0:10

You are listening to the War and the Rocks podcast. On

0:13

strategy, defense, and foreign affairs, you know the routine. If

0:15

you're a regular listener, my name is Ryan Evans, the

0:17

founder of War and the Rocks. I'm

0:19

sitting here with your favorite and mine, Mike Kaufman.

0:21

Mike, thanks for joining us again on the show.

0:23

Yeah, thanks for having me back. We're

0:25

here to talk about Ukraine, obviously. Let's start with the most

0:27

acute battle going on right now at a DFCA. DFCA

0:30

has been a somewhat fitful fight

0:33

that's been ongoing since October. You

0:36

know, the initial big Russian push there over

0:38

the fall wasn't successful. They lost quite a

0:40

bit of equipment. I think their losses have

0:42

crept up into 500 plus pieces of equipment

0:45

at this point. For

0:47

those who are kind of curious, this is at

0:49

the level of having lost almost an

0:52

entire division or something towards a combined

0:54

arms army. But while the fight

0:56

stabilized towards the end of the year, I think

0:58

last time we really talked about this was

1:00

around New Year's, Russian forces have in

1:02

the past week, we're going to have

1:05

have made gains around the DFCA. And

1:08

so the situation around of DFCA

1:10

is, I would say stable, but

1:12

stably bad and trending for the

1:14

worse. You know, it sounds that Russian forces

1:16

are making incremental gains. And I

1:18

still hold to kind of my earlier judgment back

1:20

in the fall that there's a good chance of DFCA

1:23

will eventually be lost. What does

1:25

it say about the manpower situation

1:27

of the Russian army that

1:30

Putin seems, and associated forces of course,

1:32

that Putin seems comfortable throwing all these

1:35

people into that meat grinder. It doesn't

1:37

seem like there's any change in the

1:39

Russian concept of operations. It's just this

1:42

very relentless willingness to accept lots

1:44

of casualties approach to war. So

1:46

they tried a mechanized

1:48

breakthrough back in the fall. It failed and

1:50

they just took a much more traditional approach.

1:53

But that being said, for

1:56

all its shortcomings, what the Russian military

1:58

was able to do last. year, and this

2:00

was perhaps a wider conversation, is they were

2:03

able to replace their losses, and

2:05

they were able to generate several additional units

2:07

and combined arms armies, so they

2:09

are able to grind it out over time.

2:12

And so they've been steadily trying to eat away

2:15

at the position of Difka. And

2:17

what it says about the Russian

2:19

military is that, although perhaps effectiveness

2:22

is not dramatically improved, they still

2:24

have the numbers and that particularly

2:26

an advantage in firepower. Russia

2:29

does not have a huge manpower advantage on the ground. What

2:31

it does have an advantage in is that

2:34

it's able to replace its losses and it's

2:36

able to generate additional units. That's why Ukraine

2:38

is currently engaged in a very important mobilization

2:40

debate on what to do for the coming

2:42

year. Also, Russia has a significant

2:44

firepower advantage, right? Ukraine was experiencing

2:46

shell hunger, we were last during November, and it

2:48

got a lot worse over the last couple months.

2:51

And we know that the Russian military is

2:54

very heavily fire-driven. And now that they've established

2:56

a five-to-one fire's advantage at the front... You

2:58

believe it's five-to-one? Yeah, I believe it's five-to-one

3:00

at this point. It might be trending worse

3:02

because... And this of course relates to slowed

3:04

US assistance with Ukraine aid stuck in Congress.

3:07

Very much. That's a factor. I think

3:09

it's a very significant one. And, you know, I even saw an

3:11

announcement the other day of French or somebody saying that

3:13

they could supply 3,000 shells to

3:15

Ukraine a month. That's barely a day's

3:17

worth of ammunition, if you're thinking. So

3:19

pretty dire. So, Difka falls, let's say

3:21

that happens. Let's say your prediction is

3:23

right, is that eventually Difka falls. What's

3:26

the sort of next major

3:28

battle on the front? What do Russian forces

3:30

do next? Or what options do they have

3:32

next? Yeah, my own question is that if

3:34

Difka falls, it would probably just even out

3:36

the front because Difka was always a natural

3:38

salient. The issue is probably a

3:41

bit less of Difka overall and more the

3:44

other areas we're trying to advance. Russian forces

3:46

essentially took Marinka over the course of the

3:48

past month. Marinka's further down south. Is that

3:50

a small town? Yes, it's a small town.

