0:07

welcome to the

0:07

podcast. Tis but a scratch, fact

0:10

and fiction about the Middle

0:10

Ages. I'm your host, Professor

0:14

Richard Abels. Today I'll be

0:14

talking about crusading warfare

0:18

with my special guest, Professor

0:18

Nicholas Martin, of Nottingham

0:23

Trent University in the UK. I'm

0:23

so delighted to have back on the

0:27

podcast, Dr. Nicholas board. Now

0:27

you must remember, Nick, from

0:33

his really wonderful episode

0:33

about the Mongols. And Nick, who

0:39

is his specialty is actually the

0:39

Crusader States and the Latin

0:46

East in the High Middle Ages,

0:46

he's come back to talk to us

0:50

about a subject which I think he

0:50

probably knows more about it

0:54

than anybody I know, with the

0:54

possible exception of John

0:57

France, and that is crusading

0:57

warfare. So Nick, welcome back.

1:03

I'm going to start by just

1:03

asking you, How did you get

1:05

interested in the Crusades? And

1:05

how did you get interested in

1:10

military history of the

1:10

Crusades?

1:13

Sure. Firstly,

1:13

thank you so much for having

1:15

back up the the podcast,

1:15

Richard, it's great to be here.

1:19

Yeah. So I suppose my interest

1:19

in the Crusades, if you want to

1:22

trace it far enough back is

1:22

being dragged around castles in

1:26

the rain by my parents, as a

1:26

child, I suppose is a core, the

1:30

root of it all. And then the

1:30

books that you read as a child

1:33

of castles and knights and

1:33

things like that. But in terms

1:36

of the actual crusades, I

1:36

studied the Crusades with

1:39

Jonathan Phillips at Royal

1:39

Holloway University. And I had,

1:44

I came into it with several

1:44

questions. The first one was

1:47

thinking about it from a

1:47

Christian perspective. Yeah. I

1:51

thought Jesus said you're

1:51

supposed to love your enemies

1:53

and do good to those that hates

1:53

you. So Where's, where's the

1:56

holy war coming from? Well, and

1:56

the whole sort of beating your

2:00

spears into plowshares rather

2:00

than your plowshares into

2:03

spears. But yeah.

2:07

Very muscular

2:07

form of Christianity, isn't it?

2:10

Or

2:10

Quite so. So

2:10

part of it was theological. But

2:13

also, I was interested from a

2:13

military perspective, because I

2:16

realized very early on that

2:16

we're talking about multiple

2:21

military cultures operating in

2:21

close proximity. Yes, you've got

2:25

the Byzantines Empire, which is

2:25

essentially the direct line

2:28

continuation of Eastern Roman

2:28

Empire. You've got the Seljuk

2:32

Turks, bringing traditions from

2:32

the Central Asian steppe region,

2:35

and the Mongols doing the same

2:35

thing too. You've got many forms

2:40

of Muslim warfare, depending on

2:40

whether they're drawing upon

2:44

Persian traditions or Bedouin

2:44

traditions or Fatimid

2:47

traditions. And then you've got

2:47

Armenian, Armenian armies, and

2:52

George knows, I probably missed

2:52

a few out too. But what happens

2:56

when they meet? And what do they

2:56

learn from each other? And what

3:00

does that look encounter look

3:00

like? And what how do they

3:03

perceive each other? It's that

3:03

encounter and that willingness

3:07

to learn or not? These are the

3:07

questions are brought to, to the

3:11

table here. And you've already

3:11

mentioned John France, really.

3:15

And yeah, he was certainly an

3:15

inspiration, because he was

3:19

interested not just in the

3:19

Crusaders themselves, but in all

3:21

the cultures tried to really get

3:21

to grips with the cultures, or

3:25

all the various societies

3:25

involved in the many wars,

3:28

spanning the Middle East in this

3:28

era. So in many ways, these were

3:32

these are the triggers for me to

3:32

want to find out more.

3:35

The military

3:35

history of the Crusades hasn't

3:38

been ignored by any means. But

3:38

in my opinion, it has received

3:42

less serious academic attention

3:42

than their religious and

3:47

political aspects. The

3:47

campaign's of the number of

3:50

crusades, of course have been

3:50

recounted in numerous general

3:54

histories, but often without

3:54

real analysis and the military

3:58

activities of the rulers of the

3:58

Latin states, the Kingdom of

4:02

Jerusalem, the Principality of

4:02

Antioch, the county of Tripoli,

4:06

have been virtually ignored,

4:06

except in their relationship to

4:10

the numbered crusades. There are

4:10

exceptions are sea snails

4:14

classic crusading warfare 1097

4:14

to 1193, published in 1956, his

4:21

student Christopher marshals

4:21

warfare in the lack nice 1192 to

4:25

1291, published in 1992, and

4:25

John Francis victory in the

4:29

Eastern Military History of the

4:29

First Crusade, published in

4:32

1994. But I don't think that

4:32

military history per se, has

4:37

received the attention that it

4:37

merits considering the

4:41

challenges the military

4:41

challenges presented by

4:45

crusading. And in part I think

4:45

that has to do with the eclipse

4:49

of military history within the

4:49

larger discipline, academic

4:54

discipline of history. It may

4:54

come as a surprise to our

4:58

listeners, but Military History

4:58

was at least when I was a grad

5:02

in graduate school in the 1970s,

5:02

the black sheep of the larger

5:06

discipline of history. By the

5:06

1960s. Military History,

5:10

although it remained a staple of

5:10

popular history had fallen into

5:14

disrepute with academics. This

5:14

was in part I think, because of

5:18

the horrors of the two World

5:18

Wars had called into question

5:21

both the historical value and

5:21

morality of battle narratives

5:25

that seemed to glorify warfare

5:25

and pot because of an

5:28

ideological shift to the left of

5:28

the dominant political culture

5:31

and academe. Propelled in the US

5:31

by student opposition to the

5:35

Vietnam War. The new military

5:35

history attempted to restore

5:39

academic respectability to the

5:39

field by aligning it with data

5:43

driven social and economic

5:43

history, traditional military

5:46

history, it focused on battles

5:46

and campaigns, much of it was

5:50

written by retired military

5:50

officers to illustrate what they

5:53

believed to be the unchanging

5:53

tenets of military science.

5:58

Their focus was on battle

5:58

tactics and strategy. The new

6:01

military history, in contrast,

6:01

studied subjects like the

6:05

recruitment, organization, and

6:05

economic maintenance of armed

6:09

forces, the relationship between

6:09

those forces and society as a

6:12

whole and the impact of warfare

6:12

upon civilian populations. The

6:17

only facet of military history

6:17

which did not seem to interest

6:21

historians of this school was

6:21

actual warfighting, this they

6:25

left to the traditionals. The

6:25

Divide was a bitter one

6:29

traditionalist denied that war

6:29

in society studies was real

6:33

military history. While some of

6:33

the most strident and outspoken

6:36

representatives of the new

6:36

military history, dismiss

6:40

traditionalist as married war

6:40

enthusiasts, rather than serious

6:44

historians. I was wondering if

6:44

you ever had reservations about

6:49

being labeled a military

6:49

historian? I know I did. That's

6:53

the interesting

6:53

question. Yes, no, you're right.

6:58

The funny thing is that when you

6:58

talk to people about the history

7:01

of the Crusades, particularly if

7:01

you ask people who aren't

7:04

military historians, the one

7:04

topic they'll say that has been

7:07

overdone, has been researched to

7:07

the point of exhaustion is

7:10

military history. When you

7:10

actually look at the Military

7:13

History of the Crusades, there's

7:13

surprisingly little there. Yes.

7:18

It's that dichotomy, really,

7:18

which is astonishing. Now, did I

7:22

have reservations about becoming

7:22

a military historian, for myself

7:26

purely in terms of my own

7:26

interests? No. Military History,

7:30

in my view, is every bit as

7:30

complex as challenging and

7:34

demanding and rigorous as any

7:34

other form of history. Now, of

7:39

course, there are works of

7:39

military history that aren't as

7:42

rigorous. But that's not to say

7:42

that the entire field has to be

7:46

that way. My only my reservation

7:46

was more was more rooted in, in

7:51

the perception of it. I didn't

7:51

know what other people would

7:54

make of make of it. If I overtly

7:54

adopted a more military

7:58

dimension to my research,

7:58

because I'm afraid I do see,

8:02

what's the word is stigma too

8:02

strong a word. There is an

8:07

though and I

8:07

myself, I spent by early years

8:11

as historian denying that I was

8:11

a military historian. And it was

8:17

basically the job market and

8:17

being hired at the Naval

8:20

Academy, as a pre modern

8:20

military historian that allowed

8:25

me to embrace that title.

8:27

Yeah. And in my

8:27

previous career, in the earliest

8:31

stages of my career, I started

8:31

off looking at institutional

8:34

history, the Teutonic Knights, I

8:34

then moved on to cross cultural

8:40

perceptions of other societies,

8:40

whoever that who has

8:45

perceptions, though those those

8:45

may be. And so looking at

8:48

alterity, and models like that.

8:48

And so that's behind my book,

8:52

encountering Islam on the First

8:52

Crusade. And so the point I'm

8:56

making is I've, I've already

8:56

gone through several sub fields

8:59

in the broader umbrella, as it

8:59

were of Crusader studies. But I

9:04

felt very strongly that military

9:04

history needed more research.

