0:00

Life is a highway, and on it

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there will be many chicken sandwiches. But

0:05

there's only one McRispy, so go ahead

0:07

and hit the turn signal if you

0:09

know about this juicy gem of

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a detour. When

0:16

your space has the long-lasting noticeable scent

0:19

of Airwink Vibrant Essential Mist, you'll want

0:21

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0:23

to reality TV watch parties, even the

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in-laws. It smells... amazing.

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Airwink Vibrant Essential Mist is infused

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with two times more essential oil

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versus regular Airwink Essential Mist for

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breath of fresh Airwink. Can

0:55

a historical myth be

0:57

unbustable? Here's

0:59

what I mean by that. Sometimes

1:02

when you're exploring the past,

1:04

you come across a figure

1:06

whose reputation has quite obviously

1:08

been inflated by legend or,

1:11

conversely, tarnished by slander.

1:15

But usually, with a bit of research,

1:17

some critical reading, and a close comparison

1:19

of historical sources, we can

1:22

disprove many of these misconceptions. We

1:25

can bust the myth, or

1:27

at least add some nuance to the story. I

1:30

mean, you know, obviously this kind of stuff is

1:32

my bread and butter here. But

1:35

are some myths bust-proof?

1:40

There are rare cases where it seems pretty

1:42

clear that the story that's been preserved

1:44

about a person or an event is

1:47

skewed in some way. A

1:49

figure seems a little too perfect.

1:53

Or, things seem to unfold in

1:55

a way that seems a little

1:57

too close to a well-known storytelling

1:59

trope. But, we

2:02

have no evidence to support

2:04

a different reading. This

2:08

can often be the case with religious figures.

2:11

If you're not a believer, then

2:13

you're likely going to be skeptical

2:15

about the miraculous tales associated with

2:18

Moses, the Buddha, Jesus, or

2:20

the Prophet Muhammad. But

2:23

trying to find a historical source pertaining

2:25

to the life of those figures that's

2:28

not been written or

2:30

redacted by their

2:32

religious followers can

2:34

be a difficult and often impossible

2:36

thing to do. You

2:39

might smell a myth, but

2:41

with no available evidence to contradict

2:43

it, that myth might

2:46

prove to be unbustable. This

2:49

can also happen with national

2:52

heroes, people who

2:54

have been held up as the

2:56

embodiment of a particular national or

2:58

cultural identity. Sometimes

3:01

the reputation of a national hero

3:03

can become so unassailable that getting

3:05

a clear picture of who they

3:07

actually were can be difficult.

3:11

I would argue that this is

3:14

the case with one of Korea's

3:16

most celebrated historical figures, the

3:19

Admiral Yi Sun-shin, savior

3:22

of the Korean people and hero

3:24

of the Great East Asian War,

3:27

or what Koreans call the

3:29

Imjin War. In

3:32

a 2019 Gallup poll, Admiral

3:34

Yi ranked number one on

3:37

a list of historical figures

3:39

South Koreans respect the most.

3:42

To give you a sense of

3:44

his competition, the number two person

3:47

on that list was King Sejong

3:49

the Great, the beloved 15th century

3:51

Joseon dynasty monarch who was instrumental

3:54

in creating the Korean alphabet. King

3:57

Sejong is widely regarded as Korean.

4:00

Korea's Golden Age King.

4:02

And still, Admiral Yi

4:05

tops the list. There

4:09

are many reasons for this. Admiral

4:11

Yi's exploits on the high seas

4:14

during the Great East Asian War

4:16

were truly impressive. His

4:18

use of the redesigned and

4:20

uniquely Korean go-book sun or

4:22

turtle ships can't help

4:24

but capture the imagination. His

4:27

unjust betrayal, torture at

4:29

the hands of lesser

4:31

men, return to glory,

4:33

and ultimate martyrdom. Well,

4:36

that can't help but remind you of

4:39

another well-known figure. Admiral

4:43

Yi's story really has everything.

4:46

He's Horatio Nelson, George

4:48

Patton, and Sun Tzu,

4:51

with just a dash of, well,

4:53

you know who. In

4:57

the years that followed the Great

4:59

East Asian War, one of the

5:01

best-read and most enduring histories of

5:03

the conflict was a Korean memoir

5:05

known as the Jinbiroc. This

5:08

was written by the Korean

5:11

courtier, Roo Sung-young, who

5:13

had held a number of high-ranking positions

5:15

in the court of the Korean King,

5:17

Sun Jo, during the war. This

5:20

included the influential post of

5:22

first state counselor. Roo

5:25

Sung-young was also Admiral

5:27

Yi's greatest supporter at

5:29

the Korean court. The

5:32

title of this memoir translates

5:35

roughly as the Book of

5:37

Corrections and was intended

5:39

to be a clear-eyed look at the

5:42

failures of the Korean government and the

5:44

Joseon dynasty in defending the country

5:46

in the early days of the war. The

5:50

thing that needed to be corrected

5:52

in the Book of Corrections was

5:54

Korea's response to the Japanese threat.

5:57

In The Book, the author does not spare him.

6:00

Themselves from criticism and often

6:02

laments his own failings as

6:04

an administrator. It

6:06

reminds me a little bit of

6:08

Winston Churchill's massive historical volumes about

6:11

the First and Second World Wars.

6:14

You. Get a valuable behind the

6:16

scenes perspective. We also need to

6:18

remember that the author is far

6:20

from impartial. To. The credit

6:23

of russo long, he doesn't pad

6:25

himself on the back quite as

6:27

much as our died Churchill. Still,

6:31

The figure who comes out looking

6:33

the best in the book of

6:36

Corrections is Admiral Years Soon Shin.

6:39

In. The authors estimation Admiral Ye

6:41

deserved more credit than any

6:43

other Korean commander for the

6:45

ultimate survival of the Joson

6:48

kingdom. In. The

6:50

memoir the authors sincerely compares

6:52

Admiral Use Victories At Sea

6:54

to quote acts of Divine

6:56

Providence and quote. Bespoke

7:00

hugely influence the historical reputation

7:02

of Admiral You Eat, a

7:04

reputation that was only further

7:06

buttressed by the stories of

7:08

his heroics that appeared in

7:10

the engine Knock. The. Fictionalized

7:12

history of the engine war that I mentioned

7:14

at the top of the last episode. So.

7:18

For centuries, Admiral Ye was

7:20

an unambiguous hero in Korea.

7:23

But. His. Historical reputation was

7:26

super charged in the early

7:28

twentieth century as response to

7:30

the Japanese occupation of Korea.

7:32

From nights intend to Nineteen

7:34

Forty five, Koreans,

7:36

Resisting the Japanese at that

7:39

time gravitated towards the old

7:41

war hero as he represented

7:43

victory over the Japanese. His

7:46

story could easily be framed

7:49

as the Korean National Spirit

7:51

succeeding. Even when the Korean

7:54

government had failed. As.

7:56

such korean nationalist writers from

7:58

this period returned to the

8:01

story of Admiral Yi. When

8:03

Korea regained its independence in 1945, the

8:07

writings of these nationalists became

8:09

increasingly popular. In

8:11

these histories, Yi Sun-shin became

8:14

more than just a great

8:16

Korean. He became

8:18

the perfect Korean. The

8:21

nationalist historian Shin Che-ho

8:24

wrote that Admiral Yi was,

8:26

quote, both a hero and

8:28

a saint, end quote. Similarly,

8:31

the writings of Yi Guangsu

8:34

emphasized not only Admiral

8:36

Yi's military acumen, but

8:39

also his moral excellence.

8:42

Admiral Yi was a warrior

8:44

poet, a great humanitarian, as

8:47

well as a fierce combatant,

8:49

a man whose only crime was

8:52

being too honest and unwilling to

8:54

play the corrupt games needed to

8:56

get ahead in the court of

8:58

King Sun-jo. This

9:01

image of Admiral Yi was

9:03

seized upon by South Korea's

9:05

autocratic military leader Park Chun-hee

9:07

in the 1960s. President

9:11

Park had a massive statue of

9:13

the admiral erected in the middle

9:15

of a major intersection in Seoul

9:17

on the approach to the presidential

9:20

palace. Park allegedly

9:22

chose Admiral Yi for commemoration,

9:24

as he was, quote, a

9:27

person most feared and admired

9:29

by the Japanese, end quote.

9:33

The image of Admiral Yi

9:35

tapped into an anti-Japanese sentiment

9:38

still keenly felt among Koreans

9:40

after the occupation. It

9:43

also didn't hurt that Admiral Yi was

9:46

a military man, an obvious

9:48

choice of hero for a military

9:50

dictatorship. The

9:52

massive statue in Seoul, which still

9:54

stands today, was just the start.

9:57

President Park had statues of Yi

9:59

erected in the middle of a

10:01

major intersection all over the country

10:03

and even commissioned Admiral Yi miniatures

10:05

to be sent to elementary schools

10:07

all over South Korea. Now,

10:11

as I was researching this, I

10:13

discovered that some controversy arose around

10:15

Admiral Yi's statue and soul when

10:17

it was being restored in 2010.

10:21

And at first I thought, of course, this

10:24

statue must now be seen

10:26

as a symbol of the

10:28

deeply controversial Park regime. Opinions

10:31

about the legacy of Park Chun-hee

10:33

are quite divided in South Korea.