3:52

The reason they were fighting over it is

3:54

they're trying to get around Uglodar. Last winter

3:56

there was a big fight for Uglodar. The

3:58

Russian military failed in that fight. and Marinka

4:01

will allow them to try to make progress to

4:03

cut off the ground level of communication. So

4:06

they're still kind of at the same pocket, just trying

4:08

to eat in a different way. But

4:10

then further up north, there have been some Russian

4:12

gains, and it's a little bit of

4:14

a murky picture right now along Luhansk

4:16

and the Harkov Order Line. And so

4:18

to me, it does seem clear that

4:21

the Russian priority for this year is

4:23

to take the Rosso Dombas, focused on

4:26

Donetsk, but also to return to the

4:28

position they held in the Harkov Obelisk

4:30

before they were pressed out

4:32

of there back during the Harkov Offensive. So basically

4:34

get back to the Oskiel River and try to

4:36

put themselves in a position to actually threaten the

4:38

city of Harkov and threaten

4:40

the key cities in Donetsk from that northern

4:42

axis. And so they're pushing along the northern

4:45

part too, at least, so I think overall

4:47

you see at least three main areas where

4:49

the Russian military has been trying to slowly

4:51

press along the front. Let's talk about the

4:54

campaign against Ukraine's infrastructure this winter

4:57

and Russia's efforts

4:59

to take out key

5:01

nodes, key infrastructure. How's that proceeding?

5:03

So that's a really great question.

5:05

It proceeded differently than expected and certainly different from

5:07

last year. You were very worried about it. I

5:10

was worried about it, I'd be worried about it, and for

5:12

good reason. Russia had stockpiled a lot of drones, significant

5:15

number of missiles, but it

5:17

seems they mostly targeted instead

5:19

of critical infrastructure, defense industry,

5:22

and essentially haven't

5:24

focused on Ukraine's power grid,

5:27

but rather have done, I'd say more of a

5:29

scattershot campaign and are trying to, from my point of

5:31

view, both saturate air

5:33

defense that's been deployed

5:36

and also trying to go

5:38

after Ukraine's defense industrial capacity,

5:41

which is a different set of targets. And we can debate

5:43

why. I mean, I would be a liar if I said

5:46

I know exactly why they did it differently this

5:48

year. Well, it fits with what we understand about

5:50

Russia's theory of victory in a way is that

5:53

you try to reduce

5:55

Western support, to produce international

5:57

support, reduce the political will for

5:59

countries to... keep supporting Ukraine with arms.

6:01

And then if you winnow down Ukraine's

6:03

ability to arm itself, then you're

6:06

able to settle the war on favorable

6:08

terms for Russia in a couple of years. That's

6:10

probably the theory of victory, I'm guessing. Yeah. I

6:12

think- Especially if Trump were to win. Sure.

6:14

I think that they basically at this point have a three-year

6:16

plan. They're spending the most they've spent on

6:19

defense in a very long time this year, in 2024.

6:21

And at the time, this

6:24

has become more of a marathon rather than

6:26

a race. And so they're going after sustainment

6:28

and what Ukraine would need to do to

6:30

regenerate capability. And so what's happening this year

6:32

is you essentially have a contest

6:35

for reconstitution. And whoever is able to

6:37

effectively use this year to reconstitute, then

6:40

we'll have decisive advantages towards the end of 2024

6:42

headed into 2025. And

6:45

that advantage may then be irrecoverable for the

6:47

other side. It'll be difficult to turn it

6:50

around. And that's why I think the Russian

6:52

strike campaign has been trying to go afterward.

6:54

They think our important sources of Ukrainian industrial

6:57

capacity and that

6:59

could be used for reconstitution. And

7:01

also trying to see what they could do against

7:03

the air defense deployed and slowly bleeding air defense.

7:05

They know that along with

7:07

artillery ammunition, air defense, interceptors, and

7:10

munitions is one of those key

7:12

areas where Ukraine is constantly trying

7:14

to manage its available arsenal.

