:54

130 people were killed in Russia

0:56

itself. Gunmen attacked the audience

0:58

in the Krakos concert hall just 12 miles

1:01

from the Kremlin. Islamic State

1:03

claimed responsibility. Four

1:05

men from Tajikistan were arrested and

1:08

brutally treated by the Russian authorities.

1:11

But all this leaves many more

1:13

questions than answers. Western intelligence

1:15

agencies actually warned Vladimir Putin's

1:17

own intelligence agencies, including the

1:20

FSB, that an Islamist terrorist

1:22

attack in Russia was imminent.

1:24

For some inexplicable reason, these

1:26

warnings were ignored or

1:28

discounted. For his insight on

1:31

the attack and what looks like an

1:33

extraordinary Russian intelligence failure, I'm joined again

1:35

by the Russian intelligence expert, Andrei

1:38

Soledadov. Andrei,

1:41

can we start with what you make

1:44

of this pretty profound

1:46

Russian intelligence failure it would

1:48

seem and the Krakos city hall

1:50

concert attack? What do you think has been going on

1:52

there? Well, I think

1:54

that you are absolutely

1:56

correct. It is a failure of the

1:59

FSB. Russian agency

2:01

in charge of counter-terrorism. Unfortunately, it's

2:04

also a failure of emergency services.

2:06

More people were killed by fire

2:08

than by terrorists, which is a

2:11

horrible, horrible tragedy. Unfortunately, it's not

2:13

the very first time we see

2:16

these kind of problems

2:18

with the Russian counter-terrorism response.

2:20

And it is the

2:22

same story over and over again. And

2:24

I've been covering this topic for 20

2:27

plus years, and it's still

2:29

the same problem. It

2:32

looks like there are some really big

2:36

problems with the Russian response

2:38

to these kind of attacks.

2:41

And it's just there.

2:45

Now, of course, any intelligence agency

2:48

can have an intelligence failure. But

2:50

the United States in particular is

2:52

very clear. They warned the

2:54

Russians about this. So what do you think

2:56

went wrong there? Is it that

2:58

actually nobody dares go and say to Vladimir

3:01

Putin, look, the CIA have just told us

3:03

something bad is going to happen. Maybe we

3:05

should do something. I mean, is it really

3:07

something like that? That humans are frightened within

3:09

the Russian system of telling the leader that

3:12

something bad might happen. First

3:15

of all, I need to remind

3:17

our listeners that unfortunately

3:19

these kind of things happen.

3:21

And I remember quite well

3:23

what in 2013 in

3:26

the United States, there was

3:28

this horrible attack called Boston

3:30

bombings. And the Russians, specifically

3:32

the FSB, sent several

3:35

letters to the Americans. And

3:38

it was quite embarrassing for the

3:40

FBI because it looked like they

3:42

missed this warning. The problem was

3:45

that with the FSB and their

3:47

letters 10 years ago, it was

3:49

not actually about a real warning.

3:52

What actually the FSB wanted together

3:55

and why they sent all these letters, they

3:57

asked for information on the.

4:00

two brothers who

4:02

eventually attacked the

4:04

microphone in Boston. They didn't

4:06

provide any information. As far as I

4:09

understand, now it is a slightly

4:11

different situation. The Americans did

4:14

send some information. The

4:16

head of the FSB said

4:19

that, look, this information

4:21

was not detailed, so

4:23

they couldn't act upon this

4:26

information, which to

4:28

me sounds a bit hypocritical, because

4:30

of course you never get a

4:32

full picture. You always

4:35

get a tip, and then you

4:37

just need to decide whether you

4:39

think it's worth it to act

4:41

upon it and ask your people,

4:43

order your people, to go

4:45

and investigate the warning. All

4:47

you think is absolutely nothing.

