Episode Transcript
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0:10
This is an I heeart original.
0:15
What's interesting though about the drumcase though, of course, is that
0:18
I think it's a very sympathetic impulse
0:21
to want to use some sort of law here
0:24
to convey that
0:27
what Laurie Drew and her daughter
0:30
did in this case not only did
0:32
it have a tragic ending, but
0:34
the act itself was quite
0:37
cruel. I'm
0:39
joannic Neil, and this is main
0:41
accounts the story of my
0:44
Space episode
0:47
seven. My safety
0:56
users regularly experienced
0:58
online harassment on my Space, hateful
1:02
and hurtful comments, even buying,
1:05
especially users who were very young
1:08
yet at the time, with social
1:10
networking still new and regarded
1:12
as an experiment, these experiences
1:15
weren't often taken seriously, and
1:18
to those who did experience online harassment
1:21
in the context of MySpace and
1:24
at the time and the odds, it
1:26
was so unexpected or bizarre that
1:28
they often didn't know how to process
1:31
it. Take for example,
1:33
Roommates, the web series
1:36
MySpace produced from two thousand and seven
1:38
to two thousand and eight. The
1:40
show was available to watch on MySpace.
1:44
It was also promoted through the
1:46
social network. It was critical
1:48
for driving engagement. The team
1:50
set up accounts for individual characters
1:53
on the show, audiences could
1:55
interact with the characters like they were
1:57
real people. It was exciting,
2:00
but as Roommates creator Scott
2:02
Zacharan soon found out, there
2:04
were drawbacks to being this public
2:07
available. Some of the comments
2:09
made about the characters played
2:11
by real people actors
2:14
we're really cutting. Yeah,
2:17
I mean I've happened a few times. I mean in
2:19
our early shows when people would
2:21
see the photos and people would comment
2:23
on their books any
2:25
actor, male, female, it
2:29
was really painful for them. At first, we removed
2:31
the the the garden
2:34
variety hater or
2:36
we warned them we only would
2:38
go to MySpace if there was something that,
2:41
you know, was beyond what
2:43
we should be doing, so you can get a sense
2:45
of you know, okay, this guy can be salvaged
2:48
or ignored, but
2:52
somebody else if they start to get you know, too
2:55
sexual, or you know, something
2:57
that goes beyond our standards and practices, that's
2:59
when we would kick it up to my Space. The line
3:02
between Stan and Stalker is
3:04
kind of a thin one. Like the people who
3:06
like really get enthusiastic
3:08
about a celebrity, it can be can
3:11
I get very easily tip the other way because
3:13
I think people are more nervous about doing that back
3:16
then because they didn't know what have caused. Now
3:18
it's tearing people apart is
3:20
common interactivity. Most
3:26
users on my Space did
3:29
not have access to my Space the company,
3:31
like the roommates, cast and crew. They
3:34
cannot make special requests for the company
3:36
to intervene. Typically,
3:38
it was expected back then that if
3:40
you were harassed online, the
3:43
only thing to do was ignore
3:45
it, don't feed the trolls.
3:48
This is something bridget Todd, host
3:51
of Beef and there Are No Girls on
3:53
the Internet, commented on
3:55
in our interview. I think for far
3:57
too long, people in positions
4:00
of power, or like parents and educators
4:02
and administrators, people who are in positions where
4:04
they're meant to help young people understand
4:06
the role around them, we've been telling
4:08
them this complete fiction that
4:11
what happens on the Internet is just the Internet, and like
4:13
your real life is your real life, and like who
4:15
cares what they're saying, It's just words on the on a
4:17
screen. And so when young people
4:20
are facing this kind of thing, there's
4:22
oftentimes not a lot of adults in the room
4:24
who can really understand what's happening
4:26
and like talk to them about it in a real way. That's going
4:28
to be meaningfully helpful when we're talking about
4:31
things like online harassment. It is really important
4:33
to keep that in mind. And I think that
4:35
we're seeing that that attitude
4:37
sort of slowly change, but I think
4:39
it's changing far too slowly
4:42
to actually, you know, deal
4:44
with the problem at any kind of scale.