7:17

This is probably a good segue into the article

7:19

that you just wrote for War on the Rocks

7:21

with two of your colleagues. You want to tell

7:23

us about the basic argument there? Sure. So the

7:25

article is called the whole building strike, a vision

7:27

for how Ukraine could retake the advantage for

7:30

2024. And I wrote it with my colleague,

7:32

Rob Lee, Dara Maseka. And what it basically

7:34

lays out is essentially as it advertises, a

7:37

vision for if the resources were there, right,

7:39

if Congress was to pass a supplemental if

7:41

we actually had the money, what

7:44

could be done over the course of this year,

7:46

thinking maybe 18 months out of a

7:48

more long-term strategy in this war? And

7:51

what could a theory of success look like that's

7:53

feasible, right? And what the basic way is out

7:55

is Three main pillars. One is

7:57

kind of hold, which is about fortifying

7:59

in defending post consolidating, rationalizing the Ukrainian

8:01

forces here trying to exhaust a Russian forces

8:04

at the peak of their defense spending

8:06

which I think it's possible given some

8:08

strap social challenges. The Russian military has limits

8:10

your early advantage, but their advantage isn't

8:12

the size of a dozen, just sort of.

8:15

You. Know confer, victory, make the second

8:17

is billed as a sucky port Does

8:19

as I should recall seeing the Green

8:21

military. Focusing. On Force quality training

8:24

and industrial capacity both fair and a

8:26

bitch during the Wasp. Now. Will

8:28

require a lot of resources in order to

8:30

have an opportunity. And Twenty twenty five,

8:32

they retake the advantage for some kind

8:34

of major offensive operation and last part of

8:37

strike. Going. After Russian critical

8:39

infrastructure, Russian Air Force, and elements

8:41

of the Russian economy, this board

8:43

is about negating some the Russians

8:45

advantages and creating problems forum maybe

8:47

capitalizing on the campaign last year

8:50

in the Black Sea. He does

8:52

not a substitute for major offensive

8:54

just to be clear And it's

8:56

not a strategy that by itself

8:58

a when the war for Ukraine

9:00

but his of way of. Inflicting.

9:03

Damage and create problems for the

9:05

Russian military while focusing eerie constitution and

9:08

sort of avoiding bad attritional fights

9:10

are just localized offences for the sake

9:12

of offences which are two classic. Basically

9:14

the strategy suggests. The. Ukraine has

9:16

the husband it's resources. Fight. Smartly

9:19

because. Doesn't. Know we don't know

9:21

what kind of resources can be available on

9:23

Twenty Twenty five to drive for Ukraine of

9:25

fear will in scoring twenty five. right?