4:51

Of course, in the climate we have

4:53

now in Russia, to be

4:56

suspected of being too

4:58

close to the Americans might be quite

5:00

dangerous. Thinking about some

5:03

unfortunate officer of the FSB

5:06

who was put in a position basically

5:08

to make a case for the Americans

5:10

that they are trustworthy and they need

5:12

to do something because they got this

5:14

information. Yeah, I can

5:16

see how that would be very difficult. There

5:20

are a lot of things extraordinary about

5:22

this. For instance, the four men arrested

5:24

from Tajikistan have been

5:27

brutally tweeted, but

5:29

publicly brutally tweeted. Somebody has leaked the

5:31

pictures, they've been everywhere, and then we've

5:33

seen them in court with

5:36

smashed up faces, apparently an ear torn

5:38

off. Do

5:40

the Russian authorities want to boast about how cruel

5:42

they can be? First

5:45

of all, it is completely unprecedented.

5:47

We know, of course, that Russia

5:51

security services have been

5:53

torturing suspects for quite

5:56

a long time, but never before the

5:59

footage of it. horrible

6:01

things that were leaked. My

6:04

guess and my suspicion is that

6:06

unfortunately it was not completely irrational.

6:08

It's not only an act of

6:11

revenge and it's not only about

6:13

emotions. It looks

6:15

like there are two target audiences

6:17

for this kind of messaging. One

6:20

is old people who

6:23

found themselves on

6:25

the opposite side of the Kremlin. We

6:29

all know that these

6:31

days the list of

6:33

terrorist organizations in Russia

6:36

includes many people who have nothing

6:38

to do with terrorism. For instance, the

6:40

LGBTQ community, the Navalny

6:43

supporters, all kinds of

6:45

activists. The message is

6:47

very clear. Now these

6:49

methods are used against terrorism suspects.

6:51

Tomorrow they could be used against

6:54

you. So it is

6:56

a pure intimidation. And

6:58

there is a second audience for

7:01

this kind of narrative and messaging. And

7:04

this is the Russian military

7:06

and Russian security services who

7:08

are now operating in

7:11

Ukraine. And

7:13

the message is, look, we know what you are doing. We

7:16

know that you are extremely brutal and

7:18

we are okay with that. This is

7:20

a new norm for us and

7:23

for you. And we are proof of

7:25

it. I

7:39

wondered how to sum up the result

7:41

of this. Will it be more

7:44

repression at home? Because

7:47

Putin has failed or seems

7:49

to be failing in Ukraine and he's

7:51

failed to guarantee security domestically, it's

7:54

difficult to see how else he's going

7:56

to respond and continuing to blame Ukraine

7:58

for something which... seems that absolutely nothing

8:00

to do with them is part of the mix.

8:04

These times are extremely depressing because it

8:06

looks like every time Putin finds

8:08

himself in some trouble and

8:11

we see that he has a

8:13

huge problem with security in the

8:16

country and that was

8:18

his main thing, main selling point

8:20

to Russian audience for all these

8:23

years. He was selling stability

8:25

and security. And now

8:27

while with terrorist attacks and

8:30

drone attacks and all refineries being

8:32

set on fire almost on a

8:34

daily basis, well, obviously

8:36

Russian audience and Russian population, they

8:39

do not have that stability and

8:41

security. The usual

8:43

way Putin responds to this is

8:45

more repression. And actually he indicated

8:47

that even before

8:49

this attack, he said

8:52

that basically

8:54

he's ready to send people after

8:57

those Russians who changed sides. Now

8:59

there is a conversation about people

9:01

who might be suspected

9:03

of helping terrorists, well,

9:05

they should be killed

9:09

wherever they could be found. Again,

9:11

it's a hint that Russian security

9:13

services would be given more free

9:15

hand abroad, not only in

9:18

the country. And it's always a bad

9:20

news for Russian society. Once again, because

9:22

once you have some methods adopted

9:25

for use against terrorism suspects,

9:28

literally tomorrow they are used

9:30

against people who just have

9:33

to be a different opinion from Putin

9:36

and his people. It

9:38

does seem ludicrous though, when you have

9:40

got four people from Tajikistan who've been

9:42

arrested and apparently arrested on site from

9:45

Vladimir Putin, even to try to blame

9:48

Ukraine. Do you think, I mean, around the world

9:50

people see through this. Do you think most Russians

9:52

see through it as well as nonsense? It

9:57

sounds like nonsense about.