10:36

Some older Koreans defend Park's

10:39

autocratic rule as essential to

10:41

Korea's economic revival. But

10:44

many Koreans under the age of 40 view

10:47

Park as a dictator who stood in

10:49

the way of the country becoming truly

10:51

democratic. I guessed

10:53

that this debate about the legacy

10:55

of the Park regime had surely

10:57

spilled over into discussions about the

10:59

future of the statue. I

11:03

guessed wrong. It

11:06

seems that despite Park Chun-hee's

11:08

best efforts, most

11:10

Koreans do not immediately

11:13

associate Admiral Yi with

11:16

Park's mid-20th century military

11:18

government. Even

11:21

President Park's fiercest critics don't

11:24

seem to think that the statue of

11:26

Admiral Yi has been sullied by its

11:28

connection to the military government. This

11:32

seems to be because at this

11:34

point nothing can really sully the

11:37

reputation of Admiral Yi in South Korea. It

11:41

turns out the debate about the

11:43

statue in 2010 was

11:45

about whether it looked heroic enough.

11:49

At the time, some Koreans were concerned

11:51

that the way that Admiral Yi was

11:53

depicted, that is, holding his sword scabbard

11:56

in his right hand, might be a

11:58

good idea. misinterpreted

12:00

as a sign of surrender.

12:04

According to some, this

12:07

giant patriotic statue needed

12:09

to look more unambiguously

12:13

heroic. It's

12:16

honestly one of the more surprising public

12:18

history debates I've come across. The

12:21

two sides were like, that

12:23

statue is just heroic enough and

12:25

reflects how we thought about heroism

12:28

in the 1960s, opposed

12:30

to, well, I'm just concerned

12:32

that the younger generation will

12:34

grow up thinking that Admiral

12:36

Yee was just okay when

12:38

they should understand that he

12:40

was awesome. So

12:43

when that is the public profile

12:46

of a historical figure, one

12:49

can't help but smell some

12:51

mythmaking. In fact, most

12:54

serious historians of Korean

12:56

history note that Admiral

12:58

Yee's reputation has been

13:00

swollen to mythic proportions.

13:04

In his analysis of the Korean Navy

13:06

during the Great East Asian War, the

13:08

historian Yee Min-eong makes the point

13:11

that most existing writing on the

13:13

topic is, quote, marked

13:15

by extolling individual

13:17

heroism and patriotic

13:19

martyrdom, end quote. Everybody

13:23

knows that there is a mythic

13:25

elephant in the room, but

13:29

the myth of Admiral Yee might

13:32

be unbustable. If

13:34

there's a counter narrative out there that

13:36

Admiral Yee isn't all that he's cracked

13:39

up to be, I've

13:41

yet to find it. Some

13:44

sources will vary in how

13:46

effusive or hyperbolic their praise

13:48

is, but the

13:51

stories about Admiral Yee are

13:53

never really different. You

13:56

see, I've learned that if

13:58

I'm going to take all a

14:00

beloved national hero, I

14:03

need to come correct. I

14:05

need to have clear historical evidence

14:08

that I can point to that

14:10

demonstrates that the popular understanding of

14:12

this beloved figure is wrong. In

14:16

the case of Admiral Yi, I

14:19

have not been able to find that evidence.

14:22

Everything we have is very complimentary

14:25

of the Admiral. That

14:28

may be because he was just

14:30

that great, or

14:33

because differing opinions were scrubbed out

14:35

of the record a long time

14:37

ago. But I can't

14:40

prove that. Just

14:42

like his statue in Seoul, modern

14:44

historians of the Great East Asian

14:47

War are left debating whether or

14:49

not Admiral Yi was pretty

14:51

heroic or super

14:54

duper goat level heroic. So

14:58

how does Korea's most respected

15:00

historical figure fit into this

15:02

story? Let's see if

15:04

we can get to it today on

15:06

Our Fake History. Episode

15:30

number 202, What was the

15:32

Great East

15:37

Asian War Part 2? Hello

15:47

And welcome to Our Fake History.

15:49

My name is Sebastian Major and

15:51

this is the podcast where we

15:53

explore historical myths and try to

15:55

determine what's fact, what's fiction, and

15:58

what is such a good. Story

16:00

that it simply must be

16:02

told. Before. We Get Going

16:04

this week. This is just a reminder

16:07

than an ad. Free version of this

16:09

podcast is available through Patriotic. Just.

16:11

Go to patriarch.com/our Fake History

16:13

to get access to an

16:16

ad. Free feed and a

16:18

huge collection of extra episodes

16:21

including the most recent patrons

16:23

only episode on Merlin the

16:25

Wizard. The. Patrons seem to

16:28

be digging it. I've.

16:30

Been getting lots of great

16:32

feedback and even the Merlin

16:34

skeptics in the crowd seemed

16:36

to be enjoying the show.

16:38

So if you want to

16:40

hear that episode and all

16:43

the other awesome extras that

16:45

we have on offer at

16:47

Patriarch got a patriotic.com/our fake

16:49

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16:51

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16:53

for you. If you want

16:55

the whole enchilada including that

16:57

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16:59

supporting. At five dollars or more every

17:02

month. That's. patreon.com/our Fake

17:04

History. This.

17:08

Week we are returning to a conflict

17:10

known in Korea as the Engine War.

17:12

But. Is also known by

17:14

scholars as the Great East

17:16

Asian War. Now. This

17:19

is part two of what is

17:21

going to be a trilogy of

17:23

episodes on this topic. So.

17:25

If you've not heard per one and

17:27

I strongly suggest that you go back

17:29

and give that show a listen. Now.

17:32

In that first part, I did my best

17:34

to set the stage for this trilogy. I.

17:37

Introduce the idea that this

17:39

conflict has been unfairly overlooked

17:41

outside of Korea, especially given

17:43

the number of soldiers involved

17:46

and the fact that it

17:48

sucked in the most militarily

17:50

sophisticated, easy and empires of

17:52

the era. As. such

17:54

i agree with those scholars who

17:56

think that this conflict should be

17:58

more widely known as the first

18:01

great East Asian war. Next,

18:04

I discussed the unique challenges

18:06

of looking into this historical

18:08

conflict, given the biases inherent

18:10

in the Japanese, Korean, and

18:12

Chinese sources, and the

18:15

admitted inadequacies of the English language

18:17

books on the topic. As

18:20

such, I felt I needed to be

18:22

extra transparent about my sources this time

18:25

out. From there,

18:27

we turned our focus to

18:29

Japan, and explained the rise

18:31

of the Japanese leader, Toyotomi

18:33

Hideyoshi, in the late stages

18:36

of Japan's Sengoku Jide, or

18:38

the warring states period. I

18:41

did my best to show how this

18:43

war in Korea was a direct outgrowth

18:45

of more than a century of civil

18:47

war in Japan. We

18:49

finished off that episode, exploring

18:52

the reasons why Toyotomi Hideyoshi

18:54

embarked on the ambitious project

18:56

of trying to conquer Ming

18:58

China by way of Korea. We

19:03

saw that while sometimes this

19:05

gets ascribed to Hideyoshi's megalomania,

19:08

that explanation isn't really satisfying.

19:11

Instead, it seems like maintaining

19:14

order in Japan, keeping

19:16

the ambitious Japanese lords,

19:18

or daimyo, flush with

19:20

honors, lands, and rewards,

19:23

and keeping the still mobilized

19:26

Japanese armies fighting people who

19:28

were not Japanese, were

19:30

likely at the front of Hideyoshi's mind.

19:34

The breakdown in trade between

19:36

Japan and China during the

19:38

Sengoku era, also created a

19:40

situation where Hideyoshi needed to

19:42

get trade flowing again with

19:44

the mainland. Conquest

19:46

seemed like the only option

19:48

for restarting trade without Toyotomi

19:51

Hideyoshi having to humble himself

19:53

in front of the Ming

19:55

emperor in Beijing. The

19:58

last episode was focused mostly

20:01

on Japan. So today

20:03

in part two I want

20:05

to look more closely at Korea and then

20:08

of course finally get into the

20:10

thick of this conflict. In

20:13

Japan the 150 years

20:15

leading up to the Great East

20:18

Asian War had been characterized by

20:20

a chaotic state of multi-directional civil

20:22

war but the

20:24

situation could not have

20:26

been more different in

20:29

the Korean Peninsula. 1592

20:31

the Imjin year which marked the start

20:33

of the Japanese invasion of Korea also

20:36

marked the 200th anniversary of

20:39

the foundation of Korea's Joseon

20:41

dynasty. Officially

20:43

founded in 1392 the Joseon dynasty

20:47

would prove to be

20:49

Korea's most sturdy and

20:51

long-lived ruling order. The

20:53

Joseon dynasty would last nearly 600

20:57

years before transforming into the

20:59

short-lived Korean Empire in the

21:01

late 19th century. But

21:05

of course Korea's history stretches

21:07

back long before the founding

21:09

of the Joseon dynasty. The

21:12

national myth of Korea is

21:14

that the first Korean king,

21:16

Tonggun, was the son of

21:18

a she-bear who had been transformed into

21:20

a human woman by a god around

21:22

5,000 years ago. But

21:26

the Korean historian Kyung Mun

21:28

Hwang has argued that the

21:31

first distinctly Korean or perhaps

21:33

proto-Korean state on the peninsula

21:36

supported by reliable historical records

21:38

was the Kogoryo Kingdom founded

21:40

sometime in the first century

21:43

BC. By

21:45

the time the Joseon dynasty was founded in

21:47

1392 the peninsula

21:49

had seen the rise and fall of

21:52

a number of distinct kingdoms. At

21:55

one point the peninsula was divided into

21:57

three kingdoms. This was known as the

22:00

Three kingdoms, period. The

22:03

Kingdom of Sila ended up absorbing

22:05

its rivals and nearly unifying all

22:07

of what we think of as

22:09

modern Korea. Sila

22:11

eventually gave way to the Koryo

22:14

Kingdom in the late 10th century.