4:48
The tragic death of Megan Meyer,
4:51
which resulted in major news coverage
4:53
ongoing for years following
4:55
the Lory True trial, was
4:59
a reckoning. The thinking
5:01
until then a mix of on
5:03
the Internet no One Knows You're a Dog as
5:06
a fame as New Yorker cartoon caption
5:08
from nineteen ninety three put it, combined
5:12
with a moral panic over youth online
5:14
that we addressed in earlier episodes,
5:18
belied how sometimes
5:20
the real threat of online harassment
5:22
is more prosaic. Your own
5:24
neighbor could create indescribable
5:27
pain for your family. Laurie
5:30
Drew, the mother of Megan Myers
5:32
classmate a neighbor of the Myers,
5:35
became virtually universally scorned
5:38
when her role in the bullying of Megan
5:40
became public. But while
5:43
most people familiar with the case believe
5:45
that her behavior toward Megan was
5:47
cruel, there was no clearly
5:50
drawn path to accountability. There
5:52
were no laws that perfectly
5:55
prevented someone else from behaving
5:57
the way that Laurie Drew had on my Space.
6:00
She was taken to court in the case United
6:02
States versus Drew and
6:04
faced felony computer hacking charges.
6:09
Drew was charged in two thousand and eight
6:11
with misdemeanor offenses of
6:14
unauthorized access to my Space.
6:17
This was overturned in two thousand and nine
6:19
and Drew was fully acquitted. Now
6:22
to a new development in the case of the Missouri teenager
6:24
who took her own life after she was harassed
6:27
on the internet. Her family wanted the mother allegedly
6:29
behind the hopes to be prosecuted. That authorities
6:31
hit a roadblock, But now there has been a
6:34
surprising development. What
6:37
kind of reactions to the Drew cose do you
6:39
get through nurse students case?
6:41
Specifically, I
6:43
would say that by
6:46
the time in the semester where I'm introducing the students
6:48
to this case, they've
6:51
already been quite outraged by the
6:54
scope of the CFAA in certain
6:56
other cases. But I think many
6:58
of them are primed to think
7:01
that the prosecutor here was really overreaching.
7:04
They already have Aaron Schwartz's
7:06
story in their minds as
7:09
somebody who was massed downloading
7:11
academic articles from j store
7:15
and was prosecuted and then
7:17
ultimately tragically took his own
7:19
life after
7:22
being charged under the CFA.
7:24
They have him in their minds. They have other
7:27
types of cases in their minds, where you
7:32
know, LinkedIn is trying to stop
7:35
another company from scraping its website
7:38
the public profiles that people have posted
7:41
on LinkedIn, and they're trying to use the CFAA
7:44
for that, and
7:47
so by the time they get to the Drew case,
7:49
I think many of them are already a little
7:51
skeptical of the
7:54
ways in which especially
7:57
sort of corporate actors can
8:00
use a law like the CFAA
8:04
to exert
8:07
forms of power and control
8:10
over websites
8:12
that they create. That's
8:16
Thomas Cardre. He teaches at
8:18
the University of Georgia School of Law,
8:20
and he's an affiliated researcher with
8:23
a Cornell Clinic to End tack
8:25
abuse, and as he just mentioned,
8:28
United States versus Laurie Drew is
8:30
a case that he brings up in his classes.
8:33
What's interesting about the Drew case that, of course, is that
8:36
I think it's a very sympathetic impulse
8:38
to want to use some sort of law here
8:42
to convey
8:44
that what the
8:48
what Laurie Drew and her daughter
8:51
did in this case, not
8:53
only did it have a tragic ending, but
8:56
the act itself was quite
8:58
cruel. And so
9:00
I think there's at least, you know, there's this perception
9:03
that what happened was was
9:07
a very at the very least uncivil
9:09
and mean spirited. And
9:13
so I think the students do
9:16
have a tough time swearing
9:20
their opposition to this very
9:23
far reaching federal law that
9:26
probably makes all of them a cyber
9:28
criminal. In my classroom,
9:32
in every class when they
9:34
drift off for a second and they go on a website
9:37
and they you know, they
9:39
violated term of service without even realizing
9:43
after the break. But we'll learn more
9:45
about the CFAA and
9:47
to find out why this and other laws
9:51
were slippery to hold Lorry Dry to account.