9:09

And there were several reasons

9:09

for that. But number one was

9:12

just how much material there is

9:12

on military history, not just in

9:17

Frankish, or Latin sources, but

9:17

in Eastern Christian, Arabic and

9:21

Greek sources, as well as many

9:21

others. There's so much

9:24

material, and it really hasn't

9:24

been used. And you're right.

9:27

Historians have tended not

9:27

always to focus on big battles,

9:32

because why wouldn't you yet,

9:32

but at the same time, what I

9:36

wanted to do is I didn't want to

9:36

exclude the big battles and have

9:39

some kind of response to people

9:39

who said it big battles. I

9:44

wanted to try and put the whole

9:44

thing together. And so I wanted

9:47

to create a data driven study,

9:47

in which every single military

9:52

encounter from the smallest raid

9:52

to the biggest Siege is

9:55

included, in part so I can

9:55

extract from that meaningful

10:00

patterns about the development

10:00

and movement of conflict and

10:04

their evolution over time. But

10:04

also because I was aware that

10:08

once pooled that data could

10:08

include a lot of meaningful

10:12

material that can shed light on

10:12

a lot of other things, such as

10:16

the cross cultural exchange of

10:16

ideas or tactics. Now, yes,

10:21

these things are military, but

10:21

there's that that also has a

10:23

bearing on lots of other topics

10:23

connected to it. And I was

10:27

interested, for example, in how

10:27

frequently individual kings or

10:31

princes or other rulers go on

10:31

campaign and how often they lead

10:36

those campaigns themselves. And

10:36

what we can then learn from that

10:39

data about them as individuals,

10:39

demos, rulers, about the pace

10:43

and balance of the conflict as

10:43

it develops over time. So it's

10:46

trying to think about meaningful

10:46

ways to use data that's been

10:50

pulled together as much as we

10:50

can, of course, we can't

10:53

possibly claim to have got every

10:53

single military encounter that

10:55

actually ever happened. But we

10:55

can do the best we can, and then

10:59

see what we can what we can get

10:59

from that. And that really was

11:02

the thought behind my own

11:02

research.

11:04

Well, I want to

11:04

give a plug for your book, The

11:07

Crusader States and your

11:07

neighbors, a military history

11:10

1099 to 1187. Oxford University

11:10

Press 2020. I think it's a model

11:16

of military history. First of

11:16

all, their research and it is

11:20

exhaustive, you mind the

11:20

sources, both the Latin, and

11:25

Eastern sources, compile all the

11:25

major and minor military

11:30

activity, skirmishes, sieges,

11:30

battle, grades, rebellions. And,

11:36

frankly, as a medieval military

11:36

historian, who's studied the

11:40

Crusades, I was surprised at how

11:40

much I didn't know about the

11:44

military activities of the

11:44

Crusader States. The

11:48

comprehensive research

11:48

underlying your book is a solid

11:51

foundation for the important

11:51

point you make about the nature

11:55

of crusading warfare and the

11:55

lubok, during the first century

11:58

of the Kingdom of Jerusalem,

11:58

both in terms of adaptations to

12:02

new conditions of warfare, and

12:02

perhaps most interestingly, at

12:06

least to me, resistance to

12:06

change by the rulers of Lutra

12:10

mir.

12:11

Well, thank you very much for that. That's very kind of you. But you mentioned

12:12

the conservatism of armies in

12:17

this era, and that there is a

12:17

there is a finding, yeah, they

12:21

do adapt, they do change a bit

12:21

over time, they do work out ways

12:25

of hazard out the Turkish, like

12:25

cavalry commanders work out ways

12:30

of doing things and Frankish

12:30

knights workout way of dealing

12:33

with Turkish like cavalry. But I

12:33

think there is a conservatism

12:38

underneath all of this. I was

12:38

expecting to find more

12:41

innovation than I found. And I

12:41

found some but not much. And I

12:45

think that it's very easy in an

12:45

age where changing technology is

12:51

changing approaches to all sorts

12:51

of things, not merely in

12:55

military life, but in all sorts

12:55

of things. We are accustomed to

12:57

changing our ways of doing

12:57

things. And I think what we're

13:00

looking at is here as a downward

13:00

pressure of ingrained tradition,

13:05

this is how we do it. We've

13:05

always done it this way. We've

13:09

always we always will do it this

13:09

way. That's it. Now,

13:13

I think partly

13:13

it's because the military

13:16

doctrines, and the organization

13:16

military organization is so

13:21

ingrained in the social system.

13:21

Yeah, that to do to do any kind

13:27

of fundamental innovation would

13:27

be threatening that social

13:33

structure. I think

13:34

so. Yeah. And

13:34

and that that routing in society

13:37

is so important that things

13:37

begin to make sense. Once you

13:40

begin to sort of trace those

13:40

lines back I think, you can, you

13:44

can work out new strategies, you

13:44

can work out that if you lead,

13:47

if you lead your Frankish

13:47

pursuers through marshland, that

13:52

as a as a, as a Turkish

13:52

Commander, your light cavalry

13:56

can probably negotiate the marsh

13:56

and then the Frankish cavalry

13:59

will sink. So yes, you can, you

13:59

can devise things like that, but

14:02

to fundamentally change the way

14:02

in which you fight and operate.

14:06

It's much harder. I mean, the

14:06

Franks adopts Turco poles, to

14:10

provide them with a light light

14:10

cavalry wing, but that's really

14:13

sort of bolted on to what is

14:13

really quite a conventional way

14:16

of fighting. They probably do

14:16

become more disciplined. But

14:21

ultimately, it's the army

14:21

doesn't look that Burke so very

14:25

dissimilar in the way it fights

14:25

at the end of the period. It

14:27

doesn't the beginning, which

14:29

sort of which

14:29

surprised me tell you the truth.

14:31

I was expecting more innovation,

14:31

more change. To appreciate

14:35

crusading warfare. I think it's

14:35

important that we begin with a

14:39

picture of what warfare was like

14:39

in Western Europe on the eve of

14:44

the First Crusade in 1097. And

14:44

it's probably not what most of

14:49

our listeners imagine. Large

14:49

scale battles with knights on

14:53

horseback charging one another

14:53

with couch Lance's which is a

14:57

staple of movies. We're

14:57

extremely Rare. The most common

15:01

military activities of this era

15:01

were raiding and sieges, armies

15:07

were small, and although led by

15:07

nobles on horseback, consisted

15:11

mainly of foot soldiers. The

15:11

British historian John

15:15

Gillingham explained the

15:15

rationale behind this using the

15:19

career of King Richard the first

15:19

of England, Richard the lion, as

15:23

a model Gillingham argued that

15:23

there was not only an art of war

15:28

in the 12th century, but a

15:28

science of war. This strategy

15:32

was shaped by logistical

15:32

considerations and military

15:36

typography that is, by limited

15:36

agricultural production,

15:40

seasonal warfare and fortified

15:40

strong point studying the

15:44

landscape Gillingham posited

15:44

that the basic offensive

15:49

military doctrine of commanders

15:49

in the 11th through 14th

15:53

centuries, focused on two

15:53

interrelated military activities

15:58

ravaging and siege, prudent

15:58

military commanders avoided

16:02

battle, because the risks were

16:02

greatest, and the rewards of a

16:06

victory were questionable, as

16:06

conquest of territory dependent

16:10

upon Securi castles and walled

16:10

cities. Instead of seeking

16:14

battle. The offensive strategy

16:14

was to cross into enemy

16:17

territory and to make

16:17

immediately begin looting

16:20

villages, destroying Mills,

16:20

burning fields, and seizing

16:24

cattle and captains for ransom.

16:24

By doing this, the commander

16:28

would feed his own troops, since

16:28

war needed to pay for itself and

16:32

deprive the enemy of provisions

16:32

and resources as well as

16:36

demoralizing them. Once they had

16:36

ravaged the countryside. The

16:39

invading army would then turn to

16:39

the chore of besieging and

16:43

taking the enemy's castles and

16:43

fortified towns, since

16:46

possession of castles and strong

16:46

points were the only way to take

16:50

and hold territory. The invader,

16:50

as I said, avoided engaging the

16:55

enemy in a pitch battle, unless

16:55

circumstances was so favorable,

17:00

that victory was all but

17:00

guaranteed. A risk always

17:03

remained. However, since

17:03

medieval kings and commanders

17:06

slept from the front and were

17:06

vulnerable to being captured or

17:10

killed, which, as in chess,

17:10

meant that the game was over. In

17:14

short, medieval warfare.