22:17

That kingdom was able to assert

22:20

its control over the entire peninsula

22:23

and more or less fixed its

22:25

borders where the modern states of

22:27

North and South Korea are today.

22:30

In this period, the Yalu River

22:32

in the North took

22:34

shape as the ultimate border of

22:37

what is considered Korea. And

22:40

yes, there are some who

22:42

will argue that all of

22:44

Manchuria is also historically Korean,

22:47

but man, that's a debate

22:49

for another day. The

22:52

Koryo Kingdom also integrated the

22:54

cultures of the previous three

22:57

kingdoms and created the basis

22:59

for the modern Korean identity.

23:02

Even the English word for the

23:04

country of Korea is derived

23:07

for the name of this kingdom, Koryo

23:10

Korea. It

23:13

was in this period that Korea first

23:15

started to get an international reputation. And

23:18

that reputation was, for the most part,

23:20

quite positive. In

23:22

the year 947, an Arab

23:25

historian would write this about

23:27

the Korean peninsula. Quote,

23:30

seldom has a stranger who has

23:32

come there from Iraq or another

23:34

country left it afterwards.

23:37

So healthy is the air there. So

23:39

pure the water. So fertile the

23:42

soil. And so plentiful all the

23:44

good things. Sounds

23:48

nice. While

23:50

A little unsolicited praise from

23:52

the Islamic world was certainly

23:54

appreciated, Koreans were mostly focused

23:56

on the relationship with their

23:59

largest neighbor. China. The.

24:01

Middle Kingdom. Much.

24:04

Of Korea's history right up

24:06

to the late nineteenth century was

24:08

defined by a particularly close

24:10

relationship with China. As

24:12

author Samuel Holly as put it

24:14

quote. The. Koreans have

24:17

based their culture on Chinese

24:19

culture be studied Chinese history

24:21

and the writings of Chinese

24:23

sages. They modeled their court

24:26

after the Chinese court, shaped

24:28

their government administration along Chinese

24:30

lines and closed their officials

24:33

in Chinese robes. They

24:35

made Chinese morals, their morals.

24:38

Chinese laws. They are laws

24:40

and considered the Chinese mode

24:42

of conduct superior to anything

24:45

else. And. Quote. Know.

24:49

I know that some Koreans my

24:51

bristle at that quote. As.

24:53

It's become controversial in some

24:56

quarters to suggest that Korean

24:58

culture was overly influenced by

25:00

outsiders. As I

25:03

mentioned in the last episode,

25:05

the Japanese occupation of the

25:07

early twentieth century came along

25:09

with a pernicious attempt to

25:11

destroy Korean culture and identity.

25:14

The. Japanese of that period

25:16

taught a skewed and frankly

25:18

falsified version of East Asian

25:21

history. That. Sought to erase

25:23

the achievements of the corinne

25:25

kingdoms and scrub away the

25:27

historical basis for a unique

25:29

Korean identity. One.

25:32

Koreans reclaimed their independence. They

25:34

were also keen to reclaim

25:36

their history. Many.

25:38

Wanted to emphasize the

25:40

uniqueness and historical distinctiveness

25:42

of Korea to counter

25:45

years of Japanese propaganda

25:47

that Korea had barely

25:49

existed. This. Was

25:51

an understandable impulse. Koreans,

25:54

Did not want to be written out of

25:56

their own history. So.

25:59

to clear, these Korean kingdoms

26:02

were distinct and sovereign,

26:04

albeit in a tributary relationship

26:07

with the Chinese court. Koreans

26:10

had a unique language,

26:12

cuisine, customs, and artistic

26:14

traditions. After the

26:16

reign of King Sejong in the early 1400s,

26:19

they also had their own unique

26:22

phonetic alphabet, quite different from the

26:24

Chinese characters used throughout much of

26:26

East Asia. The

26:28

Korean alphabet has been called by

26:31

historian Michael J. Seth, one

26:33

of the most logical and

26:35

scientific writing systems ever developed

26:37

anywhere on earth. The

26:40

distinctiveness of the Korean identity cannot

26:42

and should not be denied. Now

26:46

that might seem like an almost ridiculous thing to

26:48

say in 2024, when

26:50

no one is really denying the

26:52

existence of a Korean identity. But

26:56

as I have learned, the experience

26:58

of having your culture suppressed and

27:00

your history denied is

27:02

a trauma not quickly forgotten. So

27:06

I think it's worthwhile to be crystal

27:08

clear on that point. However,

27:12

to understand this era of Korean

27:14

history at all, you

27:16

need to understand the influence of China,

27:19

which was massive. In

27:23

the 1500s, the influence of

27:25

the Chinese was not a controversial thing

27:27

in Korea. Chinese culture was

27:30

simply synonymous with civilization, and

27:33

Koreans prided themselves on being

27:35

exceptionally civilized.

27:39

The text known as the Tongmong

27:42

Sun-Sip, which was for generations considered

27:44

required reading as

27:46

part of a classical Korean education,

27:49

proudly states, quote, we

27:52

made our customs like that of

27:54

the flowery land so that the

27:56

Chinese themselves praise us saying Korea

27:59

is love. little China." According

28:03

to this text, Koreans thought being

28:06

little China was high praise.

28:10

The relationship between Korea and

28:12

China would shift and change

28:14

over the centuries depending on

28:16

which dynasties happened to hold

28:18

power in both countries. However,

28:21

in the period of the Great

28:23

East Asian War, the relationship between

28:25

the two countries was quite close,

28:28

and this was because the

28:30

two ruling dynasties had come

28:32

up together. The

28:35

Ming Dynasty in China had risen to power

28:37

in 1368 after

28:39

the collapse of the Mongol-led

28:41

Yuan Dynasty. In

28:44

Korea, the founder of the Joseon

28:46

Dynasty, a former general in the

28:49

previous regime, swept into

28:51

power, favoring a close alliance

28:53

with the newly ascendant Ming

28:56

in China. The

28:58

Joseon Dynasty was thus legitimized and

29:01

given added clout by its close

29:03

relationship with the Ming court in

29:06

Beijing. As such,

29:08

the Joseon Dynasty entered into

29:10

a tributary relationship with the

29:12

Ming. The Joseon

29:15

Monarchs recognized that the

29:17

Ming Emperor was the

29:19

quote-unquote celestial emperor who

29:21

mediated between heaven and

29:23

earth. In return,

29:26

the Ming emperor recognized that

29:28

the Joseon rulers were the

29:30

Kings of Korea, with

29:32

sovereign authority over the peninsula south

29:35

of the Yalu River. The

29:38

King of Korea was expected to make

29:40

tribute payments to the Ming emperor, but

29:43

as I mentioned in the last

29:45

episode, these tribute missions were actually

29:47

the way that trade was done

29:49

between the two kingdoms. Nearly

29:52

as much wealth flowed back to

29:54

Korea as was sent to China

29:57

in the form of these tribute

29:59

flashtakers. trade missions. For

30:02

two centuries, Joseon Korea was

30:05

considered the model tributary state

30:07

by Ming officials. Korean

30:09

delegates were allowed to sit in a

30:11

place of honor at the Ming

30:13

court. The Koreans of

30:16

the era seem to have really taken

30:18

some pride in this, being

30:20

quite happy to have a more

30:22

prestigious seat at court than diplomats

30:25

from other tributary states like those

30:27

in Southeast Asia. While

30:30

technically all these tributary states

30:32

were considered equals in this system,

30:34

Korean historian Kyung Moon Hwang has

30:37

explained that in this period

30:39

the Joseon dynasty prided itself

30:41

on being quote the

30:43

first among seconds end

30:46

quote. The

30:48

Joseon dynasty of this period

30:50

was also defined by the

30:52

wholesale adoption of the political

30:55

ideology associated with the Ming.

30:58

That was neo-Confucianism.

31:02

Okay, now

31:05

I could easily get

31:08

lost explaining the philosophical,

31:10

moral, and ethical nuances

31:13

of neo-Confucianism. But

31:16

for our story here, here's what

31:18

you need to know. Neo-Confucianism

31:20

was a revival of

31:23

the teachings of the

31:25

beloved ancient Chinese philosopher

31:27

Confucius. But like

31:30

any revival, these

31:32

traditional teachings were modified,

31:35

honed, and in some

31:37

ways intensified by a group

31:39

of later scholars. At

31:42

the core of this philosophical system

31:45

was a belief that harmony, peace,

31:48

and good order could

31:50

be achieved if the

31:53

correct relationships between things

31:55

were properly maintained. Here's

31:58

what I mean. Confucians

32:00

believed that there were hierarchies that

32:02

could be observed everywhere in existence.