10:01
Essentially, the CFAA, the Computer
10:03
Fraud and Abuse Act, is a federal
10:05
criminal law that
10:09
makes it a crime to access
10:12
a computer without authorization
10:15
or to exceed your authorized access
10:17
on a computer. Now
10:20
what all of those magic words
10:22
mean has been the subject of now
10:25
decades of scholarly
10:28
debate. Different court
10:30
decisions. Many
10:33
different interpretations have been kind of put forward,
10:35
and different cases have kind of tested the boundaries
10:38
of what some of those key terms might
10:40
mean, especially the idea of what it
10:42
means to access a computer
10:45
without authorization or to exceed your authorized
10:47
access. That concept
10:49
of unauthorized access is
10:52
really at the heart of a lot of these disputes
10:55
colloquially to see if it is talked
10:57
about as the federal hacking
10:59
law. But of
11:01
course even what constitutes hacking
11:04
is a kind of disputed, and
11:08
some of the confusion surrounding the interpretation
11:10
of the statue reflects some of those those
11:13
kind of colloquial tensions as
11:16
well. One thing that I just was curious
11:18
about because it is allaw that, unless
11:21
I'm mistaken it, it's been on the books for decades
11:24
now, So has a
11:27
perception changed over the decades
11:30
because of changes in the technology
11:33
or what does
11:35
it mean to have a low of that hold? Absolutely?
11:38
Yeah. So one of the interesting things about the
11:40
CFAA is that I think best
11:42
septions surrounding the laws have
11:45
changed, and the law itself has also
11:47
changed. It's been amended by Congress several
11:49
times since it was initially passed in
11:52
the nineteen eighties, and so we've
11:55
got these kind of two parallel changes that
11:57
are going on, and they're not always syncd
11:59
up. So sometimes I would say public perceptions
12:01
surrounding the law has changed in
12:04
response to a case like
12:06
the law a Drew case, or a situation
12:09
like Aaron Schwartz, one
12:12
of the founders of Reddit, who was famously
12:14
charged under the CFAA. We've
12:17
had other high profile cases more
12:19
recently than those two, but there
12:21
are these kind of moments where there's increased
12:23
public consciousness surrounding the CFAA, usually
12:27
paired with opposition
12:29
to how it's being enforced or interpreted.
12:34
The origin of the CFAA, possibly
12:36
apocryphal, is that President
12:39
Reagan watched war games
12:41
at Camp David. It's that Matthew
12:43
Broderick movie from nineteen eighty three. You
12:46
know it. The only winning move is
12:48
not to play yeah that one.
12:51
Reagan was allegedly so disturbed
12:53
by the hacking depicted in this movie that
12:56
he whipped up legislation that extremely
12:58
broadly outlawed computer
13:01
access without authorization.
13:04
In the summer of twenty twenty one, there
13:06
was a Supreme Court case which narrowed
13:08
the scope of the CIFAA. The
13:11
way that the CIFA was applied
13:13
in the laureatory trial would probably
13:15
be considered obsolete. But
13:18
also I am very very
13:20
obviously not a lawyer, So other
13:23
Thomas Cadree take it from here. But
13:26
I still teach the case to my students because
13:29
I think it really helps to kind of ground the stakes
13:32
of what the Supreme Court was really
13:35
doing in this case last summer
13:37
in saying, well, there's
13:40
this one way that we could read the statute that might
13:42
cover all of these forms of conduct,
13:45
some of which may be harmful
13:48
but maybe not harmful in the way that this statute
13:51
was designed to cover, and other
13:53
of which may not be harmful at all, maybe really innocuous.
13:56
And of course, one of the main things that staid issue in the Drew
13:58
case and in many other cases involved in the CFA
14:01
is one of the violation of terms
14:04
of service or some other form
14:06
of contractual agreement
14:09
or written policy, whether violating
14:12
that kind of a restriction that
14:15
isn't bypassing some sort of technical restraint
14:18
on access to a computer, that is really doing
14:21
something that you're not supposed to be doing under
14:23
some sort of rule that's written down or
14:26
that's conveyed to you in some way or maybe that's implied.
14:30
Those were the cases that always, I think,
14:32
gave judges some of the greatest discomfort
14:35
in saying that the CFA should apply there.