17:14

According to Gilligan most

17:18

resembled Sherman's March to the

17:18

Sea. defensive strategy was the

17:23

mirror image. Upon receiving

17:23

news of an invasion. The

17:28

defending general would order

17:28

the garrisoning and provisioning

17:31

of the major castles and world

17:31

cities. He would reserve a

17:35

portion of his voices for a

17:35

field army that would shadow but

17:39

avoid engaging the enemy in

17:39

battle. Because of the threat

17:43

posed by this field army, the

17:43

invaders could not then out into

17:48

small raiding bodies, which

17:48

limited the damage they could

17:51

do. The shadowing lobby could

17:51

also relieve sieges, catching

17:56

the procedure between the

17:56

garrison forces within the

17:59

castle and the relief army

17:59

coming to his rescue. What the

18:02

defenders had on their side was

18:02

time, warfare was limited to the

18:08

harvest seasons when an invading

18:08

army might be able to find

18:12

sufficient food and resources to

18:12

campaign on. Once the season was

18:17

over, and food became scarce,

18:17

the invader had to retire. This

18:22

often was followed in the next

18:22

campaigning season, by a counter

18:26

incursion into the territory of

18:26

the erstwhile invader, during

18:30

which the roles of the attacker

18:30

and defender were reversed. In

18:35

this type of warfare foot

18:35

soldiers were essential. This is

18:39

not to say that knights and

18:39

mounted sergeants were

18:42

important. A force of armored

18:42

men and horseback was needed to

18:46

threaten to defend against a

18:46

possible battle, and a battles

18:50

were rear small scale skirmishes

18:50

were common. Mounted men also

18:55

redeemed for recon, and recon

18:55

was a standard military activity

19:00

in this period. Knights also led

19:00

these armies military leadership

19:04

was a prerogative of the

19:04

nobility, as a chain of command

19:07

reflected the social and

19:07

political hierarchy. But if

19:11

knights possessed higher social

19:11

and economic status than

19:14

footsoldiers, nonetheless, the

19:14

labor intensive activities of

19:18

ravaging, pillaging and laying

19:18

siege required foot soldiers in

19:23

mass numbers, which is why foot

19:23

soldiers always greatly

19:26

outnumbered men on horseback, in

19:26

medieval armies, sometimes as

19:31

much as 10 to one because this

19:31

approach to warfare follow the

19:36

maxims of the late Roman

19:36

military Magnus Vyas, whose de

19:41

re military was widely known in

19:41

the Middle Ages. Gillingham term

19:45

this, the KT and strategy. Now

19:45

not all medieval military

19:51

historians agree completely with

19:51

Gillingham. My friend and

19:54

colleague Clifford Rogers, who

19:54

teaches at West Point has

19:58

forcefully argued that King

19:58

Edward the third of England and

20:01

his son Edward, the Black

20:01

Prince, actively sought battle

20:05

and that at least in the 14th

20:05

century, the commander of the

20:09

side pursuing aggressive war

20:09

aims typically wanted battle,

20:14

though he concedes that

20:14

defenders typically avoided

20:16

battle. Another friend and

20:16

colleague Steven Grillo of

20:20

Wabash College, while generally

20:20

accepting Gillingham thesis

20:24

considers the cultural

20:24

imperatives that lead

20:27

Submittable military commanders

20:27

to seek or accept battle.

20:31

Despite the risks. Both Rogers

20:31

and Marilla will observe that

20:35

honor might dictate battle, even

20:35

if a quote unquote, objective

20:41

military analysis of the

20:41

situation wouldn't honor and

20:45

prestige where political and

20:45

social capital among the

20:49

medieval military elite, a

20:49

Fabian strategy of battle

20:52

avoidance and attrition might

20:52

prove effective militarily, but

20:56

could undermine a kings or count

20:56

standing among the nobility,

21:01

especially if it involves the

21:01

ravaging of the nobility slants,

21:05

as Marilla nicely put it warfare

21:05

is not just politics by other

21:09

means, as Clausewitz said, it is

21:09

also culture and the

21:14

aristocratic culture of the High

21:14

Middle Ages placed a premium on

21:18

honor and prowess. Gillingham

21:18

fully persuaded me that King

21:22

Richard the Lionheart did not

21:22

seek battle, he only fought at

21:27

most three or four battles, but

21:27

when battle was forced upon him,

21:32

as it was during the Third

21:32

Crusade or soothe, Richard

21:35

personally led the charge of his

21:35

knights into the ranks of the

21:39

enemy. He was after all, Richard

21:39

the Lionheart. But the dominance

21:44

of Gilling Hans views, I think,

21:44

is reflected by the name adopted

21:50

by the professional Society for

21:50

the Study of medieval military

21:55

history, de Ray military. And

21:55

I'm basically persuaded that

22:01

Gillingham is right, at least as

22:01

refined by Murillo. But if the

22:07

leaders of the First Crusade and

22:07

the Second Crusade had this idea

22:13

of warfare, the question is, how

22:13

was it changed by their

22:18

experiences in fighting against

22:18

Turks in the Middle East?

22:23

Will process

22:23

best fight if I offer Mueller a

22:25

past but as sort of comparison

22:25

to the situation in the Middle

22:29

East? Yeah, same period. Because

22:29

yeah, so that there's Gilliam's

22:34

theory, which pertains mostly to

22:34

Western Christendom, but it's a

22:38

little different in the Middle

22:38

East because I mean, just just

22:41

to focus on the encounter

22:41

between Frankish armies and

22:45

Turkish armies, Frankish armies,

22:45

mostly infantry, quite heavily

22:50

armored, increasing use of

22:50

ballistic weapons, small but

22:55

powerful formations of heavy

22:55

cavalry with the most elite,

23:00

Chevron's being those of the

23:00

military orders. And then, in

23:04

addition to that, formations of

23:04

light cavalry Turco poles,

23:07

broadly speaking, that's your

23:07

Frankish army. And then you have

23:11

on you have Turkish armies

23:11

normally formed around a ruler,

23:16

often the ruler of Damascus or

23:16

Aleppo is Asgar, their personal

23:20

following, supported by

23:20

formations of Turkman, like

23:24

cavalry, who are often hired,

23:24

and often the local adath, or

23:28

civic militias, who then have

23:28

provided the cavalry or infantry

23:32

to support that force, but for

23:32

the most part, it's primarily or

23:36

even a holier amounted force.

23:36

This is very crudely the

23:41

encounter. And, yeah, we're told

23:41

by those that may have been

23:46

monkeyed, who is well versed in

23:46

Frankish, millet tactics, that

23:51

the Franks are the most cautious

23:51

people in war, which is an

23:55

interesting statement. But I

23:55

think the disincentives from

24:00

fighting battles for the Franks,

24:00

at least are higher in the

24:03

Middle East than they are in

24:03

western Christendom. Because

24:08

they are built trying to build

24:08

big armies on a narrow

24:11

population, they cannot afford

24:11

to take losses. And as I think

24:15

it's the chronicle of the wild

24:15

says in the 13th century, the

24:19

Kingdom of Jerusalem actually

24:19

bears a closer resemblance to a

24:22

barony rather than a kingdom.

24:22

It's so small, and the northern

24:26

Crusader States are smaller. So

24:26

they've got no territory to play

24:29

with. It's not like they can

24:29

retreat and fight a battle

24:31

deeper inside their territory.

24:31

They have to fight it on the

24:34

frontier, because they can't

24:34

afford to lose territory. So if

24:37

they lose, they lose big if they

24:37

win. Let's say they've won a

24:42

battle against the Emir of

24:42

Damascus. Their opponents are

24:46

mounted and so their opponents

24:46

will be able to clear clear away

24:50

from the battlefield very

24:50

quickly, pursued by infantry and

24:54

chain males. So aside from the

24:54

actual casualties taken in close

24:58

combat, the area of drum because

24:58

his troops will probably have to

25:00

get to safety and for the most

25:00

part very quickly, and then

25:04

reform. And so the incentives

25:04

for advancing given you're

25:08

fighting a highly immobile

25:08

enemy, who can adapt to defeat

25:11

and then come back very quickly,

25:11

you're not going to gain very

25:14

much. Whereas of course, if a

25:14

Frankish Field Army is defeated,

25:17

particular was defeated badly,

25:17

you could have to wait for the

25:21

next, the next arrival of a

25:21

convoy from Western Christendom

25:24

or even the next crusaders in

25:24

the case of her team for

25:27

reinforcements. So there are

25:27

very strong disincentives for

25:31

fighting battles and very strong

25:31

incentives for avoiding them. If

25:35

you're a Frankish. Commander.

25:35

For a Turkish commodity, by

25:38

contrast, there are strong

25:38

incentives for doing so. But one

25:42

of the points are

25:42

shown in your

25:42

book, that although they have

25:46

all these disincentives that

25:46

they actually do, the Frankish

25:51

commanders actually do engage in

25:51

battles. They haven't seen I

25:58

ever expected divide.

26:00

Yeah, not astonishing number. And they tend to and the Turks and the

26:01

Franks tend to win and lose at

26:05

about a rate of 5050. Yes, they

26:05

would, as many as they lose. And

26:09

that's Paul's pretty much

26:09

consistent from the start to the

26:12

end of the period. The only

26:12

civilization the Franks are

26:16

consistently successful against

26:16

is the Fatimids of Egypt. But

26:20

the basic point is that it's

26:20

partly because the Franks have

26:23

nowhere to retreat that they

26:23

have to fight. So if they're

26:27

invaded, they will typically

26:27

cluster their army around a

26:30

strong point. And in doing so,

26:30

they're offering the strongest

26:34

possible disincentive for their

26:34

opponent to seek battle because

26:38

an army flanked by a

26:38

fortification isn't a very

26:41

strong location. If their

26:41

opponent's still wants to give

26:44

battle at that point, they're

26:44

going to have to fight there's,

26:48

there's nothing else they can

26:48

do. They could arguably take

26:51

refuge in the castle, but they haven't got the kind of territory to, to spend in that

26:53

way. They're going to have to

26:56

fight whether they like it or

26:56

not. So I think forced battles

27:01

are a very common feature of the

27:01

Warcraft of the Crusader States

27:06

battles, which Frankish

27:06

commanders didn't really want to

27:08

fight, but which they had no

27:08

option to fight because they've

27:11

got nowhere else to go. Our

27:12

listeners

27:12

probably don't have a really

27:15

good sense of what the Latin

27:15

states were. So can you just

27:20

simply explain what the Latin

27:20

states were where they were?