10:00

I suspect that many people in

10:02

Russia would accept that for

10:05

several reasons. One is that

10:07

there is a general feeling

10:09

of xenophobia towards Central Asian

10:12

workers and migrants cultivated by the

10:15

Russian authorities for quite

10:17

some time. And

10:19

basically, up to the point that lots

10:22

of people I spoke with, they

10:24

believe that people from Central

10:27

Asia are not capable

10:29

of organizing such a sophisticated

10:31

attack. So there should be some ominous

10:34

hostile force Ukrainians or maybe the

10:37

Americans who are really behind in

10:39

attack. There are a lot of

10:42

conspiracy theories, traditionally,

10:44

which are quite popular in Russia,

10:46

again, because the political climate is

10:49

such that you cannot have a

10:51

proper political discussion. The

10:53

European place substitutes a real

10:55

conversation with rumors and

10:58

gossip and conspiracy theories. But

11:01

Putin knows how to navigate in

11:04

these waters. He knows how to

11:06

exploit it. And to

11:08

be honest, if you look back where

11:11

he started, I remember that really

11:13

well, already in 2000, there

11:16

was this narrative promoted by Putin

11:18

that, and back then

11:20

we had this horrible war in Chechnya. Chechens

11:23

were helped and trained by the

11:25

Americans. And that actually all

11:27

the hadiths we got in Chechnya,

11:29

the either agents of Al-Qaeda or

11:32

CIA or maybe both. That

11:35

narrative force changed only because of 9-11. But

11:38

we see that Putin got back to it

11:41

even before this terrorist attack. If

11:44

you check his interview

11:46

with Taker Kaolsan, in this

11:48

conversation, Putin basically is saying

11:51

that he believes

11:54

that CIA trained

11:56

Chechen terrorists and

11:58

Islamists. We have

12:00

all kinds of conspiracy theories here. First

12:02

of all, that the Americans are actually

12:04

supporting global terrorism. Second, that all opposition

12:06

leaders in the country are actually terrorists.

12:10

And there is no difference between them and

12:12

people who kill people in trolls. And

12:16

as I said, it's a very old

12:18

narrative. It has been

12:20

always popular with rank

12:24

and file inside the security

12:26

services, but it's been also

12:28

quite popular among many, many

12:30

Russians. So Putin is just

12:32

to evoke this narrative. And

12:34

people would believe it of

12:36

his. It's a very

12:38

sad state of affairs, Andrei. Thank you very

12:40

much again for your insights and your knowledge.

12:43

Thank you. Thank you for having me. It's

13:11

a busy world out there. Once you've

13:13

woken up and got on top of all

13:16

your WhatsApps, your texts, your emails and your

13:18

DMs, then you've got another pile of stuff

13:20

to get through. The news. Honestly,

13:22

who's got the time? That's where Paper

13:24

Cuts, the brand new podcast, comes in. Paper

13:27

Cuts is your first funny tour of

13:30

all the best bits of the papers,

13:32

from the biggest scoops to the weirdest

13:34

headlines to the definitely not made up

13:36

showbiz gossip. And it's out every weekday

13:39

with me, Miranda Sawyer and a host

13:41

of guests, including TikTok comedian Marcus Brixtock.

13:43

Marcus, what's your favourite thing about Paper

13:45

Cuts? It's the puns. It's

13:48

obviously the puns. I mean, when we

13:50

go through the papers and you see

13:53

what creative beauties the people who work,

13:55

particularly in the tabloids, have come up

13:57

with, often I think it's pun first,

13:59

then story. for them. I've got

14:01

one. Find a story to match this. But

14:03

it's a really fun part of the podcast

14:05

to see what they've come up with every

14:07

day. Especially the Daily Star. Ah, the Star.

14:09

Proud to love animals. So if you

14:11

want to be on top of the news and

14:13

have a laugh while you're doing it, get Paper

14:16

Cuts every day on your favourite podcast app. We're

14:18

out around lunchtime Monday to Friday, perfect for a

14:20

bit of me time in the middle

14:22

of a busy day. That's Paper Cuts. We

14:24

read the papers so you don't have to.