9:27

To be able to may be we take

9:29

the initiative and afflict some sort of meaningful

9:31

defeat on Russia. Bottom. Line

9:34

it's it's also porn argument because and

9:36

lays out with a seasonal if the

9:38

resources board there. We. Know

9:40

that Ukraine has to change quite a lot

9:43

of things to be successful. if they

9:45

follow your advice the united states and

9:47

other right western backers do as well

9:49

what are some of these recommendations in

9:51

your piece targeted specifically a washington for

9:53

washington one we'd have to change or

9:55

training base on the experience of last

9:57

year more we learn to enable ukraine

9:59

so scale operations. Yes, so they're not just

10:01

operating at a company level, so they actually are

10:04

operating as battalions and dare we dream brigades that

10:06

are fighting more coherently. Absolutely and just to be

10:08

clear, it can be done when you're not trying

10:10

to make a surge effort to conduct an offensive

10:12

a few months out. When you have a year

10:14

plus to train, there's a lot you can do

10:17

when you're not trying to make brigades over the

10:19

span of three months, right? And this is also

10:21

as a Ukraine's fault, it's also a shared responsibility,

10:23

the kind of training that the West

10:25

was delivering. Right, another one's defense industrial

10:27

capacity, you know, investments have been made,

10:30

some have been very sluggish, particularly in

10:32

the European side, but it is

10:34

improving and we could be in a very different

10:36

place come 2025 in terms of

10:38

output of artillery ammunition, of other communications and

10:41

also investment in Ukraine's industrial production, production

10:43

of drones, production of communications for them,

10:45

whether it's in Ukraine or let's suggest

10:47

outside of Ukraine but for them, there's

10:49

a lot that can be done over

10:51

the course of a year with the

10:53

West correctly applies its resources and

10:56

so this is the kind of the build

10:58

part of the argument. Europe has belatedly realized,

11:01

I think, what a giant mess it's

11:03

actually in and how

11:06

by under delivering for their own security and

11:08

for Ukraine's war effort that

11:10

they've put themselves in a real

11:13

hole, especially if Donald Trump wins the next

11:15

presidential election and I don't know

11:17

if they're turning things around quickly

11:19

enough or if they even can anymore to be

11:21

honest with you but I guess we're

11:23

about to find out. So I would say that I

11:25

think a lot is going to be

11:27

decided in this war over the course of the next

11:30

12 months and for folks listening, you know,

11:32

what point wasn't that true though? So

11:34

right, every period in the war is decisive,

11:36

right? It's a bit of sophistry to say

11:38

that this is the turning point decisive year,

11:41

you know, fair, fair, what is that that

11:43

true? But what let me put it a

11:45

different way, for folks who are focused on

11:48

the US election, right, and Donald Trump potentially

11:50

being elected, the good news and

11:52

the bad news that I have is I think that

11:54

much will be decided and will have a tremendous

11:56

sort of inertia that they will cast over

11:59

the course of... conflict is the trajectory,

12:01

they'll set, between January and the

12:03

next. And so much will already be set in place one

12:05

way or another. A lot of this has to do, of

12:07

course, with what Congress decides to do. Senator

12:09

Mitch McConnell, the Republican

12:12

leader, has decided, I'm hearing, I don't

12:14

know if this is a final decision

12:16

or still a debate in the Republican

12:18

conference, to decouple the Ukraine issue from

12:21

border negotiations, which could

12:23

make it easier to pass Ukraine

12:25

aid. But I think it's still an

12:28

open question. Although it has been interesting,

12:30

and you can interpret this any way

12:32

you'd like, to see the president using

12:34

emergency authorization to give Israel things, including

12:37

things related to 155 artillery

12:40

shells without congressional authorization, whereas

12:42

with Ukraine, he keeps going through the

12:45

normal congressional authorization process. That's something to

12:47

watch. It's something that's frustrated

12:49

even Biden supporters that he hasn't been going

12:51

through Congress on that. But anyway, just an

12:53

observation. Yeah. I think where I am is

12:55

that as far as I understand, it's

12:57

not a done deal yet either way, but

13:00

my view has been growing increasingly gloomy over

13:02

the last couple of months. Yeah. Let's talk

13:04

about the maritime picture. Ukraine does have some

13:06

success to boast of on the Black Sea

13:09

in terms of keeping shipping lanes open.

13:11

Yeah, that's Ukraine's main success. You know,

13:13

Ukraine's shipping, commercial shipping, particularly through deep

13:15

water ports like Odessa, jumps

13:17

significantly after November. I'm talking, this is

13:19

really a changed picture just over the

13:22

last two months. And

13:24

the volumes and number of ships

13:26

traversing the routes just increased dramatically

13:28

that's not at pre-war levels, but

13:31

it's getting up

13:33

there. And so this is probably the main

13:35

success story from 2023 that

13:37

to some extent we've

13:39

neglected. Now it's very important for Ukraine's economic

13:42

vitality and Ukraine's prospects is that a solution

13:44

by itself to a major ground defense of

13:46

or anything else, no, it isn't, but it's

13:48

a very big bright spot in the story

13:50

for last year. Which otherwise has sort of

13:53

been a year of missed opportunities. I know

13:55

this is in either of our area of

13:57

expertise, but we've been, I had

14:00

to become a lot more familiar with some

14:02

of Ukraine's internal political debate as it relates

14:04

to mobilization and manpower. Walk us

14:06

through this. This is a

14:08

complex topic, but the way

14:10

I see it is there's

14:12

currently a debate. There was

14:14

a proposal that was

14:17

put out by Ukraine's president, Ziansky, saying that the

14:19

general staff was looking for 450,000 to 500,000 men.

14:23

This is a very, very large

14:25

number that's been batted back and

14:27

forth. There was a bill introduced

14:29

regarding mobilization that's been rejected on

14:31

first reading by the Ukrainian legislature.