27:24

Sure. So the greatest extent the Kingdom of Jerusalem began at roughly

27:26

Beirut, which is in modern day

27:30

Lebanon, in the north, and then

27:30

you can trace that border all

27:34

the way down to the edges of the

27:34

Sinai desert in the south. And

27:39

then out to the east, the

27:39

Kingdom of Jerusalem would have

27:42

extended to cover much of what's

27:42

they'd be modern day Jordan. And

27:46

that in the Northeast, the

27:46

northern area around the Sea of

27:50

Galilee, Lake Tiberius, those

27:50

would be the sort of the main

27:54

sort of points as it were the

27:54

compass when it comes to the

27:57

Kingdom of Jerusalem. And above

27:57

that, you've got the county of

28:00

Tripoli, which would embrace

28:00

much of modern day northern

28:03

Lebanon. And then the coastal

28:03

part of southwestern Syria,

28:08

looking into the homeless gap,

28:08

which is a gap in the big

28:11

mountain range that runs

28:11

parallel to the coast, there's a

28:13

big gap and it called the

28:13

homeless gap. And there are some

28:16

big fortresses there that

28:16

practice a value over and above

28:19

that the coastal strip then

28:19

continues from or that gets

28:24

Tortosa. over the border there

28:24

changes a little bit, which is

28:27

then the beginnings of the

28:27

Principality of Antioch, which

28:30

then controls that coastal strip

28:30

up towards the big port of

28:34

latter care. And then beyond

28:34

that, St. Simeon, which is the

28:37

port for Antioch itself. And

28:37

Antioch extends up to the

28:41

Amandus mountains on the other

28:41

side of which you have Saudi

28:44

Syrian Armenia, which the

28:44

Antioch sometimes will sometimes

28:47

didn't. And then extending east,

28:47

there's a very fluctuating

28:52

frontier zone facing Aleppo,

28:52

which is two days march to the

28:57

east of Antioch, and the ball of

28:57

air can go one way or the other.

29:02

A great deal during this period.

29:02

Sometimes, the N top antiochene

29:05

is a pressing right up against

29:05

Aleppo, and sometimes the

29:08

weapons are pressing right up

29:08

against Antioch to the

29:11

northeast, you have the hardest

29:11

to define. Crusader States

29:15

largely because we have so

29:15

little information about it,

29:18

which is the county that which

29:18

is the County of Edessa centered

29:22

on Edessa itself, embracing a

29:22

quite a large area of territory

29:26

around it, including cities like

29:26

tel Bashir, among others, but

29:32

that's quite hard one to pin

29:32

down because the geography of it

29:36

moves a lot. And we don't

29:36

actually have much data on

29:39

exactly where the frontier lay.

29:39

What

29:42

is the relationship? What was the relationship between the

29:44

Principality of Antioch the

29:48

county of Tripoli and the

29:48

Kingdom of Jerusalem?

29:51

Well, it reminds me a little bit of a quote I heard in a political

29:53

satire series called yes

29:57

minister, which is sort of which

29:57

goes like this. It We'd all hang

30:00

together, we'll all hang

30:00

separately. I think that that is

30:04

an ethos, I think to put it more

30:04

elegantly. The chronicler of the

30:07

Kingdom of Jerusalem or one of

30:07

them called William of Tyre,

30:11

constantly repeats, it repeats

30:11

an adage from Horace, the

30:15

classical author, where he says,

30:15

if your neighbor's house is on

30:18

fire, your own house is in

30:18

danger. So I think underpinning

30:22

everything they do is a sense

30:22

that if they don't support each

30:27

other, at least, to some degree,

30:27

they will all fall separately.

30:31

And that's just going to happen

30:31

so that that fear that if they

30:35

don't work together, they will

30:35

suffer for it. That's very

30:38

prevalent. It gets voiced in

30:38

various contexts throughout the

30:42

history of the Crusader States.

30:42

Nevertheless, there are

30:45

rivalries too. And in the early

30:45

years, it served as rivalries

30:50

over conquest. And you can see

30:50

Antioch and Jerusalem both

30:54

driving very hard at their

30:54

frontiers trying to conquer as

30:57

much land as possible. Tripoli

30:57

in the middle, tried to stake

31:01

its own claims and territories,

31:01

it feels it has a right to

31:05

Tripoli always has its eyes on

31:05

Homs, or sometimes hammer. It

31:10

never takes either, but it's

31:10

constantly looking at them as

31:12

possible targets. And so it's

31:12

about the various areas

31:15

demarcating relative to each

31:15

other in in negotiation with

31:19

each other, where they feel they

31:19

have a right to conquer and

31:22

probably get acknowledgment from

31:22

the other rulers as well. So

31:26

that creates lines of friction.

31:26

There's various other disputes,

31:30

too. So Antioch for a long

31:30

period in the early part of its

31:34

history, felt it had a claim to

31:34

the county of Odessa, it so felt

31:37

very strenuously that it

31:37

shouldn't. And that too, could

31:40

lead to some extraordinary

31:40

conflict as well in 1108, where

31:44

you have to Wytheville

31:44

claimants, Turkish rival

31:47

claimants for Aleppo, and two

31:47

rival claimants for a DESA. And

31:50

they realized that on the

31:50

principle that my enemy's enemy

31:54

is my friend that they have

31:54

potential allies here. And so

31:56

you get a battle where you've

31:56

got one claimant for Aleppo, one

31:59

client for Odessa on one side,

31:59

and the other two on the other

32:02

side, and they fight a big

32:02

battle. So it can create some

32:04

extraordinary alliances, but

32:04

tensions over hegemony and who

32:09

has greater authority over who

32:09

that can be another cause of

32:14

conflict. And similar similar

32:14

things true with the Kingdom of

32:17

Jerusalem and the county of

32:17

Tripoli, county Tripoli tends to

32:21

operate in Jerusalem's orbit.

32:21

And for a time Raman the third

32:26

of Tripoli moving towards the

32:26

end of our period felt that he

32:29

had rights over the kingdom of

32:29

Jerusalem. He, I think he felt

32:32

very strongly he could be King

32:32

of Jerusalem. And when he was

32:35

denied his claim when rivals got

32:35

into power, he famously made a

32:39

treaty with Saladin which made

32:39

him very unpopular in the

32:43

region, at least with other

32:43

Franks in the area. So there

32:47

could be rivalries, but for the

32:47

most part, it's a fairly

32:51

established, it's a famous

32:51

tautology of all Frankish

32:55

rulers, they realize they have

32:55

to work together this is

32:58

understood,

32:59

what is the

32:59

political situation among the

33:03

Muslim states of this region?

33:06

Sure. So when

33:06

the First Crusade arrived, the

33:10

Middle East is already a war

33:10

zone, as specifically the region

33:14

with regional become the kingdom

33:14

of Jerusalem. And the two main

33:18

two main powers at war, are the

33:18

fact that empire Shia Muslim

33:23

empire in Egypt, which holds

33:23

territory up to but not

33:27

including Jerusalem, and then to

33:27

the northeast, you have the

33:31

Seljuk Turks, who conquered much

33:31

of northern Syria in the 1070s.

33:36

And as you've quite rightly pointed out, there's only a few couple of decades of for the

33:38

Crusader wives itself, and

33:41

Jerusalem itself area around

33:41

Jerusalem and up to an including

33:45

Damascus and parts of a coastal

33:45

strip. There are a war zone

33:48

between the Fatimids and the

33:48

Seljuks. And then, during the

33:51

First Crusade, the First Crusade

33:51

has worked this out, or I think

33:54

they're probably told it by

33:54

Alexius Comnenus. That's the

33:57

Byzantines emperor. And so they

33:57

make overtures to the factories

34:02

very early on for a military

34:02

alliance against the Seljuks.

34:05

And the Fatimids are open to

34:05

this. And negotiations go on for

34:09

well over a year to try and

34:09

hammer out some kind of deal

34:12

negotiations collapsed. But it's

34:12

interesting to see that they're

34:14

doing that because the phasmids

34:14

want to secure an ally against

34:19

the Seljuk Turks who for them,

34:19

at least are their long standing

34:21

opponent. But when the when the

34:21

negotiations break down, and the

34:27

Crusaders conquer and brutally

34:27

conduct brutal massacres in

34:31

Jerusalem itself, that the

34:31

possibility of that alliance

34:34

just disappears. And the

34:34

Pharisees look far more to

34:38

making alliances with the Seljuk

34:38

Turks in a way they never had

34:42

previously. Because their

34:42

perception of where the threats

34:46

lie to them changed

34:46

dramatically. So that changes

34:50

the constellation of alliances

34:50

further north. You've got to

34:56

hear and sticking to the early

34:56

period, you've got to Seljuk

34:59

governors In Damascus, and

34:59

Aleppo, and then the broader

35:03

Seljuk Empire, which spans all

35:03

the way up to the steppe borders

35:05

in Afghanistan and that sort of

35:05

regions, it's huge.