32:06

There was a natural hierarchy in

32:08

nature, a hierarchy in

32:11

the human body, a hierarchy

32:13

in the family, a hierarchy

32:15

in the state, a hierarchy

32:17

in international relations, and a

32:19

hierarchy in heaven. Things

32:23

were best when one knew

32:25

their spot in these various

32:27

hierarchies and acted

32:30

accordingly. In

32:32

the case of the family, children

32:34

honored and obeyed their parents, but

32:37

in turn, parents cared for

32:39

and protected their children. Similarly

32:42

in society, subjects were

32:45

expected to obey and honor

32:47

their social superiors, but

32:49

those superiors were supposed to act

32:51

charitably and benevolently

32:53

towards their lessors. The

32:57

emperor was to be honored and

32:59

worshipped, but he was

33:01

also supposed to rule with

33:04

an eye towards peace, harmony,

33:06

and balance. That

33:08

system of tribute-based trade I described

33:11

earlier is a perfect example of

33:13

this. The king

33:15

of Korea notes his subordinate

33:17

status to the emperor of

33:19

China, but then the

33:22

emperor rewards the king of Korea

33:24

with gifts. Everyone

33:26

wins and the balance is

33:28

preserved, at least

33:30

in theory. Now,

33:32

of course, this is just

33:34

the tip of the iceberg,

33:36

but hopefully you're getting the idea.

33:40

Now both Ming China

33:42

and Joseon Korea were

33:44

administered by these huge

33:46

court bureaucracies. To

33:49

get a post in the

33:51

government, you needed to pass

33:53

a civil service exam that

33:55

was entirely based on the

33:57

Neo-Confucian curriculum. This

34:00

meant that in theory there was

34:02

a level of meritocracy in this

34:04

system. Anyone who

34:07

passed these exams could potentially

34:09

serve in government. But

34:12

in practice, it took years

34:14

of expensive schooling to even have

34:16

a chance at passing the

34:18

exams. So, inevitably,

34:21

it was overwhelmingly people from

34:23

wealthy aristocratic families who ended

34:26

up taking and passing the

34:28

civil service exams. These

34:31

exams also had nothing to

34:33

do with the actual work

34:35

of government administration. They

34:38

were entirely based on the

34:40

students' knowledge of key Confucian

34:42

texts and the approved Neo-Confucian

34:45

commentaries on those texts. It

34:48

was common for students to study these texts

34:50

so rigorously that they could recite them from

34:52

memory. The thinking was

34:55

that if you staffed your

34:57

government with good moral Confucians

35:00

who understood philosophy and could

35:02

write beautifully, then they

35:04

could learn the rest on the job. These

35:07

government positions became a real

35:10

source of prestige among the

35:12

aristocracy in both China and

35:14

Korea. As such,

35:17

they became more sought after than

35:19

positions in the armed forces. In

35:22

this period, a career in the

35:25

army or the Navy was seen

35:27

as less impressive than passing the

35:29

civil service exam and getting a

35:31

position in the court bureaucracy. Now,

35:35

to be clear, there is lots

35:37

of debate among historians concerning the

35:39

state of the Ming and the

35:41

Korean armed forces before 1592. The

35:46

historian Kenneth Swope has even argued that

35:48

the Ming could be understood as having

35:50

a military revival in the lead up

35:53

to the Great East Asian War. However,

35:57

few deny that in Korea, ambivalence,

35:59

and the feelings among the

36:01

neo-confucian government class towards the

36:03

military affected how the early

36:06

stages of the war unfolded.

36:10

Finally, it's important to

36:12

understand that in both China

36:14

and Korea, this class of

36:17

government administrators was

36:19

deeply divided by rival

36:21

factions. Now

36:23

from a historical distance, all political

36:26

factionalism looks petty,

36:29

stupid, and counterproductive. I

36:33

have no doubt that in the future people

36:35

will look at our time, the

36:38

time we're living in right now, and they

36:40

will shake their heads at

36:42

how political one-upmanship, obstructionism,

36:45

and the prioritizing of

36:47

party loyalty kept Western

36:50

democracies from addressing any of the most

36:52

pressing issues of our time in a

36:54

meaningful way. In

36:57

that sense, the governments of China

36:59

and Korea in the late 16th

37:01

century were no different. Except

37:04

in those governments, the different factions

37:06

didn't have any real ideological

37:10

differences. They

37:12

were all dyed in

37:14

the wool neo-confusions. Instead,

37:17

the factions were entirely

37:19

based around personal loyalty

37:21

and patronage. You

37:24

see, Joseon Korea became

37:27

so deeply ensconced in

37:29

the ideology of neo-confucianism

37:32

that eventually they set

37:34

up something known as the Censor-It.

37:37

This was a government agency

37:39

that was meant to police

37:42

corruption and malfeasance among government

37:44

officials. In

37:46

Korea, the so-called three offices

37:49

also policed the moral

37:51

and philosophical purity of

37:54

everyone in government, including

37:56

the king. The

37:59

censors could officially... criticized government

38:01

appointments and even get policy

38:03

changed if it was not

38:05

considered consistent with Neo-Confucian philosophy.

38:10

This comparison is not perfect so I don't want

38:12

to take it too far, but

38:15

this was kind of

38:17

a Neo-Confucian Inquisition operating

38:19

within the Korean government.

38:22

Getting accused by the

38:24

censorate of corruption, impiety,

38:27

or improper conduct could

38:29

get you sacked and,

38:31

depending on the severity of the accusation,

38:34

executed. In

38:37

Korea, the court factions began

38:39

as a way to protect

38:42

oneself against denunciation to the

38:44

censors. Old

38:47

respected political veterans would promise

38:49

political cover and words of

38:51

defense to younger colleagues just

38:54

in case they were ever

38:56

accused of anything. In

38:59

return, those veterans would build

39:01

up a collection of younger

39:03

colleagues who would defend them

39:06

if they ever were accused of

39:08

anything. This

39:10

informal system of court alliances

39:13

eventually hardened into two clear

39:15

factions in the Korean court.

39:18

They became known as the Easterners

39:20

and the Westerners. These

39:23

factions vied for influence and

39:25

competed over court appointments. But

39:29

there were no real ideological

39:32

differences here. They

39:34

were all Neo-Confucians and they

39:36

all deeply supported the Joseon

39:38

dynasty. All

39:40

the disagreements were over smaller

39:43

policy questions and often

39:45

differences were manufactured just so one

39:47

side could get the edge on

39:50

the other. The

39:52

Easterners might think a Western

39:54

proposal was good, but

39:57

they would speak against it because you

39:59

can't let the Easterners get a

40:01

win? This

40:03

dynamic would hugely affect how Korea fought the

40:06

war in 1592. So let's go to 1592

40:08

and explore the

40:10

opening moves of the Great East

40:16

Asian War. Today's

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You need, indeed. In

42:16

1592, the Joseon dynasty was

42:18

in its 200th year and

42:21

the monarch, King Sanjo, was

42:23

25 years deep into his

42:26

reign. While

42:28

factionalism and a type of

42:30

fundamentalist Confucianism was starting to

42:32

seriously impede the operation of

42:35

government, the preceding

42:37

200 years of Joseon rule

42:39

had largely been prosperous, stable,

42:41

and peaceful. In

42:44

fact, the early Joseon era often gets

42:46

looked back on as a bit of

42:48

a golden age in Korean history. And

42:51

while we need to be careful not

42:53

to overly romanticize this period, there's no

42:55

doubting that in the 15th and early

42:57

16th centuries, there were certainly worse places

43:00

to live than the Korean Peninsula. But

43:04

it's generally accepted that when

43:06

the Japanese attacked in the

43:08

Imjin year of 1592, the

43:11

Koreans were not ready. Or

43:14

more accurately, they were not as ready

43:16

as they needed to be. Part

43:19

of this had to do with

43:22

a litany of diplomatic misunderstandings that

43:24

would almost be funny if they'd

43:26

not ended up leading to such

43:28

a tragic conflict. Now,

43:31

it's not like better diplomacy would

43:33

have averted this war. Toyotomi

43:36

Hideyoshi had clearly made up his

43:38

mind about this invasion and

43:41

no amount of clever negotiation could have

43:43

stopped him. Hideyoshi

43:45

had proposed that the Koreans

43:47

just stand aside while his

43:49

army marched through their country

43:51

towards the ultimate goal of

43:53

Ming China. But this was

43:56

completely unacceptable. The

44:00

Japanese would end up sending two

44:02

separate emissaries to visit the Korean

44:04

King, Son-jo, bearing letters

44:06

from Toyotomi Hideyoshi. One

44:09

of those letters I quoted from At Length in

44:11

Part 1 of this series. That

44:14

was the letter where Hideyoshi described

44:16

his miraculous birth, described his destiny

44:19

to conquer all of Asia, and

44:21

laid out his plan to march

44:23

through Korea on his way to

44:26

Beijing. This

44:28

letter had been delivered to

44:30

the Korean court by Hideyoshi's

44:32

first emissary, an old battle-scarred

44:35

daimyo who had little time

44:37

for what the Koreans considered

44:39

essential diplomatic decorum. The

44:42

Koreans already had prejudices that

44:45

the Japanese were uncultured barbarians,

44:48

and this first envoy seemed to

44:50

live up to that stereotype. What's

44:53

more, this letter he had

44:55

with him did not follow

44:57

the proper conventions of diplomatic

44:59

letters written from one vassal

45:02

king to another. Hideyoshi

45:04

was using a verb tense that

45:06

was supposed to be reserved for

45:08

the Emperor of China. Now,

45:11

the conclusion should have been

45:14

that Hideyoshi was dead serious

45:16

about dethroning the Ming emperor

45:18

and seizing that title for

45:20

himself. But

45:22

instead, King Sonjo and his courtiers

45:24

concluded that this letter was so

45:27

rude, impetuous, and lacking in decorum

45:29

that it should not be taken

45:31

seriously. The Koreans

45:34

still did not even understand

45:36

Toyotomi's role in the Japanese

45:38

government, which to be

45:40

fair was super convoluted. As

45:44

far as they were concerned, this guy

45:46

was a nobody who hadn't

45:48

paid close enough attention in letter-writing

45:50

class. Neo-Confucians

45:52

really cared about

45:54

letter-writing class. fared

46:01

only slightly better in that he

46:03

was able to impress on at

46:05

least some members of the Korean

46:07

court that Hideyoshi needed to be

46:09

handled delicately. So

46:11

King Sanjo agreed to send a

46:13

diplomatic mission to Kyoto to take

46:16

the measure of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Now

46:19

Hideyoshi had asked his emissary

46:22

to get the Koreans to

46:24

send a tribute mission to

46:26

formally offer their submission. He

46:30

was expecting a member of the

46:32

royal household. If not the

46:34

king, then at least a royal prince or

46:36

maybe one of the king's brothers. He

46:39

wanted someone of that rank

46:41

to come to Japan and

46:44

formally submit to his overlord

46:46

ship. It

46:49

seems that the Japanese emissary, understanding

46:51

that the Koreans would have rejected

46:53

that out of hand, softened

46:55

the demand considerably once he got

46:57

to the Korean court. So

47:00

the delegation sent by King Sanjo

47:03

was sent to Kyoto with no

47:05

plans to submit to the Japanese.