14:38
But some courts and some judges,
14:41
including the judge and the Laurie Drew case, felt
14:43
compelled to reach that conclusion in
14:46
part because the
14:48
terms in the statute to say that you're
14:50
doing something, you're accessing a computer without
14:53
authorization, the statute
14:55
gave no specialized definition
14:57
about what without authorization should mean,
15:00
and so often when judges
15:02
are faced with interpreting a law like that, they
15:05
just look to the ordinary meanings, and we know what
15:07
without authorization means. It's synonymous
15:10
with things like without permission, not
15:12
allowed. And so
15:15
if something is forbidden in a written policy
15:17
and you go ahead and do it anyway, it
15:20
sort of makes sense to talk about that as lacking
15:22
authorization of some kind, lacking permission,
15:25
And so judges, like the judge in the
15:27
Laurie Drew case felt compelled
15:30
to say, well, these actions
15:32
because Laurie Drew
15:35
and her co conspirators, as the
15:37
court puts it, co conspirators here being her
15:40
daughter and her eighteen year old employee.
15:43
The mother's eighteen year old employee. They
15:46
violated various terms of service
15:49
that my Space had laid out, and so they were acting
15:52
without authorization and therefore they violated.
15:55
Therefore they violated the law. And so I still
15:57
teach it to my students because it's a fascinating case
15:59
to kind of show. I think a lot
16:01
of a lot of people, my students included, they
16:04
have some sympathy with
16:06
the idea that operators of websites
16:08
should be able to set certain rules and
16:11
if those get violated, it's
16:13
not just a question of oh, you breached the contract,
16:16
but you did something that violated a
16:18
criminal law, and
16:20
so we should be able to use the criminal
16:22
law to get at those kinds
16:25
of permissionless
16:27
uses of computers. But
16:30
I think the Drew case kind of pushes some
16:32
of those impulses to say, well, if if
16:35
this is allowed, then this is the this is the extent
16:37
that you could go to one question I have about
16:40
this case and then going back to this moment
16:42
in time in two thousand and seven, two thousand and eight, I
16:46
think a lot of reactions to the story
16:48
of Meganmeyer is that something
16:51
terrible happened and this
16:56
you know, what does justice look
16:58
like in this in this situation,
17:01
what is on the books at
17:03
all, and if the CFA is a
17:05
perfect legislation, and was
17:10
there anything at the time that could
17:12
have been more suitable, or in
17:15
the years since then have
17:17
there been developments to enforced cases
17:20
of what I would say extreme online
17:22
harassment of this nature
17:24
or any nature. At
17:26
the time, there certainly
17:29
weren't as many laws that would apply as
17:32
there are now. And that's one of the reasons
17:34
why I would imagine federal prosecutors
17:36
reached for a law like the CFAA that,
17:41
given its interpretation at the time, was
17:44
something of a capsule, or at least it could
17:46
help fill in the gaps where
17:49
some other laws wouldn't apply. And
17:52
so you might have had certain laws
17:54
that prohibited forms
17:59
of harassment but that didn't
18:02
yet apply to internet based
18:04
harassment. Or you might have had
18:07
uma
18:11
claims that could be brought for intentional infliction
18:13
of emotional distress. That's a taught that
18:15
had existed for a long time, but the
18:18
government can't bring that as a criminal charge.
18:20
That's a private lawsuit that needs to exist
18:22
between people. So you know, Megameier's
18:25
parents, for example, might have been able to sue
18:27
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
18:31
But actually there are all sorts of very complicated reasons. We
18:33
won't get into about why it's difficult for Paris
18:35
to sue when when something
18:37
like that happens to a child. But anyway,
18:39
that the
18:41
bigger point is that, yes, that's
18:44
one of the reasons why prosecutors
18:46
reached for a law like the CFAA, where
18:50
you can you can bring in. It
18:54
gives a legal basis for our
18:57
sense of moral outrage that something
18:59
bad happened and somebody needs to be held responsible.