35:08

I think it's worth noting that with the exception of the Fatimid

35:10

caliphate, that this warfare is

35:15

between two newcomers to the

35:15

region, the Crusaders, who

35:21

established the Crusader States,

35:21

and only a couple of decades

35:26

before them, the Seljuk Turks,

35:26

who conquered who conquered

35:31

Byzantine Anatolia, and the Arab

35:31

dominated Near East, and

35:36

although the Seljuk Empire was

35:36

enormous in size, and in

35:40

manpower resources, one of the

35:40

advantages that helps explain

35:45

the success of the First Crusade

35:45

was the constant rivalry and

35:50

infighting of the local

35:50

governors who represented the

35:55

Seljuk Sultan, as well as the

35:55

lack of an established principle

35:59

of succession. In this alternate

36:02

all Celtic

36:02

empires consumed by infighting

36:04

as a huge civil war over who's

36:04

going to be the next Sultan. And

36:07

when in 1105, the Seljuks do

36:07

finally settle on their necks

36:12

Sultan, Sultan, Mohammed a few

36:12

years later, they send armies

36:17

into the Middle East to try and

36:17

deal with the Franks. And what's

36:22

interesting is just how little

36:22

support particularly some of

36:25

their later campaigns they get

36:25

from local Turkish rulers,

36:28

because the local Turkish rulers

36:28

will Yes, they might like the

36:31

idea of receiving assistance to

36:31

fight the Franks. But they're

36:35

not going to feel enthusiastic

36:35

about that assistance. If the

36:37

Seljuk Sultan uses his armies,

36:37

to then force them into a much

36:43

tougher form of obedience,

36:43

they've been used to go

36:45

independent for decades, they

36:45

don't have stopped answering

36:48

orders at or worse still being

36:48

replaced. And so there are

36:52

instances where actually you've

36:52

got local Turkish rulers,

36:56

siding, or at least remaining

36:56

neutral, when the Franks are

36:59

fighting these big armies from

36:59

the Seljuk Sultanate. So I could

37:02

give plenty of examples from the

37:02

later period too, but my point

37:05

is that there are various lines

37:05

of tension. And these lines of

37:08

tension can create some very

37:08

interesting cross cultural

37:11

alliances and different

37:11

constellations of alliances

37:15

throughout the throughout the

37:15

period.

37:17

It actually

37:17

sounds not all that dissimilar

37:20

from the Mongol Empire, and the

37:20

internal fighting that you had

37:26

with the different cognates.

37:28

Certainly no longer empires later history. Yeah, perhaps. Yeah. One of the

37:29

things

37:31

that's always

37:31

interested me is that if you're

37:34

looking at the Military History

37:34

of the Crusades, the only really

37:39

fully successful crusade was the

37:39

first. It's an argument for

37:44

perhaps Frederick, the Second

37:44

Crusade being fully successful.

37:49

After all, he does recover

37:49

Jerusalem to Christian control,

37:53

although he does it through

37:53

diplomacy, rather than military

37:57

action, right? Yeah. But the

37:57

First Crusade is successful, and

38:02

it overcomes enormous

38:02

difficulties. Okay, why is the

38:08

First Crusade successful? And he

38:08

wanted to talk a little bit

38:11

about the difficulties that it

38:11

overcame.

38:13

This is

38:13

something that, yeah, it sticks

38:15

out, doesn't it? Because really,

38:15

if you view it purely from a

38:19

military perspective, in many

38:19

ways, the first crusades got the

38:22

harder job. It's got to match

38:22

the 1000s of miles, sporadically

38:28

supported by the Byzantines

38:28

empire and others into territory

38:32

where there is no friendly

38:32

outpost from their perspective.

38:35

And they've got to take hold,

38:35

and then they seek ultimately to

38:39

consolidate and expand cities

38:39

that are well over 1000 miles

38:44

from the nearest source of help.

38:44

That is a very difficult task,

38:47

and they're doing it. Yes, the

38:47

Seljuk Empire is in a state of

38:51

civil war, but every major

38:51

governor in the Seljuk empire in

38:54

its western districts throws a

38:54

field army at the First Crusade.

38:58

So there's still plenty of

38:58

resistance and the Seljuks have

39:00

got several decades worth of

39:00

almost unbroken success to draw

39:04

upon when confronting the First

39:04

Crusade. By contrast, the Second

39:09

Crusade is just got to get to

39:09

the Crusader States and the

39:12

Third Crusade? Well, obviously,

39:12

the situation has deteriorated

39:15

from the Crusaders perspective

39:15

by the Third Crusade, but they

39:17

still have places they can go to

39:17

and regroup in the Middle East.

39:21

So it does go. It does, as you

39:21

say, raised the question of why

39:25

was it successful? And this

39:25

isn't my argument, but I think

39:29

it's probably true. I think that

39:29

it helps the First Crusade from

39:33

a military perspective that many

39:33

of the people going on crusade.

39:37

We're not kings, because there

39:37

counts the leading nobles. But

39:43

many of these people have burned

39:43

their bridges to go on crusade

39:45

and some of the most aggressive

39:45

commanders numerous able

39:49

commanders, either have nothing

39:49

to go back to my Godfrey of

39:53

Breon, who sold his lands in

39:53

order to go on crusade so he's

39:55

not going back. It's going to

39:55

work. Well that's it. And then

39:59

Berman Toronto who does have

39:59

some does have plans to go back

40:02

to, but they don't even nearly

40:02

match his enormous ambitions. So

40:07

he too, wants to turn this into

40:07

something he can really

40:10

translate into his own

40:10

territory. And he does. So I

40:14

think there is something very

40:14

important about the fact that

40:17

you have these commanders who

40:17

have either burned their bridges

40:21

or have little to go back to

40:21

their they'll determine they're

40:24

going to do something with this,

40:24

as opposed to perhaps kings who

40:28

have to be mindful that whilst

40:28

they are on crusade, they do

40:31

have to make sure that their

40:31

position their person, and

40:36

indeed their kingdoms back home,

40:36

are okay. They can't afford to

40:40

take such big risks. They've got

40:40

to be able to get through this

40:43

in such a way that they can

40:43

return home, both alive and to a

40:48

Kingdom that's willing to

40:48

welcome them. That's that that

40:51

changes the dynamic and I can't

40:51

help suspecting that that makes

40:56

them a little bit more risk

40:56

averse.

40:58

I'm not sure if

40:58

they would describe Richard the

41:01

Lionheart on crusade is risk

41:01

averse, at least in terms of his

41:05

personal safety. But it's

41:05

absolutely true that he returns

41:10

to England or at least tries to

41:10

return to England because of

41:14

news that his kingdom is

41:14

threatened by the ambitions of

41:18

his brother John, and John's

41:18

alliance with his greatest

41:21

enemy, King Philip Augustus of

41:21

France, Richard had no intention

41:26

of spending the rest of his life

41:26

in Ultra mayor.

41:29

But having said

41:29

that, in the Third Crusade, you

41:33

do have Frederick the first of

41:33

Germany, who conducts what could

41:37

be described as one of the most

41:37

successful military crossings of

41:40

Anatolia, the famous graveyard

41:40

of armies of any commander,

41:44

including the First Crusade, the

41:44

First Crusade armies, led by

41:48

people like Godfrey have we are

41:48

in Beaumont, and what would have

41:51

normally Yeah, they managed

41:51

across Anatolia, but plenty of

41:55

the armies of the First Crusade

41:55

didn't most notably Peter the

41:57

Hermit. But Frederick the first

41:57

does it very effectively, his

42:01

army only falls apart, once it's

42:01

reached trendy territory because

42:04

he falls off his horse and has a

42:04

heart attack in a in a snow melt

42:08

river. So in terms of a military

42:08

operation, it doesn't achieve

42:12

its goals. And yet the hard part

42:12

of the journey has been

42:16

negotiated already by Frederick.

42:16

So with

42:19

that also

42:19

emphasizes the importance of the

42:21

commander in a medieval army,

42:21

you have a very large army,

42:26

probably the largest of those

42:26

crusading armies. And it's been

42:30

very successful, in part because

42:30

of the unity of command, which

42:34

is really rare for at least the

42:34

numbered crusades, but Frederick

42:39

dies. Yeah. And the army doesn't

42:39

totally disintegrate. But it

42:45

fragments. Yeah, Frederick

42:47

tukar. Swabia

42:47

does what he can he can't hold

42:49

it. He can't hold the army

42:49

together satisfactorily. And it

42:52

does seem to have broken up.

42:52

Yeah. But this business are

42:55

targeting commanders is

42:55

interesting because this this,

42:59

this, this is the case of only

42:59

when a Frankish commander is

43:02

either captured or or dies or

43:02

killed. It's also the case the

43:06

other way around. And notably,

43:06

one of the reasons why the

43:09

Kingdom of Jerusalem is so

43:09

successful in its early years

43:13

against the Ottoman Empire. And

43:13

this is a bit of a

43:15

generalization, but not much.

43:15

What they often do is to march

43:20

out at night, when they're still

43:20

a long way away from the Fatimid

43:24

encampment travel a long ways

43:24

10s of miles in some cases,

43:30

until they are very close to the

43:30

Fatimid encampment, then just

43:34

before dawn breaks, they'll

43:34

close to within a few 100

43:38

meters. And as soon as they as

43:38

soon as they get line of sight.

43:42

They charged before the Fatimids

43:42

can fall. And this time and

43:45

again, they this is how they

43:45

defeat Fatimid armies. And it's

43:48

it's quite striking. And it's a

43:48

response to the fact that the

43:52

Franks have so few troops, but

43:52

they do have heavy cavalry that

43:57

can have enormous impact against

43:57

the fact that the factories have

44:01

an enormous army. And they've

44:01

got to try and work out in that

44:03

asymmetric context, how they're

44:03

going to win a battle against

44:07

what is really a vastly superior

44:07

opponent.