47:08

They were there just to open

47:10

up friendly communication. To

47:13

do this, Sanjo sent two

47:15

mid-ranking court officials, one

47:18

from the Eastern faction and one

47:20

from the Western faction. Their

47:24

trip to Japan ended up being its

47:26

own kind of debacle. Toyotomi

47:29

Hideyoshi was annoyed and insulted

47:31

that the Koreans had sent

47:33

what he perceived to be

47:35

two low-ranking courtiers. He

47:38

wanted a royal prince. So

47:42

Hideyoshi decided to pull some power

47:44

moves. First, he

47:47

kept the delegation waiting for four

47:49

months. When he

47:51

finally received the Koreans, instead

47:53

of throwing the expected lavish

47:55

banquet, he served the delegates

47:57

some basic rice cakes And. A

48:00

modest serving of rice, wine, Now.

48:04

To. The neo confucian Koreans who had

48:06

spent their life mastering bank with at

48:08

A Kiss. This was a

48:10

scandal and a mockery of decorum.

48:14

Things got even more shocking

48:16

when Hideo Sheath suddenly left

48:18

the hall in the middle

48:20

of the meal and returned

48:22

wearing informal closing. Okay,

48:25

Now I know that may not sound

48:27

like a big deal, but think of

48:29

it like this: Imagine you were visiting

48:31

of the White House for a state

48:33

dinner. And half way through

48:35

the President leaves the room and

48:38

comes back and wearing a hoodie

48:40

as some sweatpants. If.

48:42

You were dressed in a tuxedo.

48:45

You. Might think this feels kind of weird.

48:48

Were. Told that he the oh she

48:51

was then handed his baby and

48:53

walked around the room casually in

48:55

till the baby peed on him.

48:58

Kid. He or she had a good

49:00

laugh about this. Handed the baby off

49:02

to one of his many nannies, left

49:05

the room and never came back. The

49:08

Korean delegates were beside themselves

49:11

totally shocked. He

49:13

the oh she seems to have been

49:15

making the point that he didn't need

49:17

to stand on ceremony for any one.

49:19

he could do what he wanted. Like

49:21

Lyndon Johnson taking a meeting while he

49:24

sitting on the toilet with ever heard

49:26

that story. Who knows? That might be

49:28

historical mess, but that's a story that's

49:30

out there. But

49:34

interestingly, The to curry

49:36

and delegates ended up making

49:38

two very different assessments of

49:40

all of this. When.

49:43

Those two men returned to Korea and made

49:45

their reports to King's son Joe and the

49:47

rest of the court. They. Told

49:49

two very different tales

49:51

and because the to

49:54

ambassadors were from two

49:56

different political factions. The.

49:58

issue became pull politicized

50:01

Samuel Hawley summarizes it like this

50:04

quote The Western faction

50:06

member described Hideyoshi as having the

50:08

piercing eyes of a man of

50:11

resourcefulness and daring He

50:13

seemed fully prepared to start a war

50:15

the ambassador said and posed a great

50:17

danger to Korea the

50:20

Easterner strongly disagreed Hideyoshi

50:23

had the eyes of a rat He

50:25

countered and he was not to be

50:27

overly feared He did not

50:29

pose a danger and would not start a

50:31

war there was in short

50:34

no pressing need to take defensive

50:36

measures With the balance

50:38

of power in the capital now swinging

50:40

back in the Easterners favor The

50:43

assessment made by the Eastern

50:45

ambassador was afforded the most

50:47

weight end quote I'm

50:51

Sure, you could imagine what would happen

50:53

if one of the major political parties

50:56

in your country Refused

50:58

to acknowledge the potential severity

51:00

of a looming threat Even

51:03

if that political faction didn't have

51:06

complete control of every level of

51:08

government They could still make

51:10

it hard to address the issue in

51:12

a fulsome way in Korea

51:16

in the late 16th century

51:18

this meant that war preparations

51:20

were uneven and hampered by

51:22

political gridlock Eventually

51:26

after months some within the

51:28

Eastern faction Finally conceded that

51:31

maybe a small attack was

51:33

coming and some preparations needed

51:35

to be made So

51:39

in the southern provinces conscription was

51:41

tightened up key southern

51:43

towns were Refortified and new walls

51:45

were built on top of that arsenals

51:48

were restocked and weapons

51:51

were distributed Now

51:54

this is where one of our key

51:56

Korean sources comes in the

51:58

so-called book of corrections

52:00

by Yu Song-Yong. As

52:03

the title of that book suggests, it's

52:06

all about what the Joseon Kingdom should

52:08

have done differently in 1592 and

52:10

beyond. Now,

52:12

as I mentioned earlier, in

52:14

that book the author expresses regret

52:17

and even admits his own

52:19

mistakes. But

52:22

one can't help but notice that

52:24

he still comes out looking pretty

52:26

good. You see,

52:28

the author, who I'll just be calling

52:31

you moving forward, had

52:33

been a lifelong government official. One

52:36

of those guys who passed the

52:38

Confucian exam and entered the prestigious

52:40

world of public service. Over

52:43

the course of his career, he held

52:45

many different positions. But

52:48

in 1591, on the eve of

52:50

the Japanese invasion, he was elevated

52:52

to the influential position of Minister

52:55

of the Left. This

52:57

made him like the second most

52:59

important advisor to the king. Now,

53:03

despite the fact that Yu was

53:05

aligned with the Eastern faction, he

53:08

tells us that he broke with

53:11

the party line and started to

53:13

advocate for improvements to Korean defenses.

53:17

He also started advocating at court

53:19

for the one military official who

53:21

seemed to be capable and had

53:23

a clear understanding of the threat

53:25

that was on their doorstep. Yi

53:29

Sun Shin. It

53:31

didn't hurt that Yi and

53:33

Yu had been childhood

53:35

friends. Now,

53:39

my thick history spidey sense tingles

53:41

a little bit when a memoir

53:44

writer claims that on the eve

53:46

of war, the only

53:48

two people who really understood what

53:50

was going on were him and

53:52

his best friend. But

53:55

I have no facts that contradict

53:57

that version of events, so... That's

54:01

what we have. But

54:04

finally this brings us to the man

54:06

of the hour, Admiral

54:08

Yi Sun-shin. Yi

54:12

Sun-shin was born in Seoul in 1545, and

54:14

a quick word on that

54:19

place name. In

54:21

this period Seoul was

54:23

technically called Han-sung or

54:26

Han-yang. However, in

54:28

the middle of the Joseon period,

54:31

Koreans started informally calling the city

54:33

Seoul. Eventually that

54:35

name would entirely eclipse the

54:38

old formal titles. So

54:41

for the rest of the series I'm

54:43

gonna use the name Seoul for the

54:45

capital city, as it's the name that

54:47

most people are familiar with. But

54:50

I need to recognize that we're in

54:52

a bit of a historical gray area

54:54

where the city was known by a

54:56

few different names. Okay,

54:59

so Yi Sun-shin was born

55:01

in Seoul into a noble

55:04

but not particularly wealthy family.

55:07

The story goes that Yi demonstrated

55:09

a certain genius at a young

55:11

age, and his parents hoped that

55:13

he would train for the civil

55:15

service exams. This of

55:18

course would set him on the

55:20

path towards a prestigious career as

55:22

a government administrator. But

55:24

much to his parents' dismay,

55:26

Yi Sun-shin chose instead to

55:28

pursue a career in the

55:30

military, which at the time

55:32

was considered a more humble calling

55:35

for someone born into the Korean

55:37

upper crust. Often

55:39

this is presented as a

55:41

principled decision on the part

55:43

of young Yi, as

55:45

he chose the path of

55:47

sacrifice and service rather than

55:50

the path of personal prestige

55:52

and comfort. Now

55:54

I cannot contradict this version of events,

55:56

but let me tell you some things

55:58

I've learned about the Korean military

56:00

in this period. The

56:03

officer corps in this period

56:05

often attracted the less talented

56:07

children from aristocratic families. If

56:11

you had a son who

56:13

had a hard time passing

56:15

the rigorous civil service exam,

56:17

the Army or the Navy

56:19

were face-saving second choices. Like

56:23

the civil service, to become an

56:25

officer in the Korean military, you

56:27

needed to pass an exam that

56:29

was based on the Chinese military

56:31

classics like Sun Tzu's Art of

56:33

War. This was

56:36

also supplemented with a display

56:38

of flashy horsemanship. So

56:41

you ended up getting a

56:43

crop of aristocratic officers for

56:45

whom the military was a

56:47

second choice. They

56:49

loved riding horses, but their

56:52

knowledge of combat came entirely

56:54

from centuries old Chinese texts.