19:03
Since the Drew
19:06
decision, which
19:08
ultimately remember right, even though she was convicted,
19:11
it was her conviction was ultimately overturned
19:14
because of her constitutional challenge
19:16
that she raised to her
19:19
conviction. Since
19:21
then, there have been a
19:24
whole slew of cyber bullying
19:27
and harassment and stalking statutes that
19:29
have been passed in many states across the country, including
19:31
one in Missouri, the home state
19:34
where these events kind of mainly
19:36
took place. Missouri passed
19:38
Megan's Law, which was
19:41
a statute designed to
19:43
get at various forms of cyber bullying
19:45
and cyber harassment that
19:50
the terms of the statute certainly seemed much
19:55
they seemed much closer to what
19:57
happened here, right, It's actions
20:00
that are taken with the purpose
20:02
to frighten and intimidate and cause
20:05
emotional distress. There
20:07
are different provisions that apply depending on whether
20:09
the perpetrator is a minor or
20:11
an adult. So laws
20:14
like this have since been passed, but they've also
20:16
been subject to a lot of constitutional challenges
20:18
as well, usually First Amendment challenges
20:21
based on the freedom of speech. So
20:24
courts tend to get let's just say
20:26
a little more skittish when laws
20:30
make it illegal
20:33
to communicate with people
20:36
with the intent to annoy, with
20:39
the intent to m
20:43
yeah, pester, you
20:46
know, if it's with an intent to threaten,
20:48
if it's with an intent to
20:51
harass, Generally
20:54
that's you know, the courts are
20:56
a little less
20:58
likely to strike down those laws as unconstitutional.
21:02
But the story of kind of cyber
21:04
bullying laws across the country has been one of
21:07
a few successes and many failures
21:09
in terms of those laws standing.
21:13
This sort of the wealth being
21:17
being upheld by courts when they when they're
21:19
challenge Yeah, that was
21:22
a really helpful explanation
21:24
there. It raised a question that
21:26
I have now, which is it seems
21:28
like with online harassment legislation
21:31
you have different stakeholders,
21:34
the users, the people,
21:39
the business, the executives
21:42
of a platform, the victims
21:45
of cyber bullying or online
21:47
harassment. How
21:50
do you negotiate I mean, again,
21:52
I imagine it's a very imperfect process. But
21:55
how do you negotiate with these that
21:58
balance between the First Amendment rights
22:01
and the accountability Who
22:03
is responsible for what? And
22:06
how has this process evolved
22:10
over the past couple decades. Yeah,
22:13
it's constantly evolving. It
22:16
is by no means settled. And
22:19
I'll add one additional complication,
22:21
not that we need anymore. We've got enough to be
22:23
getting along with. But law
22:26
is only one possible regulatory
22:29
tool that can be used here to
22:31
address some of these harmful forms
22:34
of conduct communication
22:36
interaction, right that conducted
22:39
through technology. Technology
22:42
itself is another regulatory
22:45
force here. Technology can
22:47
enable and constrain different forms of
22:49
behavior in ways
22:51
that is certainly not a direct analog
22:54
to law, that can be complementary
22:56
to law and sometimes not so complementary to
22:58
law. And there are other regulatory
23:00
forces as well. Right, There can be
23:03
certain like market constraints on some
23:06
of these forms of behavior, and social
23:08
norms are working in the background as
23:10
well to again
23:13
push certain types of behavior enable
23:15
it or constrain it. But technology
23:17
in particular is really important to think
23:19
and talk about in this context because
23:23
your question asked about how do we navigate,
23:25
for example, First Amendment
23:28
rights to free speech or
23:31
just the political value
23:33
of freedom of expression right with
23:37
laws and other forms
23:40
of regulation, including technology that
23:42
might seek to regulate this kind
23:45
of behavior right, And this is a constant
23:47
process of evolution. I would say that
23:51
we see play out right everything
23:53
from when a
23:56
form of resident of the United States gets
23:59
kicked off Twitter, whether that is
24:01
a First Amendment issue, a free
24:03
speech issue, whether those things are one and the
24:05
same. Right they aren't, but they
24:08
often get lumped together q
24:13
the question of online
24:15
harassment by cyber
24:19
mobs, doxing,
24:22
non consensual distribution of intimate
24:25
images, other
24:27
forms of kind of networked harassment. The
24:31
values that are at stake in
24:34
each of those different situations are
24:36
types of regulations that might be appropriate
24:39
to deal with them, the constitutional
24:41
issues at stake in
24:44
some ways, I like to think that, but you know, they
24:46
are all deserving a very distinct treatment
24:49
because they do often raise very
24:51
different questions of how
24:53
to try and mitigate or address some of those
24:56
harms. And yet at the same time, they're all
24:58
intimately connected. Right,
25:00
The types of lines that you draw in one
25:02
context will inevitably at
25:04
least have to be reckoned with in the other context,
25:07
even if they don't directly apply. And
25:09
so if we want Twitter to be able
25:12
to or you know, let's
25:14
use my Space threat since it is still around, if we want
25:16
my Space nowadays to be able to address
25:19
certain forms of networked
25:21
harassment or
25:24
targeted threats that are you know, communicated
25:28
through its platform, that
25:31
has a certain vision of the
25:34
ability of those platforms to kind of govern
25:36
and police their spaces
25:39
that they've created online. That
25:43
might also apply in the context
25:46
of trying to de platform
25:48
somebody or
25:51
remove somebody's ability to engage in
25:53
these kinds of expression, and how
25:55
they go about doing that. Right, Sometimes it's
25:57
going to be a question of law. Sometimes it's going to be a
26:00
question of other forms of regulation that they might
26:02
put in place, but it's it's all pretty connected.