44:09

We shouldn't discount the religious motivation of the leaders and

44:11

the rank and file of the armies

44:14

of the First Crusade as key

44:14

factors in its ultimate success.

44:18

I know that a lot of people are

44:18

skeptical about this, but the

44:21

researcher Jonathan Rodney Smith

44:21

and his students have

44:24

demonstrated, at least to my

44:24

satisfaction, that the main

44:27

motivation of those who joined

44:27

the first crusades was the

44:31

promise of the remission of the

44:31

penalty of sin, the desire to

44:34

rescue fellow Christians from

44:34

the oppression of those whom

44:37

they thought of as pagans, and

44:37

the opportunity to win glory in

44:41

the service of Christ. I think

44:41

that many went with the

44:43

expectation that they would

44:43

acquire wealth through booty and

44:47

land. But that was because the

44:47

Lord God is a good lord and good

44:51

Lords reward their faithful

44:51

followers. The role played by

44:55

the discovery of the holy lands

44:55

of Antioch in inspiring a

44:58

starving crew Sending army to

44:58

Saudi out from the city to meet

45:02

and defeat a much larger Turkish

45:02

relief force is striking. Yeah.

45:08

So there is that religious

45:08

belief. And I think that the

45:12

failure of the Second Crusade

45:12

creates a real crisis of faith.

45:17

What did we do wrong, that we

45:17

were not given victory? And

45:21

that, you know, because this is

45:21

an age in which victory and

45:25

defeat is not just simply a

45:25

matter of material? It's a

45:29

matter of spiritual judgment,

45:29

divine judgments as well.

45:34

Yeah, no,

45:34

absolutely. And certainly after

45:37

the Second Crusade, there is an

45:37

attempt to raise a new kusini

45:41

almost immediately afterwards.

45:41

But when a council is called no

45:44

one turns up. So. So that will

45:44

fit that very well. Just

45:49

thinking about the question, you're asked about why Simon crusades achieve their military

45:51

goals. And some don't, though, I

45:54

do think that religious

45:54

motivation, that sense of

45:57

fervor, which is so evident, in

45:57

crusade against drives many of

46:02

the events. I think that's

46:02

pretty consistent, though,

46:05

across the big crusade and some

46:05

of the smaller ones too. If that

46:09

fervor is a given, yes. Why? Why

46:09

the results, so different, but

46:15

it the from a purely military

46:15

and logistical perspective, the

46:19

undertaking of going on crusade,

46:19

for a commander Pacific

46:24

Alliance, you have virtually no

46:24

experience, or fighting in the

46:27

Middle East, even if, as they do

46:27

in the later crusades, they can

46:30

call upon the expertise of

46:30

Templars or hospitals who have

46:35

who can provide real time

46:35

experience and knowledge of the

46:38

exceed or the exigencies of

46:38

fighting in the region. It's an

46:42

it's a colossally different

46:42

difficult undertaking, and also

46:45

one that so so very different

46:45

from the conventional ways in

46:49

which war is fought in western

46:49

Christendom at this time, it's a

46:53

very different kind of

46:53

undertaking.

46:55

So we have the

46:55

First Crusade, establishing what

46:59

is called neutral mayor in

46:59

Europe, these Latin Crusader

47:04

States, which initially are a

47:04

narrow ribbon of land, and

47:10

cities along the coast of the

47:10

Levant, from Syria down to

47:15

southern Israel. And the

47:15

leaders, the Crusader States

47:19

spend the next couple of decades

47:19

trying to expand. Yeah, out from

47:23

the coast, right. Yeah. Why are

47:23

they so successful in

47:28

establishing control over

47:28

coastal cities, but they're much

47:33

less successful in being able to

47:33

expand out eastward into the

47:38

countryside? Yeah, great

47:39

question.

47:39

There's a number of factors

47:42

here. The first is to in the

47:42

wake of the First Crusade, the

47:45

veterans of the First Crusade

47:45

who stick around, and the sheer

47:50

sheer amount of experience

47:50

they've built up and their

47:53

familiarity with working with

47:53

each other and coordinating

47:57

their activities after years of

47:57

war. That's got to go some way

48:01

to giving them a cutting edge.

48:01

And I, I forget which chronicle

48:03

it is, but there's one political

48:03

from the Kingdom of England. I

48:07

think that that talks about just

48:07

how effective veterans of the

48:11

First Crusade were in the wars

48:11

of Normandy. I think I've

48:15

probably got that wrong. But the

48:15

point is that the point is that

48:19

the First Crusade has produced a

48:19

highly experienced warrior to a

48:23

level that hasn't been seen before. So that will go somewhere to explain it. The

48:25

disarray within the Seljuk

48:29

Empire will go some way to

48:29

explaining it. The sense of fear

48:33

generated by the First Crusade,

48:33

given its ongoing advance, we'll

48:40

provide some explanation. But in

48:40

terms of why that expansion

48:45

stops and why they have so much

48:45

difficulty striking in land, the

48:49

one of the reasons they're so

48:49

successful on the coast is

48:52

because the Italian cities,

48:52

various pieces in our they

48:56

supply fleets, which can help to

48:56

blockade these coastal cities.

49:00

And of course, some of their

49:00

ships can be broken up and

49:02

turned into siege towers and

49:02

other weapons which can help to

49:05

get inside the walls. It's

49:05

always astonishes me how bad

49:08

they are at siege craft, away

49:08

from the coast. They are very

49:13

rarely achieved any successful

49:13

sieges at all. Sometimes they

49:17

just sit outside of city and

49:17

hope it'll capitulate, which it

49:20

doesn't. And occasionally they

49:20

try and build a Siege Tower but

49:24

siege towers are difficult in

49:24

areas where there's not many

49:28

large trees to make into

49:28

suitable timber. Now, obviously

49:32

the Middle East is not all

49:32

desert as Hollywood would have

49:35

us believe. It has areas of sort

49:35

of Mediterranean scrub like

49:40

topography and it has some small

49:40

forests but the big corner posts

49:45

that you need to build a Siege

49:45

Tower. That kind of timber is

49:48

rare. There's some timber like

49:48

that in the north, particularly

49:51

in the forested amount of

49:51

mountains and in the soil. You

49:54

see an Armenian region, and of

49:54

course there's a famous cedars

49:58

of Lebanon, but there aren't

49:58

many forests can provide that

50:01

kind of timber, and the Franks

50:01

don't really adapt. They

50:05

occasionally call upon miners. I

50:05

suspect they may have recruited

50:09

some from Armenia. There's one

50:09

mentioned in the German crusade

50:13

of 1197 to them, using silver

50:13

miners from the hearts

50:16

mountains. But that's not

50:16

something that those aren't

50:20

specialists they can call upon

50:20

very frequently. But there's not

50:24

much adaptation and in fact,

50:24

Siege towers don't cut it, where

50:28

you can't access decent timber.

50:28

And the only reason they got

50:31

into Jerusalem with siege towers

50:31

is because when the Fatimids

50:34

besieged Jerusalem the previous

50:34

year, what someone in the army

50:38

who was tasked with dealing with

50:38

the timber permitted to deal

50:42

with a large stockpile of timber

50:42

which the Crusaders then found,

50:45

so I wouldn't want to be that

50:45

particular official when they

50:49

returned to sit to report what

50:49

had happened, but, but again, it

50:53

highlights timber the problem

50:53

and they don't really try

50:56

anything else. stone

50:57

throwing

50:57

artillery trade, O'Shea's and

51:00

catapults are a big thing in

51:00

Siege craft in Western Europe in

51:04

the 12th and 13th centuries, why

51:04

aren't they effective?

51:08

Sure, there's been some great work on this done by Mike Thornton recently,

51:09

fabulous study on on the

51:13

artillery used during this era.

51:13

And he points out that

51:17

counterweight traveling shows

51:17

which are the heavier variants.

51:21

They they seem to appear roughly

51:21

at the same time in both

51:26

Saturday and as armies and the

51:26

armies of the Crusader States.

51:29

But he also makes the point that

51:29

these these catapults can't

51:32

destroy fully formed castle

51:32

walls, they might be able to

51:36

knock down damaged walls or

51:36

perhaps walls that need a bit of

51:39

maintenance, they might be able

51:39

to knock down crenellations or

51:42

destroy buildings behind the

51:42

walls, but they won't get you

51:45

through the walls. I've been

51:45

collecting references on this

51:48

occasionally, people seem to

51:48

think that catapults could get

51:51

through walls, but I can't help

51:51

thinking these would have been

51:53

very much thinner ones, the big

51:53

walls being constructed by the

51:57

late 20th century by both the IU

51:57

bids, and the Franks wouldn't be

52:01

able to resist this. So

52:01

catapults help both from an IU

52:05

bid and a crusader perspective.