56:58

Now our sources tell us

57:00

that Yi Sun Shin was absolutely

57:02

not one of

57:04

these spoiled fail sons. However,

57:07

some historians suspect that given the

57:09

fact that all the sources agree

57:11

that Yi Sun Shin came from

57:13

a less wealthy aristocratic family, he

57:16

may have pursued a career in the

57:18

military because his family could not afford

57:21

the years of private tutelage one

57:23

needed to pass the civil service exam.

57:27

So the road to the top

57:29

was rocky for young Yi. He

57:32

was not immediately successful in his attempt

57:34

to join the officer corps. We're

57:37

told that during his first exam

57:39

he fell from his horse during

57:42

the horsemanship section and badly

57:44

broke his leg. Now

57:47

the story goes that after this

57:49

tragic fall Yi got up,

57:51

limped towards a nearby willow

57:53

tree, grabbed some fallen

57:56

branches, and crafted for himself

57:58

an improvised leg splint.

58:01

With his leg splinted with

58:03

tree branches, he then remounted

58:05

his horse and finished the

58:07

exam. Despite

58:10

this superhuman act of determination,

58:13

the fall still cost him

58:15

a passing grade. Now,

58:19

what do we do with a story like this? Seems

58:22

a little exaggerated. Samuel

58:25

Hawley includes the story of the

58:27

fall from the horse in his

58:29

history, but he leaves

58:31

out the detail about the

58:33

improvised splint. Kenneth

58:35

Swope doesn't even touch this

58:38

story. I

58:40

learned this story after scouring

58:42

the internet for tales about

58:45

Admiral Yee. In all

58:47

of the more sober-minded histories I

58:49

read, this story was simply missing.

58:53

It's one of those stories that seems

58:56

like a myth, so

58:58

historians just leave it out.

59:01

But they also don't spend

59:03

any time disproving it, so

59:06

once again, take it or leave it. From

59:11

there, we're told that the

59:13

determined young Yee Sun Shin

59:15

returned home, sealed his

59:17

wounds, and started the process all

59:19

over again. He

59:22

passed the exam on his second attempt,

59:24

but by that point he was already

59:27

31 years old, which was

59:29

considered a rather advanced age to

59:31

be starting a military career. For

59:35

the next 15 years, Yee

59:37

found himself unable to ascend beyond

59:40

the middle ranks of the officer

59:42

corps. The reason,

59:44

we're told, was that he

59:46

was too honest and too

59:48

averse to corruption. Getting

59:51

ahead in the 16th century Korean

59:53

military meant getting involved with a

59:55

clique of influential friends, occasionally

59:58

bribing a superior and

1:00:00

throwing a rival under the bus whenever you

1:00:02

could. Yi Sun-shin,

1:00:05

we're told, was simply too

1:00:07

upstanding to play this game.

1:00:11

So for years this courageous,

1:00:13

bright, and incorruptible officer was

1:00:15

stuck in the middle ranks

1:00:17

as he was constantly getting

1:00:19

blocked by more cunning but

1:00:22

less capable rivals. Things

1:00:25

finally changed on the eve of the

1:00:28

Great East Asian War. When

1:00:30

Yu Sung-young became the Minister of

1:00:32

the Left, he recommended

1:00:35

his childhood friend be promoted

1:00:37

to the lofty position of

1:00:39

Commander of the Chola Left

1:00:41

Navy. At

1:00:44

the time, most Korean coastal

1:00:46

provinces had four key military

1:00:48

commands. Right Army, Left

1:00:51

Army, Right Navy,

1:00:53

and Left Navy. The

1:00:56

Chola Province was on the

1:00:58

strategically important southwest coast of

1:01:01

the Korean Peninsula. The

1:01:03

Chola navies, both left and

1:01:06

right, were going to be

1:01:08

essential in resisting any Japanese

1:01:10

attack. So being

1:01:12

the commander of the Chola

1:01:15

Left Navy was a huge

1:01:17

promotion. It very quickly

1:01:20

made the now Admiral Yi, one

1:01:22

of the most important people in

1:01:24

the Korean military. Ironically,

1:01:27

the man whose career had

1:01:29

been defined by a principled

1:01:31

rejection of nepotism was

1:01:34

rocketed to the top because

1:01:36

of a well-connected and influential

1:01:38

friend. Life's funny

1:01:40

like that, I suppose. But

1:01:44

Yi took this command quite

1:01:46

seriously and quickly set about

1:01:48

repairing, refitting, and in some

1:01:50

cases commissioning new builds for

1:01:52

the Chola Left Navy. More

1:01:55

on that later. In

1:01:58

the haphazard preparations for the Japanese

1:02:00

attack, Yi distinguished himself

1:02:02

as one of the few people

1:02:04

who understood the scope of the

1:02:06

threat. He correctly

1:02:09

assessed Korea's strengths and

1:02:11

weaknesses and planned accordingly.

1:02:14

Now, interestingly, in 1592,

1:02:17

the Korean Navy was easily

1:02:19

the best equipped and most

1:02:21

formidable wing of Korea's armed

1:02:23

forces. In the decades

1:02:25

leading up to the war, one

1:02:27

of the most persistent threats to

1:02:29

Korea's security had been pirate raids

1:02:32

carried out by groups known as

1:02:34

the Wako Pirates, who were based

1:02:36

out of Japanese ports and thrived

1:02:38

during the chaos of Japan's civil

1:02:40

wars. One

1:02:42

of the ways that Korea had been

1:02:44

dealing with this pirate threat was by

1:02:47

building a fairly impressive navy. The

1:02:50

Korean coast was a famously challenging

1:02:52

place to sail, with high

1:02:55

winds, strong tides, and many hidden

1:02:57

rocks and shoals close to shore.

1:03:01

This meant that over the

1:03:03

centuries, Korean shipbuilding had favored

1:03:05

sturdy vessels, stable in rough

1:03:07

seas, with thickly built wooden

1:03:09

hulls. The gem

1:03:11

of this fleet were the

1:03:14

Pankosan warships, thick

1:03:16

hulled vessels powered by both

1:03:18

oars and sails and armed

1:03:20

with a huge variety of

1:03:22

cannon. This was

1:03:24

especially important. Once

1:03:27

again, we get a really

1:03:30

interesting parallel here between this

1:03:32

conflict and the nearly contemporaneous

1:03:34

Anglo-Spanish War. As

1:03:37

you might remember from those Spanish

1:03:39

Armada episodes, in 1588,

1:03:41

the Spanish favored a type of

1:03:44

naval warfare that involved getting close

1:03:46

to enemy ships and then boarding

1:03:48

them, whereas the English

1:03:50

focused on gunnery that gave

1:03:53

them better range. The

1:03:55

same dynamic played out between the

1:03:58

Japanese and the Koreans. The

1:04:00

Japanese used their warships like

1:04:02

giant platforms on which they

1:04:04

could fight land battles at

1:04:06

sea. Their tactics

1:04:08

involved getting close to the enemy,

1:04:11

boarding the vessels, and then killing

1:04:13

as many sailors as they could.

1:04:16

Sinking the ships was of

1:04:18

secondary importance. The

1:04:20

Koreans, on the other hand, were

1:04:22

all about the firepower. Their

1:04:25

ships were equipped with a huge number

1:04:27

of cannon that could blast their enemy

1:04:29

from a distance. For

1:04:32

the Koreans, killing sailors was

1:04:34

secondary to sinking ships. But

1:04:38

while the Koreans had the Japanese

1:04:40

outgunned at sea, the opposite

1:04:42

was true on land. By

1:04:46

1592, the Japanese had

1:04:48

fully incorporated the arquebus into

1:04:50

their military. These

1:04:52

were expertly crafted at Japanese muskets

1:04:55

that had been based on an

1:04:57

earlier Portuguese design. The

1:05:00

arquebus had been key to the

1:05:02

unification of Japan, and the

1:05:04

commanders tapped by Hideyoshi to lead the invasion

1:05:06

of Korea had become

1:05:08

masters of using peasant units,

1:05:11

or ashigaru, armed

1:05:13

with arquebuses as shock troops.

1:05:17

The Koreans had gunpowder weapons,

1:05:20

mostly in the form of

1:05:22

stationary cannon, but the

1:05:24

arquebus and handheld firearms in

1:05:26

general were still quite

1:05:28

new in Korea. The

1:05:31

Korean army was still largely

1:05:33

armed with the traditional swords,

1:05:35

pikes, and bows and arrows.

1:05:39

The Japanese were coming with

1:05:41

guns. Okay,

1:05:44

so let's take a quick break

1:05:46

here, and when we return, we'll

1:05:48

get into the first phase of

1:05:50

the Japanese onslaught. Thank

1:06:00

you. On

1:06:34

May 23rd, 1592, the

1:06:37

Japanese arrived in Korea.

1:06:40

Even the most stubborn, there

1:06:43

will be no war, Easterners,

1:06:45

had accepted that something was coming. But

1:06:48

no one in Korea could imagine

1:06:50

the size and scope of the

1:06:52

invasion force that arrived that May.