26:05
In this ecosystem. Social
26:08
media at scale is difficult
26:10
to govern. Any proposed
26:12
law that might aim to rid social
26:14
networks of online harassment and
26:16
prevent future laurea orus could
26:19
backfire and countless ways. But
26:22
while online harassment is real. What
26:25
you believe constitutes online harassment
26:28
depends a lot on who you are and
26:31
when I write in this area, and when I teach these
26:33
issues, I can't
26:35
just teach law. I
26:38
have to teach technology as well. I
26:40
have to teach to some extent social
26:43
norms because they're all
26:45
interacting in this space. There
26:48
are occasionally laws that are going to be a
26:51
major motivating factor, but
26:53
often there are going to be other forces that are actually pushing
26:56
some of the key protagonists in this space
26:58
to act in certain ways, to remove
27:01
certain types of content, to
27:03
protect people from certain types of harm.
27:05
Well, it seemed like no on the corporate
27:07
side of MySpace cared what
27:10
the users were doing. In fact, there
27:12
were workers of MySpace who
27:15
were on task to remove objectionable
27:17
content from the social network.
27:21
More on the MySpace content moderators.
27:23
After the break, MySpace
27:34
seemed like a free for all, a place
27:37
where you could post or upload anything,
27:41
and some took advantage of the lax rules.
27:44
There were users who uploaded incredibly
27:47
vile content. I once interviewed,
27:50
very early on in my research time a
27:53
person who had been an
27:55
executive at a digital media company,
27:58
and that person said to me very
28:02
Wiley and sagely,
28:05
if you open a hole on the inner it
28:07
gets filled with shit. And
28:11
that was like, you know,
28:13
like mic drop. So my Space
28:16
opened this hole in the Internet for people to fill
28:18
in with photos
28:20
and imagery. You
28:23
know. There were like also like you know,
28:26
kind of crude computer graphics
28:28
that were part of it too, So you can
28:30
imagine how quickly swastikas
28:33
would have shown up or you know what I mean, just
28:35
whatever crappy thing people could do,
28:38
they took the opportunity to do it. You know. It
28:40
reminds me of like when
28:44
there's a fresh piece
28:47
of sidewalk cement that
28:50
they've put in, you know, and they put some barriers
28:52
around it when they put it down, and then
28:54
in no time people are in there writing on it
28:57
and putting their face in it, like Michael Scott
28:59
in the office, and just doing stuff to it, you
29:01
know. And that's what this is. Like, it
29:03
was like this blank slate and
29:06
then what that's Sarah T Roberts,
29:09
author of Behind the Screen and professor
29:11
at UCLA. MySpace
29:13
was the first social media company at
29:16
massive scale, which meant that things
29:18
like kicking people off the platform for
29:21
say, posting swastika's
29:24
was not an easy process. There's
29:27
no size of labor
29:30
force that you could employ that could have even
29:33
gotten all the material on MySpace, you
29:35
know, much less on some of the platforms
29:38
that are out there now that are just exponential
29:41
in comparison. A lot of Sarah's
29:43
research and writing focuses on
29:46
content moderation. Big
29:48
social media platforms like Facebook
29:50
and YouTube employ massive teams
29:52
of workers, usually content workers,
29:55
to remove photos of violent or
29:57
sexual content that users have uploaded.