52:05

But they won't do the job. But

52:10

they actually seem to work

52:10

better, I think in the Ayyubid

52:14

or Turkish approach to siege

52:14

craft. And that's very

52:19

different. That is to create an

52:19

enormous barrage at the start of

52:23

the siege 1000s of archers,

52:23

catapults, fleeing stones, and

52:29

that barrage is to create

52:29

suppressing fire, that will just

52:32

clear the battlements, push

52:32

people back from the arrow

52:35

slits, persuade the siege

52:35

engineers in defending war

52:38

machines to clear out so that

52:38

the returning barrage is as soon

52:42

as possible. Now, of course, in

52:42

that initial assault, the

52:45

casualties amongst the preceding

52:45

archers would be enormously

52:49

high. But if you can get to that

52:49

suppression point, that's the

52:53

moment where the miners come in,

52:53

begin work at the at the foot of

52:58

the wall of the castle they're

52:58

trying to get into, under they

53:01

go, pop up the wall, burn them,

53:01

burn the mind, clear out what

53:06

comes down, and then go the

53:06

assault troops. And that

53:11

approach is so much more

53:11

effective than frankly, Siege

53:14

craft. There are plenty of

53:14

occasions where our ubit or

53:17

Turkish armies get through walls

53:17

get into cities or, or through

53:21

castle walls in a matter of

53:21

days, where he'll even be able

53:25

to build a Siege Tower in less

53:25

than about a month. So it's it's

53:30

an ongoing conclusion really

53:30

about Frankish Warcraft in this

53:35

era, when set against the walk

53:35

off of both Turkish forces or

53:38

human forces. They're incredibly

53:38

slow. They're slow on campaign,

53:43

they're slow to beseech that

53:43

they're heavily armored. They've

53:47

got lots of infantry, they can't

53:47

advance or retreat fast enough.

53:51

They can win battles with their

53:51

armies, and they can build big

53:53

castles. But actually, from a

53:53

mobility perspective, they lose

53:57

almost every time.

53:58

And castles are

53:58

essential for controlling

54:01

territory, right? Yeah,

54:03

they help. Of

54:03

course, they're not like the

54:06

Great Wall of China. They're not

54:06

they're not a total perimeter

54:08

defense. But at the same time,

54:08

it is remarkable just how

54:12

reluctant armies are to advance

54:12

past a castle. There's nothing

54:16

physically stopping them. If the

54:16

castle is on the hill, you can,

54:19

you can pass it in the valley

54:19

because a castle can't

54:22

physically command much more

54:22

than a bow shot from its walls

54:25

or Easter, February a shot from

54:25

its walls. So you can bypass it,

54:29

armies don't. And I think you're

54:29

right. In order to hold the

54:33

territory, you've got to take

54:33

the castles and most people will

54:35

take the castle. The only people

54:35

who do tend to bypass castles

54:39

are predominantly nomadic

54:39

attackers for whom castles are

54:44

not nearly as important often

54:44

what they're looking for is

54:47

either plunder or grazing, and

54:47

that may well be separate from

54:51

the castle. So in a sense, the

54:51

strategic logic of that

54:55

defensive line wouldn't work

54:55

nearly so well in those

54:57

contexts. There'd be

54:59

a sense of of the

54:59

size of the armies that we're

55:02

talking about.

55:03

Sure. So my

55:03

estimate would go something like

55:06

this. In the wake of the First

55:06

Crusade, we're talking about the

55:09

Kingdom of Jerusalem army

55:09

starting at about the high

55:12

hundreds rising to about the mid

55:12

1000s, by the 1110s. On armies

55:20

tend to remain small ish into

55:20

the mid 20th century into sort

55:24

of the low 1000s. But I think to

55:24

some degree, that's because they

55:28

don't actually need to fight

55:28

wars with bigger armies. When

55:32

Saladin starts to produce bigger

55:32

armies in 1170s 1180s, the

55:36

Kingdom of Jerusalem as armies

55:36

suddenly jump in size. I don't

55:40

think it's because they suddenly

55:40

became richer, and it's because

55:43

they're suddenly digging deeper

55:43

in order to raise bigger armies

55:46

because they have to, to meet

55:46

Saladin on an equal footing. So

55:50

armies condensed swoop up into

55:50

five figures, with the outermost

55:55

extent being the 1183 campaign

55:55

against the 87 campaign against

56:00

Selden. We're talking about

56:00

numbers of about 20,000 Troops,

56:03

how many nights

56:03

would be in an army of

56:05

20,000 1200 to 1300. And then

56:05

you would have sergeants mounted

56:10

sergeants.

56:12

Yeah,

56:12

what are the things that always puzzled me? I know who the Knights are. I

56:13

mean, the Knights are nobility.

56:17

The Knights are also from the

56:17

military orders, who are the

56:21

foot soldiers,

56:22

but soldiers

56:22

can be from a number of groups.

56:25

There's a large, a very large

56:25

market for mercenaries. In the

56:31

Middle East in this era, lots of

56:31

people hire mercenaries of

56:34

various kinds, but I suspect

56:34

many of the infantry would come

56:38

from the burger classes in the

56:38

big cities. For the kingdom of

56:43

Jerusalem, particularly. There's

56:43

references to Armenian

56:46

footsoldiers further north, the

56:46

Italian cities will often supply

56:49

troops, those could well be

56:49

infantry as well. And many of

56:54

those arriving by ship would

56:54

also be an infantry given the

56:57

costs involved in bringing

56:57

horses so pilgrim warriors would

57:02

often fight on foot, though not

57:02

exclusively. So I guessing these

57:05

would be the kinds of sources of

57:05

soldiers particularly urban

57:08

militias, I'd have thought, but

57:08

also it's in the 13th century,

57:11

there's attacks on incoming

57:11

ships where each incoming ship

57:14

has to pay a fee of two

57:14

crossbows. Oh, and I suspect

57:18

that's when the crossbow is the

57:18

Frankish infantry weapon power

57:22

acts are laws in this era. Even

57:22

the Mongols say that they're

57:26

afraid of Frankish crossbows. So

57:26

clearly, they want to maximise

57:30

on that strength, so they equip

57:30

their forces with crossbows as

57:33

widely as possible. And of

57:33

course, both the use of the

57:36

crossbow is almost exclusively

57:36

an infantry weapon. And that

57:40

too, demands considerable

57:40

expertise. So I suspect that

57:44

ambitious infantry warrior,

57:44

looking to ways in the world,

57:49

the obvious route would be to

57:49

become a knight if that's

57:52

possible. But actually, it's

57:52

probably more practical and

57:55

probably a better skill set

57:55

match for them to become an

57:58

expert Crossbowman, who are also

57:58

very well respected and paid,

58:01

which

58:02

actually brings

58:02

up one of the things I find most

58:05

interesting is, is how

58:05

integrated these crusading on

58:09

these became with infantry

58:09

supporting the cavalry, and

58:15

protecting the cavalry. Because

58:15

much of the military activity is

58:19

in fact, what we would call

58:19

fighting marches. Yeah. Most

58:23

famous example I think of the

58:23

Art of Fighting marches. The is

58:27

Richard the first, Richard the

58:27

lion hawks march from acre to

58:32

Jaffa. Yeah, Richard Tommy

58:32

marches 83 miles in 19 days,

58:38

under constant harassment by

58:38

solid Dean's forces. It's a very

58:43

slow movement. It's very careful

58:43

movements along the coast. And

58:48

it's one in which his cavalry is

58:48

placed inside of the infantry

58:55

column, so that the infantry can

58:55

protect both the knights and the

59:01

especially their horses, and

59:01

also the baggage trade as it

59:05

comes down the coast. And it

59:05

works as an integrated fighting

59:08

force. Yeah,

59:10

this is absolutely classic for the Crusader States. They fight this

59:11

way all the time. It's a

59:15

response to Turkish like cavalry

59:15

tactics, where they have to keep

59:18

keep themselves in a

59:18

consolidated group with their

59:21

logistics as protected as

59:21

possible. Otherwise, individual

59:24

contingents or wagons will be

59:24

picked off one by one. So it's,

59:30

it's a sort of armored, advanced

59:30

position, and it works

59:33

tremendously well for the

59:33

Franks. There's only one

59:35

occasion there's two occasions

59:35

in the history of the Crusader

59:38

States when a fighting mod is

59:38

actually defeated, but the vast

59:41

majority of them get through to

59:41

their target. But I've often

59:45

wondered about this because

59:45

Richard's got no experience of

59:47

fighting for fighting marches.

59:47

But but the Templars in his

59:52

immediate entourage do? Yes, and

59:52

there are several moments there

59:56

are several key moments in the

59:56

battles right Should fights

1:00:00

where he's doing things he's

1:00:00

never done before. But actually,

1:00:04

those are absolutely classic for

1:00:04

the Crusader States. And I

1:00:07

wonder if either it's a Templar

1:00:07

or hospitalar, running his

1:00:12

campaign for him, or at the very

1:00:12

least, Richard has had the

1:00:16

wisdom to realize he's not an

1:00:16

expert. Here they are, he should

1:00:19

be listening to them.

1:00:20

It's a brilliant

1:00:20

campaign. It's a brilliant

1:00:23

campaign. I mean, he, he stops

1:00:23

and the coast, he brings in

1:00:27

reinforcements, takes away,

1:00:27

wounded soldiers, brings in

1:00:31

supplies, and just carefully

1:00:31

marches down and resists

1:00:35

fighting battles, until he's

1:00:35

pretty much forced into one at

1:00:39

our soothe. And having won that

1:00:39

battle. He continues on to Java.