1:06:56

The Japanese launched their invasion

1:06:58

from the island of Tsushima,

1:07:00

a Japanese-aligned midway point between

1:07:02

the main Japanese islands and

1:07:05

the Korean mainland. The

1:07:09

Japanese force would eventually number over 150,000 Japanese

1:07:11

soldiers. But the initial wave was around a

1:07:13

third of that. They

1:07:21

came in a fleet of

1:07:23

around 700 transport vessels. Once

1:07:27

again, if you needed more evidence that

1:07:29

this event was super important, and

1:07:32

maybe that the Spanish Armada episode

1:07:34

was a little overblown, well,

1:07:37

the Spanish Armada, which gets

1:07:39

described as an impossibly huge

1:07:41

fleet of ships, consisted of

1:07:43

roughly 130 ships. Just

1:07:48

four years later, Toyotomi Hideyoshi

1:07:51

put together 700 vessels

1:07:53

for his campaign. Now,

1:07:56

to be clear, this Japanese Armada was a very, very, very

1:07:59

important part of the war. not made up of 700

1:08:01

warships. Most of

1:08:04

these ships were small enough to pass as

1:08:06

fishing boats. A huge

1:08:08

number of these vessels were only

1:08:10

armed with the handheld arquebuses carried

1:08:12

by the soldiers that they were

1:08:14

ferrying across. In fact, the

1:08:17

Japanese commanders had been ordered by

1:08:19

Hideyoshi to wait for a fleet

1:08:22

of Japanese warships to join them

1:08:24

as an escort. But

1:08:26

the commanders, eager for glory

1:08:29

and convinced that the Koreans were not going to be

1:08:31

able to act fast enough to stop them, made

1:08:34

a huge gamble and attempted the

1:08:36

crossing to the Korean coastal city

1:08:39

of Busan, virtually undefended. This

1:08:42

also gives you a sense of just how independent-minded

1:08:45

these Japanese daimyo continued

1:08:47

to be despite being

1:08:49

sworn to Toyotomi Hideyoshi.

1:08:53

Now, this is one of the great

1:08:55

what-if moments of the war. If

1:08:58

the Korean Navy, specifically the

1:09:00

left and right navies of

1:09:02

the Kyung-Sang Province, had acted

1:09:04

quickly and attacked these Japanese

1:09:06

transports while they were at

1:09:08

sea, they likely would

1:09:11

have blown hundreds of ships

1:09:13

out of the water and

1:09:15

severely blunted the initial Japanese

1:09:17

attack. But that

1:09:19

is not what happened. The

1:09:24

two navy commanders of Kyung-Sang

1:09:26

Province, Pak Hong and

1:09:29

Won Kyun, had between

1:09:31

them around 150 heavy Pankosan battleships. But

1:09:37

when the mass of Japanese vessels

1:09:39

appeared through the fog on that

1:09:42

day, they panicked. Now,

1:09:45

to be fair, the Koreans

1:09:47

looked outnumbered, but these

1:09:50

commanders didn't consider just how

1:09:52

vulnerable the Japanese truly were.

1:09:56

So, the Korean ships stayed

1:09:58

in port while the The commanders

1:10:00

sent frantic messages for

1:10:02

help. As

1:10:05

such, the Japanese were able to

1:10:07

land without any interference from the

1:10:09

Korean Navy. They

1:10:11

then stormed the fortified town of

1:10:14

Busan. Records

1:10:16

show that this initial fight was one

1:10:18

of the bloodiest and most intensely contested

1:10:20

of the early part of the war.

1:10:23

The newly reinforced Korean

1:10:25

defenses certainly helped, but

1:10:27

the Japanese possessed a

1:10:30

distinct technological advantage. Put

1:10:33

simply, the Korean defenders were

1:10:35

shooting arrows at Japanese soldiers

1:10:38

armed with muskets. The

1:10:41

masses of Ashi Garu, the

1:10:43

peasant archibossiers, proved to

1:10:45

be a more lethal military unit than

1:10:48

anything the Koreans had encountered in

1:10:50

the past two centuries. Within

1:10:53

a matter of hours, the walls of

1:10:55

Busan had been breached. By

1:10:58

the end of the day, the

1:11:00

seemingly formidable Busan Castle was

1:11:02

in the hands of the Japanese. The

1:11:06

commander of the Kyo-sung Left Navy,

1:11:08

Pak Hong, was so shaken by

1:11:11

this that he made a

1:11:13

decision so short-sighted

1:11:15

and disastrous, it's

1:11:18

hard to fully understand. Even

1:11:21

in a situation where it seems like

1:11:23

engaging in a fight would be futile,

1:11:26

the next logical thing to do would be

1:11:28

to take your fleet out to sea and

1:11:30

try and make a run for it. Sail

1:11:34

to safer waters, wait to

1:11:36

fight another day. Pak

1:11:39

Hong did not do that. Instead,

1:11:43

assuming that all was lost,

1:11:45

he ordered that his entire

1:11:47

fleet, the whole Kyo-sung

1:11:50

Left Navy, roughly a

1:11:52

hundred vessels, be scuttled.

1:11:55

That means deconstructed,

1:11:58

Stripped of valuables. And in

1:12:00

some cases sunk. He

1:12:03

then had all his weapons destroyed so they

1:12:05

wouldn't fall into the hands of the enemy.

1:12:08

Then. Pack. Hong got

1:12:10

on his horse and deserted

1:12:13

his command. Roughly.

1:12:15

A quarter of the entire

1:12:17

career Navy's was destroyed just

1:12:20

like that. By. One

1:12:22

spooked commander. The.

1:12:25

Commander of the right Navy one

1:12:27

children didn't do much better. After

1:12:32

he received a report about the

1:12:34

fall of Pusan, and the scuttling

1:12:36

of the left navy. He.

1:12:38

Chose to leave his base and sale

1:12:40

to see for waters. Okay,

1:12:43

reasonable. But. Then

1:12:45

he came across a group of

1:12:47

fishing boats that he accidentally mistook

1:12:49

for the Japanese fleet. So

1:12:52

he panicked and ordered this his

1:12:54

fleet be scuttled. Most.

1:12:56

Of his ships were destroyed

1:12:58

in a self inflicted wound.

1:13:01

Until. One of his subordinates

1:13:03

convinced him that the flagship and

1:13:06

three other vessels should be saved

1:13:08

and the he should remain in

1:13:10

command, less to be hunted as

1:13:13

a traitorous desert are. Seeing.

1:13:15

The wisdom in this one son

1:13:18

took the advice. So.

1:13:20

It was that the Qian

1:13:22

Sang right navy was reduced

1:13:24

from around fifty warships to

1:13:27

exactly for. Remember.

1:13:30

That name one soon because he's

1:13:32

going to come back. In fact,

1:13:34

many accounts present him as the

1:13:37

N Years soon. Shin. He.

1:13:39

Would remain as a thorn in

1:13:41

the side of the one that

1:13:44

capable Korean admiral. Luckily.

1:13:47

Use. And Sin and the

1:13:50

Tula right? Navy Commander Ye

1:13:52

Oak T still had the

1:13:54

toll on Navy's intact. But.

1:13:57

Now they were on the back. The.

1:14:00

Best plan was to bide

1:14:02

their time and strike when

1:14:04

the Japanese now convinced that

1:14:06

the Korean navy was nonexistent.

1:14:09

With. Least expected. After.

1:14:13

The Japanese established a beachhead

1:14:15

in Blue Son in occupied

1:14:17

one of careers largest coastal

1:14:19

towns. Things. Moved

1:14:21

fast, Eventually

1:14:23

there would be many di meo

1:14:26

commanding forces in Korea. But.

1:14:28

The two Japanese commanders leading

1:14:30

the charge from both sides

1:14:32

north toward Soul were. Called.

1:14:35

Nishi you can Naga

1:14:37

and keto kielbasa. For.

1:14:39

Simplicity sakes, I will just be

1:14:42

calling them Connie, Sheath and Keto.

1:14:46

The dynamic between these two

1:14:48

guys really underscores that Japan

1:14:50

had not been unified for

1:14:52

very long. These

1:14:55

were rival di meo who

1:14:57

controlled each of their contingents

1:14:59

like personal futile armies. Because.

1:15:02

In practice. They. Were

1:15:04

essentially personal futile Armies.

1:15:08

Both. Men were hungry for glory

1:15:10

and deeply resentful when they felt

1:15:13

like the rival had snatched away

1:15:15

their chance to win some battlefield

1:15:17

honor. City.

1:15:19

Oh, She had told his commanders

1:15:22

to work in concert and move

1:15:24

as a united front through the

1:15:26

Korean Peninsula. But. Cooney

1:15:29

See and Tito quickly found

1:15:31

themselves locked in a race

1:15:33

northward. Each time

1:15:35

he wanted to have the

1:15:37

distinction of being the Japanese

1:15:39

commander who entered Soul First.

1:15:43

Know. This sounds like a

1:15:45

recipe for disaster and may

1:15:47

have been. Had the

1:15:49

Koreans been better prepared and

1:15:51

not so brutally outgunned by

1:15:54

the Japanese muskets. Over.

1:15:56

The course of the next week. Many.

1:15:59

of the recently Only re-fortified fortress towns

1:16:01

in the south of Korea fell

1:16:04

much in the same way as Busan.