30:00
The worst thing you can imagine, well, someone
30:03
has probably tried to get that up on a
30:05
social media platform. At
30:07
some point. Almost every
30:10
major platform thinks
30:13
of content moderation a
30:16
little late, like they think
30:18
of it because some crisis has
30:22
predicated a new conversation within
30:24
the firm like oh, we
30:26
actually have to have some policies, or oh
30:29
my god, I didn't think someone would
30:32
nefariously do this, But here are
30:34
a bunch of people doing this thing with our our
30:37
tooling or our systems, And not
30:40
only is that distasteful
30:42
to us, but maybe it's illegal, you know, in the case
30:44
of circulating child sexual
30:46
abuse material, which people do all the time,
30:49
all the time on social media to this day,
30:52
and it is illegal, right The thing about
30:54
content moderation of social media is
30:58
that it's
31:00
treated as a trade secret.
31:03
It's treated the practices,
31:06
the specifics who
31:08
does what and where and
31:10
exactly how those
31:13
there's no consortium of social
31:15
media companies getting together and being like, hey,
31:17
we all have the same problem. MySpace,
31:20
as the first social media company at
31:23
a massive scale and one that was largely
31:25
image based, was the first
31:27
social network to grapple with the consequences
31:30
of scale. There
31:35
were like a series
31:37
of maybe moral and ethical responsibilities
31:43
that my Space felt, and then there
31:45
were also maybe some potential legal ones
31:48
that kind of came into
31:50
play, and so all of that necessitated
31:56
some gatekeeping
31:59
of some sort. But there
32:03
the firms have a hard time thinking
32:05
about that kind of activity gatekeeping,
32:08
taking material down, enforcing rules,
32:11
thinking about what can't
32:14
be done. They have a hard
32:16
time thinking about that as revenue
32:18
generating. If you were a user who encountered
32:20
some of this file stuff, maybe
32:23
someone left a testimonial with a
32:25
picture of data animals, it wasn't
32:28
clear how to flag this material, and
32:30
it wasn't clear what would happen if you did.
32:33
They often would have had no idea where it was
32:35
going. And I think in many
32:37
cases probably just presumed, oh, I'm sending
32:40
it off to the computer whatever that meant,
32:42
when in fact, you know they were sending it off to people,
32:45
but they were doing from labor
32:47
on the front end of triaging that material
32:49
already. So like maybe at
32:53
one point you had to go through
32:55
a series of menus to find where you would
32:57
report. Now, it's usually the
33:02
convention is like to have that much more
33:04
available to users, like that those buttons,
33:07
the red button or something, I've got to report this, But
33:11
you know, it was a it was a process of like flow
33:14
chart logic where you would find this place
33:17
to report, and then this is the macro category
33:20
of why it's a problem
33:22
because it's violent, or because it's
33:25
inappropriate sexual material, or because
33:27
it's some other kind of thing. I
33:29
mean, I would argue that making
33:32
a better, safer, more comfortable place
33:34
for people ultimately will generate revenue,
33:36
but that's a long that's kind
33:39
of a longitudinal argument for
33:41
companies that want quarterly returns, so
33:43
it's hard to make that case. So
33:46
what happened was, in
33:48
the case of my Space, you know, they
33:50
had to build up a content
33:53
moderation department,
33:56
which meant they also had to create a bunch of policies
33:58
simultaneously. Because the policies
34:01
governed the operations of content moderation,
34:04
executives often rationalize these
34:06
haphazard content moderation workforces
34:09
with haphazard workflows. They
34:12
assume it will all get automated
34:14
eventually, and for those who
34:16
work as content moderators, the
34:19
experience can be traumatizing. Sarah
34:24
talked to moderators from multiple platforms
34:26
for her book, including someone who moderated
34:29
my Space content. She said,
34:31
well, for the three years
34:33
after I worked at my Space,
34:36
if I met someone, I
34:38
wouldn't shake their hand. So I said, can you tell
34:40
me more about what you're saying with it? She
34:42
said, well, I know how
34:44
people are, and people are nasty and
34:47
they're growth, and I don't
34:49
want to touch a stranger's hand because
34:52
I know the stuff they do. So
34:55
this is kind of how she went forward
34:57
in the world after that experience.