1:00:43

It shows Richard to be a

1:00:43

cautious and careful military

1:00:49

commander rather than the

1:00:49

impetuous warrior that popular

1:00:54

fiction and movies presented as,

1:00:57

but isn't that true of most effective military commanders? Yes,

1:01:01

it really is. The

1:01:01

one thing that I found also

1:01:04

interesting about that, because

1:01:04

it is cultural, is that when the

1:01:07

battle of Vasu does break out,

1:01:07

and even if we go by the the

1:01:12

sauces and buzzy, it's really

1:01:12

because because the military

1:01:17

orders finally have had it with

1:01:17

getting their voices killed and

1:01:21

getting attacked. And they just

1:01:21

simply charge and then Richard

1:01:25

says, Okay, let's go for it.

1:01:25

Richard fights from the front.

1:01:29

And he exposes himself to the

1:01:29

possibility of being killed. I

1:01:34

think he has that real choice.

1:01:36

Well, and of course, that's a possibility that sort of eight years later,

1:01:38

comes home to roost when he

1:01:41

exactly, yes,

1:01:43

it's an example

1:01:43

of both how a cautious military

1:01:47

commander like Richard, and he

1:01:47

really is careful and cautious.

1:01:51

But nonetheless, there are

1:01:51

cultural necessities that would

1:01:56

force even a very cautious

1:01:56

commander to expose himself to

1:02:02

the dangers, because without

1:02:02

that he can't really have the

1:02:06

credibility to command.

1:02:08

Certainly,

1:02:08

Richard is acutely aware that

1:02:10

he's leading an army army, which

1:02:10

has not reconciled to his rule,

1:02:14

and many of them don't like him.

1:02:14

Yes, that may have provided him

1:02:19

with a strong incentive to set

1:02:19

an example. But to be honest, he

1:02:24

still acts that way in western

1:02:24

Christendom as well. And if

1:02:27

memory serves me seldom is not

1:02:27

impressed by this because it's

1:02:31

it's dangerous. Its place. If

1:02:31

we've already said if the

1:02:35

commander goes down, the Army

1:02:35

goes down. And so it's an

1:02:38

enormous risk. Okay,

1:02:40

this is a

1:02:40

terrible analogy, but I'm gonna

1:02:42

make it anyway. The Crusader

1:02:42

States were like a patient with

1:02:47

leprosy. They kept on losing

1:02:47

pots, until eventually, by 1291,

1:02:54

they went down to a single city

1:02:54

acre, and that was the Latin

1:02:58

east. Do you think that this was

1:02:58

inevitable militarily?

1:03:03

I've gone back

1:03:03

and forth on this question. And

1:03:05

I think in separate

1:03:05

publications, I've argued the

1:03:08

case going both ways. Get the

1:03:08

right that way. Exactly. I can't

1:03:13

be waiting. Because it is

1:03:13

something that is a tricky one.

1:03:17

And of course, we're playing

1:03:17

with alternative history here.

1:03:19

So we'll never actually know.

1:03:19

But I think that the point that

1:03:23

I have come down to in the in in

1:03:23

more recent years, is this, that

1:03:29

the nomadic step approach to

1:03:29

warfare is so much more

1:03:33

effective than the

1:03:33

agriculturally based approach to

1:03:38

warfare. Step armies can step

1:03:38

armies that have a, whether

1:03:43

that's the Mongols, or the

1:03:43

Seljuk Turks, who of course,

1:03:46

adopt elements of warfare from

1:03:46

the Islamic societies that they

1:03:49

conquer these approaches to war,

1:03:49

that they're faster, they're

1:03:54

harder hitting that about their

1:03:54

experience and their expertise

1:03:59

in warfare is culturally

1:03:59

derived. They're raised with it,

1:04:01

they're raised to shoot and

1:04:01

right. They don't have

1:04:04

logistics. Often. Often they

1:04:04

bring their herds with them

1:04:07

later armies do, but

1:04:07

nonetheless, they can survive

1:04:10

with minimal logistics. And

1:04:10

compared to that heavy knights,

1:04:14

requiring half a dozen squires

1:04:14

each, and several horses that

1:04:18

require farriers and all the

1:04:18

infrastructure that goes with

1:04:21

that endless wagon trains that

1:04:21

nomadic armies can easily cut.

1:04:26

And it's worth considering as

1:04:26

well that the Mongol Empire span

1:04:29

from the Pacific seaboard the

1:04:29

borders of Hungary, the Seljuk

1:04:33

Empire spanned from the

1:04:33

frontiers of Central Asia to the

1:04:36

Mediterranean. These are massive

1:04:36

empires. The Crusader States, on

1:04:40

the other hand, is just a sliver

1:04:40

of land on the eastern

1:04:43

Mediterranean. And yet it's

1:04:43

still considered to be a

1:04:47

successful venture the First

1:04:47

Crusade at least viewed from a

1:04:50

military perspective, but

1:04:50

compared to the soldier called

1:04:53

Hmong, Mongol conquest, it's

1:04:53

it's almost irrelevant. And I

1:04:57

think it is worth pointing out

1:04:57

that this Step armies and step

1:05:01

cultures of this era are

1:05:01

supremely better equipped for

1:05:05

conquest than those typically of

1:05:05

agricultural societies,

1:05:09

including Western Christendom,

1:05:11

I know that you have to leave to pick up your child at school. So just one

1:05:12

last question, how much world

1:05:16

did religion end up playing not

1:05:16

with the Crusaders who are

1:05:19

coming from Europe, in these

1:05:19

waves of crusades, but how much

1:05:25

role did religion play in the

1:05:25

thinking and the policies of the

1:05:31

prince of Antioch, the count of

1:05:31

Tripoli, the kings of Jerusalem,

1:05:36

when in their dealings with

1:05:36

their Islamic neighbors. So

1:05:41

something that

1:05:41

I've come to realize by reading

1:05:44

architectural and archaeological

1:05:44

reports, is just how expensive

1:05:48

it is to build even a single

1:05:48

church in the United States.

1:05:53

Just one medium sized church I

1:05:53

worked out cost as much as

1:05:57

supporting 300 nights for a

1:05:57

year. Wow, one medium sized

1:06:02

church, and they're building

1:06:02

10s, possibly hundreds of these

1:06:06

things. And as before we move on

1:06:06

to the castle walls, the harbor

1:06:09

said all the other stuff they're

1:06:09

building, they're building a lot

1:06:12

of religious buildings, the

1:06:12

Church of the Holy Sepulchre

1:06:15

itself is a really big ticket

1:06:15

item. And that's not the only

1:06:18

really big church they're

1:06:18

building. There are huge

1:06:20

cathedrals being constructed to

1:06:20

so the expenditure being

1:06:24

lavished on churches is immense.

1:06:24

And this is a time when the

1:06:30

commanders of the Crusader

1:06:30

States are constantly

1:06:33

complaining about a lack of

1:06:33

money for troops. So my point is

1:06:37

that the only reason I can think

1:06:37

of that is that they are

1:06:40

impelled by a very powerful

1:06:40

sense of religious purpose.

1:06:44

Otherwise, I don't see why they

1:06:44

would have diverted so much

1:06:47

money to the construction of

1:06:47

churches when the army is crying

1:06:51

out for additional troops

1:06:51

supported by cash.

1:06:55

So nonetheless,

1:06:55

they will make treaties with

1:06:59

their Turkish neighbors.

1:07:01

Yeah, I think

1:07:01

this is the point. I think they

1:07:04

are driven by a very powerful

1:07:04

sense of religious zeal and

1:07:07

purpose, but that religious zeal

1:07:07

and purpose does not mandate

1:07:11

that they therefore have to

1:07:11

treat their the Muslim neighbors

1:07:16

as adversaries in their efforts

1:07:16

and desire to conquer, maintain

1:07:22

and later reconquer the holy

1:07:22

places. They're fully prepared

1:07:26

to work with any culture that

1:07:26

can offer them support or don't

1:07:30

see it from the sources at least

1:07:30

has been a problem for them. The

1:07:34

idea of ally across across

1:07:34

cultural or religious lines, if

1:07:38

it supports their broader

1:07:38

ambitions, they'll do it. And

1:07:41

the same thing.

1:07:41

It's actually

1:07:41

pretty interesting. It's one of

1:07:44

the reasons why the European

1:07:44

crusaders who came in sometimes

1:07:48

were appalled by the leaders and

1:07:48

the people that they met in a

1:07:52

neutral manner the Christians,

1:07:52

because they seem to have gone

1:07:55

native, they they seem to have

1:07:55

become soft Orientalizing. That

1:08:01

was certainly

1:08:01

that that's that accusation

1:08:04

appears in many sources that the

1:08:04

Eastern Franks have have become

1:08:09

less vigorous in their execution

1:08:09

of arms or something like that.

1:08:13

But actually, if you look at

1:08:13

some of their campaigning

1:08:15

history, so take the Hatim

1:08:15

campaign, I forget who said

1:08:19

this, but it was a good point.

1:08:19

The Franks fight for two days in

1:08:22

the blazing sun with responding

1:08:22

to orders until the last few

1:08:26

last couple of hours. That

1:08:26

requires a lot of staying power.

1:08:30

So I don't I don't think that

1:08:30

accusation, at least from a

1:08:33

military perspective holds much water.

1:08:35

And I think

1:08:35

that's it. That's the last word

1:08:38

for today. Thank you so much for

1:08:38

being on the podcast to get this

1:08:43

was fascinating. And I hope that

1:08:43

we can have you again, perhaps

1:08:46

to come and talk about the hot

1:08:46

teen campaign. Well, that's it

1:08:52

for today. And I hope that

1:08:52

you'll come back to join us for

1:08:55

our next episode. Bye for now.