1:16:07

Despite the best efforts of the

1:16:09

newly-mustard Korean soldiers, these towns were

1:16:12

overrun and thousands were put to

1:16:14

the sword. As

1:16:17

you may or may not know, Korea

1:16:19

is a mountainous country. The

1:16:22

realities of this physical geography means that

1:16:24

it can be a challenging place to

1:16:27

move around with an army. In

1:16:29

the 16th century, there were only

1:16:32

a handful of good roads that

1:16:34

could take an army through the

1:16:36

many valleys and mountain passes that

1:16:38

led north. This

1:16:40

makes the speed of the Japanese

1:16:42

Progress North all the more

1:16:44

remarkable. By June 6,

1:16:47

the forces of Keto and Konishi

1:16:49

had made it through the so-called

1:16:52

Bird Pass – a tight

1:16:54

mountain pass about 130 kilometers south of Seoul. The

1:16:59

last formidable geographic barrier between

1:17:01

the Japanese Vanguard and the

1:17:03

capital was the Han River.

1:17:06

So it was there, near the town

1:17:08

of Chungju, that the Korean army

1:17:11

made a stand. This

1:17:13

would be remembered as the Battle of Chungju.

1:17:17

The Koreans were commanded by General

1:17:19

Sin Ip, whose battle

1:17:22

strategy that day has been

1:17:24

brutally criticized ever since. Normally,

1:17:29

if you're a defender and

1:17:31

you have a river that you can

1:17:34

use in your defense, you

1:17:37

keep that river between you

1:17:39

and your enemy. Make

1:17:41

the enemy cross the river.

1:17:45

Crossing a river is hard to

1:17:47

do and makes the enemy vulnerable.

1:17:51

But, Sin Ip, on

1:17:53

the other hand, chose to array

1:17:55

his army on the side of the

1:17:57

Han River closest to the

1:18:00

to the Japanese. The

1:18:02

Korean Army had the river at

1:18:05

their back. That

1:18:07

meant that if they needed to retreat, they

1:18:10

were going into the river. This

1:18:13

type of positioning has been called a

1:18:15

death trap. But

1:18:18

Samuel Hawley has argued that

1:18:20

while Synip's choices ultimately did no

1:18:22

favors for the Korean Army,

1:18:25

they need to be understood in

1:18:27

the context of the Chinese

1:18:29

military classics that Korean officers

1:18:31

had spent their life studying.

1:18:35

You see, Synip was working

1:18:37

with a small group of what

1:18:40

might be called regular soldiers, and

1:18:43

a larger force that was made

1:18:45

up of farmers and shopkeepers who

1:18:47

had been hastily recruited and barely

1:18:50

trained. This

1:18:52

was not an ideal force. Recently

1:18:55

drafted, farmers had a reputation

1:18:57

for running once the battle

1:18:59

was on. In

1:19:02

certain situations, these Chinese battle

1:19:04

manuals that all the Korean

1:19:06

officers read recommended

1:19:09

fighting with the river at your

1:19:11

back. While

1:19:14

the famous Chinese military mind Sun

1:19:16

Tzu normally recommended keeping the

1:19:19

water in front of you, he

1:19:22

also says of a green

1:19:24

and unreliable army, quote,

1:19:27

drive them into a fatal position

1:19:29

and they will come out alive,

1:19:32

end quote. The

1:19:35

idea is that if your ragtag

1:19:37

army has nowhere to run, they

1:19:39

will stand and fight because

1:19:42

their lives literally depend on

1:19:44

it. This

1:19:46

tactic famously worked for the

1:19:48

Chinese general Han Sin many

1:19:50

centuries earlier. Samuel

1:19:53

Hawley has argued, and

1:19:55

his critic Kenneth Swope has conceded

1:19:57

that it's probable, But

1:20:00

Sin-Ip knew all about the

1:20:02

history of this somewhat obscure

1:20:04

battle tactic from his deep

1:20:06

reading of the Chinese texts.

1:20:11

Now, this is a

1:20:13

perfect example of what can go wrong

1:20:15

when you make military training all

1:20:18

about theory and reading the

1:20:20

classics. An

1:20:22

inflexibly Confucian approach

1:20:25

produces guys like

1:20:27

Sin-Ip who come

1:20:29

up with plans like these. Now,

1:20:32

I'm going to speculate a little bit here,

1:20:35

so forgive me. But I

1:20:38

think that this is the kind of

1:20:40

battle plan that would have got you

1:20:42

a good grade if you wrote a

1:20:44

paper about it in your Confucian military

1:20:46

school. I say this

1:20:48

as a teacher. I kind of

1:20:50

know how teachers think, I am a

1:20:52

teacher. Teachers

1:20:55

love it when their students use

1:20:57

an obscure historical example, demonstrate

1:21:00

some deep reading, and come

1:21:02

up with a creative interpretation

1:21:05

of the texts we're looking

1:21:07

at in class. If

1:21:10

this battle was presented as a

1:21:12

hypothetical situation by a 16th

1:21:15

century Korean military examiner and

1:21:18

Sin-Ip presented this river to

1:21:20

the back solution, he

1:21:23

might have been praised for

1:21:25

going beyond the surface level

1:21:27

and demonstrating a deep knowledge

1:21:29

of the Chinese classics. Well

1:21:32

done, Sin-Ip. You did your

1:21:34

homework. In

1:21:37

practice, this was a

1:21:39

horrific disaster for the Koreans.

1:21:43

If the river made the fresh

1:21:45

recruits fight any harder, it

1:21:48

didn't matter in the face of

1:21:50

Japanese arquebuses. The battle

1:21:52

quickly turned into a massacre. This

1:21:57

seems like a good time to point out that while

1:21:59

we're being critical of the Korean

1:22:02

military leadership here, we

1:22:04

need to remember that the Koreans

1:22:07

were the victim of an unprovoked

1:22:09

attack. They did

1:22:11

not ask for this. They did

1:22:13

not deserve this. But

1:22:15

man, Sin Epp, River to

1:22:17

the back? Come on, dude. When

1:22:22

news reached the capital of the

1:22:24

disastrous battle, King Son

1:22:26

Jo and his retinue fled

1:22:29

the city. This

1:22:31

was not a popular

1:22:33

move among average Koreans.

1:22:37

We're told that the disgusted residents

1:22:39

of Seoul loudly taunted their fleeing

1:22:41

king as he made his way

1:22:43

out of the city. The

1:22:46

very public and deeply depressing

1:22:48

flight of the king led

1:22:51

to an angry bout of nihilistic

1:22:53

looting by the people of Seoul.

1:22:57

The first few weeks of the

1:22:59

Japanese invasion had been incredibly destructive.

1:23:02

But by the time the Japanese got to

1:23:04

Seoul, they discovered that

1:23:06

many buildings had already been

1:23:08

burnt by the rioting Koreans,

1:23:11

disgusted by the failure of the

1:23:13

Joseon dynasty to protect them. By

1:23:17

June 11, just five days after

1:23:19

the Battle of Chungju, the

1:23:22

Japanese had taken the capital.

1:23:25

Konishi ended up beating Kato to

1:23:27

the gates by just a few

1:23:29

hours. They had

1:23:31

only encountered minimal resistance from

1:23:33

a handful of Korean contingents

1:23:35

who felt honor bound to

1:23:37

die defending Seoul. Seoul,

1:23:40

the capital of the Joseon dynasty, was

1:23:43

now in the hands of the Japanese.

1:23:47

The next stop was the

1:23:49

old northern capital of Pyongyang.

1:23:52

But in the mad dash to take Seoul,

1:23:55

the Japanese had largely ignored

1:23:58

the southwestern Chola province. and

1:24:01

Admiral Yi's naval bases. This

1:24:04

would prove to be a

1:24:06

deadly miscalculation. The

1:24:09

start of the Imjin year had

1:24:11

been a disaster for the Koreans,

1:24:14

but Admiral Yi was about to change

1:24:16

things. Korea

1:24:18

was in desperate need of a

1:24:21

military man who knew what he

1:24:23

was doing. Luckily

1:24:25

for them, they had been sleeping

1:24:28

on one of history's

1:24:30

greatest naval geniuses. The

1:24:33

Korean Navy was about

1:24:35

to strike back. Okay,

1:24:40

that's all for this week. Join

1:24:43

us again in two weeks time

1:24:45

when we will conclude our trilogy

1:24:47

on the Great East Asian War.

1:24:49

I have a feeling

1:24:51

that part three is gonna be a

1:24:53

meaty one, so look forward to that.

1:24:56

Before we go this week, as always, I need

1:24:58

to give some shout outs. Big

1:25:01

ups to Chris Doyle,

1:25:04

to Charles Oberon, to Aaron

1:25:06

Petty, to Robert Hatch, to

1:25:08

Eleanor Berry, to Peter Romberg, to Jessica

1:25:11

Miles, to

1:25:19

Jim Martin, to Christopher

1:25:21

Fortin, to Maria

1:25:24

Mohler, to Mike

1:25:26

Weddle, to Laura

1:25:29

Brady, to Scott Bufis,

1:25:34

to Bert,

1:25:36

to Michael Murray, to John

1:25:39

Robbins, to

1:25:41

Carl Spartholme, to

1:25:44

Benjamin Hurler, and

1:25:46

to Peter Schliffka. All

1:25:49

of these folks are pledging $5 or more every

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month on Patreon,

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so you know what that means.

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They are beautiful human beings. It's

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an awesome time! to sign up for Patreon.

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We got a brand new extra episode

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The people that go to our tea

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My name is Sebastian Major and

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