14:34

This is one of the core topics. If

14:36

the West is debating financial resources and getting

14:38

ammunition to Ukraine and these other capabilities, the

14:41

debate in Ukraine is very much about manpower.

14:44

Ukraine needs to replace the losses from last

14:46

year and needs to generate additional combat

14:48

power. To do that, they

14:50

need more men. But the average age of Ukrainian men

14:52

in the military has really been creeping up until the 40s.

14:55

Ukraine as a matter of policy has not

14:57

been mobilizing younger men in their 20s because

15:00

it's a very small percentage of the demographic.

15:02

They are Ukraine's future. If you look at

15:04

Ukraine's demographics on the chart, you will clearly

15:06

see that there are almost four times as

15:08

many men in their 40s as there are

15:10

in those early mid-20s. It will

15:12

tell you why they have that policy. This

15:15

is a very thorny debate. Where we are

15:17

right now is sadly

15:19

nowhere, which is that there hasn't been a

15:21

subtle solution yet. The Ukrainian

15:23

Training Command, Benjamin Nikoluk said that they do have

15:26

the capacity to train these men. I'm a bit

15:28

skeptical. I think that we are abit of a

15:30

chicken and egg conversation where Ukraine

15:32

does need to mobilize people just in

15:34

general to sort out the force and

15:36

fill out the force for the coming

15:39

year. But they need to

15:41

have a sense of the resources they're going to have from

15:43

the West because they can't, they don't want to mobilize

15:45

people knowing if they don't know that they have the resources

15:47

to train and equip them. So we're

15:49

sort of looking back and forth in each other right now and

15:51

this is a critical period in planning. Both

15:53

sides try to understand the resources they're going

15:55

to have to work with for

15:58

the hard local choices that they need to have. make

16:00

this year. Before we return to

16:02

another thorny Ukrainian political debate that's ongoing

16:04

right now, I want to

16:06

call out Europe and specifically the EU for

16:08

something else. The EU seems to have tanked

16:12

G7 discussions to seize

16:14

$300 billion in Russian assets sitting

16:17

in various foreign banks, non-Russian

16:19

banks. That $300 billion

16:22

could be seized and could finance

16:24

Ukraine's reconstruction. It could finance Ukraine's

16:26

war effort. It could take a

16:28

lot of pressure off of Western

16:30

industry, Western taxpayers especially over the long

16:32

run. Yet, the EU has

16:34

basically decided they're not going to move forward

16:36

on this, according to press reports. Admittedly, the

16:38

sources are anonymous, but it's Reuters, which I

16:40

trust, and some other outlets. I

16:43

think it's a real missed opportunity. The

16:45

US and its European partners should

16:47

have been moving much faster on this to begin with,

16:49

but that's the whole story of this war. It's

16:52

just extremely disappointing. Phil Lozelico did

16:54

a great podcast with Aaron Stein on this for

16:56

us. That's part of Unspent Rounds, which is

16:58

a members-only podcast, but we published it for free. Phil's

17:01

been one of the leading voices on this. Another

17:04

opportunity that Europe has missed. Well, I will

17:06

add, I'm not sure how easily

17:08

those funds could be spent on

17:10

military assistance, but I know that overall, of

17:12

course, they could be very much spent on-

17:14

Definitely on reconstruction. Yeah. Just to

17:16

be clear, we're debating funding, often- Keeping the

17:19

government going. A

17:21

lot of it is economic assistance and financial

17:23

assistance for the government. Even the supplemental being

17:25

debated by Congress, so that's 60 billion, I

17:27

think only 30 is on the military side,

17:29

and the other half is on, aimed

17:32

towards economic assistance. So it

17:34

would make a very significant dent

17:36

in that bill. Just another dumb

17:38

European strategic mis-decision. Anyway,

17:42

we're recording this on a Monday afternoon,

17:45

and the debate du jour, and so keep

17:47

in mind, we'll be listening to this

17:49

at the earliest sometime on Tuesday, Tuesday afternoon,

17:51

I think. So I don't know which way

17:54

this will end up turning out, but General

17:56

Zaluzny, the commander in chief of Ukrainian forces,

17:59

was going to be fired. And I'm not gonna throw this on

18:01

anyone else. This isn't something I got

18:03

from Mike But I'm telling you

18:06

and you might be frustrated to hear this But

18:09