35:00
She told me that she had
35:03
coworkers or employees that she
35:05
was worried out unleashing back
35:08
into the world because of the
35:11
harm that they underwent in
35:14
what they were doing and seeing. You
35:16
know. She told me, maybe some of these people started
35:18
out a little bit weird and this job
35:21
just you know, took them to the mat
35:23
psychologically, and she said,
35:26
you know, she often worried about what became
35:29
of those people, where did they end up? And in
35:32
case you're wondering, automating
35:35
content moderation would
35:37
be extremely difficult to do.
35:40
In fact, many of the much
35:42
heralded AI applications depend
35:46
on this kind of labor too. A
35:48
recent Time magazine feature revealed
35:51
that workers in Kenya moderate
35:53
and filter chat GPT content
35:56
for less than two dollars an hour. Does
35:59
it have to be that way? I
36:03
guess companies
36:05
think so for now, um
36:10
and they throw a lot of resources on you
36:12
know, again computationally, but there's
36:15
no getting away from the human the
36:19
human ability to
36:21
discern that is so uniquely
36:26
human. To take all of these
36:28
inputs symbols,
36:31
language, cultural meaning,
36:34
you know, the specificities of a particular
36:36
region in Mexico, you know, for
36:39
example, um, and
36:42
and the political situation
36:44
in that place, and
36:47
having someone who knows intimately
36:50
that area and
36:52
can respond to it like that
36:55
is nuance And it's so it's
36:59
so uniquely human in some ways.
37:02
It's like that discernment and judgment,
37:07
like yes, if it's you know, there's too much
37:09
boob in the photo. Okay, a computer
37:11
can like make a decision about that, Yes,
37:14
But when we bring in all
37:16
of these elements language, culture,
37:19
symbols, politics,
37:25
you know, like regional politics in some case
37:27
very specific religion,
37:30
all of these elements that are so complex
37:33
that people spend entire careers
37:35
studying them or you know whatever, and
37:39
then ask very lowly paid people
37:41
in a completely different part of the world to decide
37:44
about it, or we try to create
37:46
algorithms that can imitate
37:50
those decisions. You know, things fall
37:52
through the cracks, and it's
37:54
a really hard, hard problem
37:57
to solve under the
37:59
current business model social media, which
38:01
says post it and we'll
38:04
sort it out later. My Space is
38:06
still grap billing with content moderation
38:09
because MySpace still exists.
38:11
It is still around, It
38:14
exists as a company, it exists as a
38:16
platform. It collapse, certainly,
38:19
no one I know has used it in a decade
38:21
by people still work there, people post
38:24
on it. What is MySpace now
38:27
in twenty twenty three. In the
38:29
next episode, we're going to explore
38:31
what's left of it. Thanks for listening
38:33
to Main Accounts, The Story of MySpace
38:36
and iHeart original podcast Main
38:39
Accounts The Story of MySpace
38:42
is written and hosted by me Joeanna
38:44
McNeil, editing its sound design
38:46
by Mike Coscarelli and Mary
38:48
Do. Original music by Alice
38:51
McCoy, Mixing and mastering by
38:53
Josh Fisher, Research and fact
38:56
checking by Austin Thompson, Jocelyn
38:58
Sears, and Marissa Brown. Show
39:01
logo by Lucy Kntania. Special
39:04
thanks to Ryan Murdoch Grace
39:06
Views at the Head Frasier. Our
39:08
associate producer is Lauren Phillips,
39:10
our senior producer is Mike Coscarelli,
39:13
and our executive producer is Jason
39:15
English. If you're enjoying the show, leave
39:18
us a rating and a review on your favorite podcast
39:20
platform Sadly, my
39:22
MySpace page is no longer around, but
39:25
you can find me on Twitter at Joe mc
39:27
Let us hear your MySpace story aunts
39:30
check out my book lurking main
39:33
accounts. The Story of MySpace
39:36
is a production of iHeart Podcasts.
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