the truth is that once he was planning

18:11

to fire the guy this was in the works. This

18:13

is not disputable I'm not gonna tell you

18:15

how I know this you can either trust me or not, but

18:17

it was in the works It then got

18:19

leaked I don't know by who but it was

18:21

leaked by very credible

18:24

people to very credible journalists

18:26

and Then now

18:29

I don't know what's gonna happen It's going to

18:31

be a very unpopular move both in Ukraine

18:33

where Zaluzy is very popular and

18:36

also internationally Where he's seen as a

18:38

seasoned capable military commander. And again, this

18:40

is just Ryan's personal view. I Think

18:44

this would be disastrous I think a lot

18:46

of the mistakes that we saw in 2013

18:48

particularly around sticking to Bach

18:50

moot and the human and equipment cost that

18:52

it imposed on Ukraine and some other things

18:54

this came from Zalensky from what I understand

18:56

Not from Zaluzy. So to hold him accountable

18:59

for the failed 2023 offensive is Nonsense

19:03

in my view and another thing apparently

19:05

a lot of people on Twitter We're

19:07

not aware of this and I'm sorry

19:09

that you weren't but it's you know,

19:11

the word literally the worst kept secret in Ukraine It's

19:13

not even a secret. It's openly discussed all the time

19:16

Zalensky for about two years now has been very

19:18

afraid of a presidential challenge from

19:20

Zaluzy. So this cannot be separated from

19:23

the political threat that he saw from

19:25

him And and it also

19:27

speaks to the really poor civil

19:29

military Relations and how

19:32

that's affected the campaign that we've been seeing in Ukraine

19:34

and we're told by certain Western analysts who I shall

19:36

not name Oh, don't talk about this It's the same

19:38

ones that don't want to talk about any problems that

19:40

Ukraine has they only want to talk about the good

19:42

stuff But that's not what this podcast is for. So

19:44

anyway, Ryan's rant is over Mike. I'll just ask you

19:47

this You have studied this war

19:49

very closely. I believe you met

19:51

Zaluzy knee on a past research trip What

19:53

is your impression of him as a commander to

19:55

me? His reputation rang through is very

19:57

charismatic of the challenges and problems that

20:00

I saw in Ukraine's offenses and Ukraine's

20:02

operations, I did not

20:04

think that Zaluzhny and his leadership were

20:06

among them, and I don't

20:09

know what problem his removal solves

20:11

other than the very

20:14

thorny civil relations that

20:16

have sort of burst out into the open ever

20:18

since Zaluzhny's November interview in The Economist, and for

20:20

any of you who have not been seeing the

20:22

sort of back and forth that's been happening the

20:24

last couple of months, the

20:26

situation clearly deteriorated I think between

20:29

the commander in chief and the president, so

20:31

I think for many of us who have

20:33

been watching this war and have been to

20:35

Kiev over the past year or

20:37

two years, this kind of thing

20:39

was looming that it was very much in

20:41

the offing. So we'll say

20:44

about Zaluzhny, just my impression of him

20:46

was that he was a military thinker

20:49

oriented around technology, concepts, doctrine, also very much vested

20:51

in the fundamentals, you can tell that from the

20:53

way he spoke and also what he wrote and

20:55

published, and for those interested, welcome to

20:57

these articles in The Economist and Other Places. And

21:00

lastly, yes, he was very charismatic and

21:02

very much liked by the men, so

21:05

I think that his removal will be

21:07

deeply unpopular across the Ukrainian military, and

21:09

that is, should not come as a

21:11

surprise to anyone, and I'm

21:13

not sure how pointing someone new

21:16

fixes any of these big questions on

21:18

mobilization, on what the Ukrainian strategy should

21:20

be, you know, but my job is

21:22

to analyze and so I'll look to

21:24

see how the situation plays out. I

21:26

guess we'll see, hopefully Zelensky reverses

21:29

course, but maybe we'll know by the

21:31

time this episode comes out. Thank

21:33

you for listening to this episode of the War on

21:35

the Rocks podcast, don't forget to check out our membership

21:37

program where, among other things, you get to listen to

21:39

Mike on Russia contingency,

21:41

which is one of several members only shows

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that we offer as a part of our

21:46

membership. Thank You for listening,

21:48

stay safe, and stay healthy.